Russia and hybrid warfare: Propaganda, disinformation and cyberattacks

An assessment of information security in Central and Eastern Europe highlights the critical importance of this area within the region's broader security architecture.

Information has become one of the main instruments of geopolitical competition, with Russia's strategic use of information warfare and media disinformation posing a serious challenge to states across the region.

Key threats include disinformation, manipulation of public opinion, attacks on media freedom, and systematic efforts to influence political decision-making and social dynamics through propaganda and cyber means.

As part of its broader strategy of destabilization, Russia uses a wide range of information operations aimed not only at undermining the internal stability of Central and Eastern European states, but also at discouraging them from pursuing deeper integration with Western security structures, such as NATO and the European Union.

Disinformation as a tool of destabilization and political influence

In Poland, according to a report published by the country's military counterintelligence service, Russia, with the support of Belarus, conducted disinformation campaigns between 2022 and 2024 that promoted conspiracy theories to undermine trust in climate science and environmental policies. These efforts were intended to foment social and political instability, particularly in the run-up to Poland's presidential election.

In Romania, the 2024 presidential election was followed by a surge in the influence of pro-Russian political forces, which was widely seen as a result of effective Russian disinformation campaigns. The victory of Calin Georgescu, a pro-Russian and anti-EU candidate, raised concerns within EU institutions, which saw the result as a result of Russian disinformation efforts. Such developments could ultimately weaken Romania’s integration with both the European Union and NATO.

Russian propaganda is often geared towards supporting anti-Western, populist, and Eurosceptic movements, which serve as conduits for the spread of narratives that destroy regional and international cohesion. In this context, Russia relies on both so-called “hard” disinformation tools and “soft” forms of manipulation, such as cultural narratives, designed to foster distrust of democratic institutions and Western alliances among societies in the region.

Disinformation is one of the most significant threats facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia uses a wide range of methods to spread false information that aims to cause social chaos, incite political tensions, and undermine citizens’ trust in their governments. Among the most obvious examples are fake news related to political and economic crises, which have been widely disseminated through social media and other digital platforms.

For example, Russian and Belarusian media outlets, working in coordination with troll farms, spread false claims that Poland was brutally treating migrants and denying them access to humanitarian aid. Manipulated videos, photos, and reports circulated on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram in an attempt to provoke international criticism of the country and damage its international reputation.

One of the most sophisticated aspects of disinformation is the so-called deepfake — the manipulation of video and audio in ways that make false information harder to detect, while simultaneously increasing its apparent credibility.

In June 2024, a fake video surfaced online showing U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller commenting on U.S. support for Ukraine. The recording was intended to mislead public opinion and undermine trust in official communications. Similarly, in November 2023, fabricated recordings surfaced purporting to show representatives of the Ukrainian military authorities calling for internal conflict. These efforts were designed to provoke divisions within Ukrainian society.

Manipulating public opinion and undermining Western institutions

Manipulation of public opinion is another important element of Russia's information warfare. Russia relies not only on traditional media, but increasingly on the Internet to spread narratives aimed at creating internal divisions within the states of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, these information operations target political elites, international institutions, and Western values.

One example of such manipulation is the spread of disinformation about NATO defensive exercises. The Kremlin portrays these exercises as provocations aimed at undermining trust in the Alliance and stoking opposition to military cooperation with the West. Another example is the promotion of narratives depicting Ukraine as a “failed state,” which aim to erode public support for Ukraine and foster distrust of political leaders who support Kiev.

Moreover, Russia carries out disinformation activities aimed at portraying NATO as the aggressor and Russia as the victim, with the aim of fostering distrust of the Alliance and undermining its credibility. The objective is not only to weaken the legitimacy of governments, but also to erode civil society and increase its vulnerability to external influence.

Moreover, during the border crisis between Poland and Belarus, Russia and Belarus conducted a coordinated disinformation campaign accusing EU and NATO member states of violating international and humanitarian law. These efforts were aimed at discrediting Euro-Atlantic structures and weakening the influence of Poland and Lithuania in NATO and EU eastern policy.

Russian propaganda also seeks to incite anti-Western attitudes, including populist and Eurosceptic ones, which over time could weaken the political unity of the region, while simultaneously undermining European cooperation. An example of such propaganda aimed at inciting anti-Western and Eurosceptic sentiments is the “Doppelgänger” disinformation operation.

It involved the creation of fake websites that mimicked the official websites of European institutions such as NATO, on which fake press releases were published suggesting, among other things, that NATO members were planning to double the Alliance’s military budget or were considering deploying Ukrainian paramilitary units in France to suppress protests. Another example is Russia’s disinformation campaign ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, in which it created a network of websites to spread pro-Russian propaganda. In both cases, the aim was to generate distrust of European institutions and stoke anti-Western sentiment.

Attacks on media freedom and control of information space

In its efforts to shape political and social processes in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia often uses censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression.

Particularly important in this regard are attempts to gain control over the media or to pressure journalists and editorial teams to refrain from publishing inappropriate information. One example is the strategy for taking control of Moldova by 2030, uncovered by Moldovan investigative journalists.

The plan envisaged, among other things, the expansion of the Russian Federation's information influence in Moldova, potentially through efforts to capture parts of the media landscape or to exert pressure on journalists with the aim of promoting pro-Russian narratives and silencing critical voices.

The increasingly important cyber dimension of information warfare

The discussed tools of information warfare – such as disinformation, manipulation of public opinion, and attacks on media freedom – constitute only part of a broader problem, which lies in Russian efforts to shape political decision-making and social processes through propaganda and cyber tools.

Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, including energy systems, banking networks, and state administrative infrastructure, are becoming increasingly common and are often pursued as part of a broader strategy of destabilization.

After 2022, a significant increase in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure was recorded in various countries. In Poland, around 40,000 cyber incidents were recorded in 2022, while in 2023 this number increased to 80,000.

Forecasts for 2024 showed a further increase in threats of this type. In 2022, 58% of companies in Poland experienced at least one incident related to security breaches, while 33% reported an increase in their intensity. This increase in cybercriminal activity was at least partly related to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Russia is intensifying its activities in cyberspace, using both traditional hacking techniques and more advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and self-learning algorithms. These cyberattacks aim not only to delete or alter data, but also to spread disinformation and create chaos that hinders an effective response to crisis situations.

The GeoPost