After the Allied powers gave Italy less territory than he thought acceptable at the end of World War I, the Italian poet and war hero Gabriele D'Annunzio described his sense of betrayal as a mutilated victory — a crippled victory.
The term quickly became popular among Italian nationalists, who in 1919, under the leadership of D'Annunzio, occupied the Adriatic port city of Fiume, claiming that their war sacrifice had been squandered by unfair peace terms and weak political leadership. The narrative of a nation betrayed also led to the creation of the fascist movement by the young Benito Mussolini in Milan, which transformed popular disillusionment into violent action and, ultimately, political power.
Today, almost four years after Moscow began its full-scale occupation of Ukraine, Western leaders continue to speak optimistically of a supposed peace settlement that would end Russia’s war in Ukraine. But while peace is treated in the West as a technical matter of territorial lines and security guarantees, the domestic implications for Russia seem less important to consider, and will probably haunt us for the foreseeable future.
If Vladimir Putin accepts a peace deal that does not meet his stated objectives in Ukraine, he risks triggering a moment analogous to Italy’s crippling victory in 1919. By alienating ultranationalists, disaffected veterans, and experienced soldiers, the current Russian government could find itself embroiled in a new power struggle, leading not only to domestic instability but also to further international instability.
When Italy's leadership failed to secure the territories of Fiume and Dalmatia after World War I, Italian nationalists and veterans saw this as a denial of their sacrifice, quickly cementing the myth that a negotiated peace was perhaps worse than no peace. It is precisely this sentiment that Mussolini and his fascist movement would later channel into their authoritarian ideology built on force and aggression as national renewal, while rejecting the idea of compromise and peace.
Fascism could never be satisfied with the peace that followed after millions of young men had lost their lives in the trenches of World War I. Where nationalist and veteran identities are indistinguishable from victory, the dangers of delegitimizing negotiated outcomes lie in the unfavourable peace agreements.
In our times, Putin has declared maximalist goals for his invasion of Ukraine, and the Kremlin has publicly maintained the illusion that a total victory over Kiev is inevitable, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to insist that any peace solution must be consistent with Ukrainian sovereignty.
However, Russia’s progress on the battlefield is slow and involves its forces making slow advances at painful cost while subjecting Ukrainian civilians to a relentless barrage of missiles and drones. The disconnect between maximalist propaganda and reality on the front lines is fertile ground for war fatigue and frustration among Russia’s forces, who, while Putin may claim to have achieved some version of victory in peace negotiations, may not see such an outcome in the same light.
Russia's war against Ukraine has already left Russian society with a shortage of veterans, including those who were released early from prison after being drafted to fight in Ukraine despite having been convicted of serious violent crimes. Given the lack of social care in Russia, many of these veterans are unable to reintegrate into society.
Let's not forget, frustration with Kremlin leadership led the mercenary Wagner Group to revolt in 2023, when the group's co-founder Yevgeny Prigozhin led his forces on a march on Moscow, exposing serious divisions within the Russian military high command and underscoring that even Putin's grip on power requires careful balancing.
Prigozhin was not the only pro-war Russian angered by the Kremlin’s military campaign in Ukraine. Imprisoned but with a large online audience, Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, a former commander of Russian-controlled militias in both Donbas and Crimea, continues to criticize the Kremlin from the comfort of his prison cell, where he apparently ended up because he believed his ultranationalist stance would allow his criticism of the regime to go unpunished.
A peace deal that falls short of Russia’s maximalist goals, no matter how much the Kremlin touts it as a victory, is likely to anger a powerful combination of veterans, radicals, and frustrated nationalists – a potentially explosive force ready to be exploited by a populist movement that echoes the experience of early 20th-century Italy.
Given Italy’s experience after World War I, policymakers in the West should avoid an outcome that would allow the Kremlin to claim any kind of victory without actually winning the war. A negotiated solution that simply freezes the conflict while Russia occupies large swaths of Ukrainian territory and holds the Ukrainian people hostage is precisely the kind of crippled victory that history warns against.
“Continuing and even increasing Western military support for Ukraine is not simply a moral or legal imperative, but a strategic imperative.”
Such an outcome would leave Russia neither a credible victor nor a decisive defeat, opening the floodgates for ultranationalists and fanatics to challenge Putin’s approach, perhaps violently. Given this, the most stabilizing outcome would be a clear Russian defeat on the battlefield rather than a premature peace, unless Ukraine itself demands it. While this would be painful for Russia, it would also narrow the space for nationalist mythmaking.
Therefore, continuing and even increasing Western military support for Ukraine is not simply a moral or legal imperative, but a strategic imperative, as enabling Kiev to deeply undermine Russia’s military capabilities would make it much less likely that post-war Russian politics will fall prey to narratives of betrayal spread by frustrated nationalists.
Of course, this is by no means an argument for endless war in Ukraine, every day of which carries a terrible human cost. However, it is an argument against half-baked, premature measures that only serve to prolong instability.
A conflict that ends inconclusively, with thousands of Russian soldiers returning home with more complaints than answers and a leadership unable to reconcile its rhetoric with reality, is more likely to produce future aggression than a war that ends with a clear outcome. It is imperative that Russia not claim victory over Ukraine in any form, whether triumphant or mutilated.
Supporting Ukraine long enough to cause a Russian defeat will be costly, although for countries other than Ukraine this cost is financial rather than measured in blood, and history shows that the cost of deterrence can be much greater.
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