If you think you've had a bad year, look at Aleksandar Vučić

If you think you've had a bad year, look at Aleksandar Vučić. Serbia's strongman, now in power for nearly a decade and a half, had a very bad 2025.  

Challenges such as student protests, attacks on economic megaprojects, and the failure to gain the favor he hoped for from President Trump have put the Serbian leader in a precarious position. This new year will be characterized by what we might call a “Waiting for Godot” strategy characterized by political damage control.

Domestically, the problems are not just emerging; they are so serious that they could represent the first nails in the government's political coffin. The protests may have been led by students, but they involve a
an extremely heterogeneous segment of Serbian society throughout the year. The popular unrest was triggered by the collapse of the Novi Sad station tent in November 2024 that killed 16 people. Showing no signs of fatigue, the protesters remain strongly committed to their goals of greater accountability and transparency, a freer judiciary and media, and the holding of early elections.

The masks have now been removed. Tactics often used by the government, such as smear campaigns against activists and academic staff, distractions through self-generated crises in northern Kosovo, and blaming neighboring or unnamed Western countries for interference, have failed to break the spirit and support of the protesters.

The more violent the government and its thugs became in their attempts to suppress peaceful demonstrators, the more determined the demonstrators became. Their immunity to these tactics is a worrying sign for Vučić. How he finds control over this massive grassroots movement will remain a central question well into 2026.

Although the strength of the protesters speaks for itself (a rally in March attracted more than 300,000 demonstrators), that does not mean that the government – ​​especially Vučić – will quietly leave. A political impasse has emerged: any concession would mean either the end of the protests or the possible collapse of the system. This deadlock is likely to continue throughout the year.

Vučić was also forced to say goodbye to major economic projects. In November, British-Australian mining company Rio Tinto announced the indefinite suspension of its proposed investment in a lithium mine in Serbia. A few weeks later, American investment firm Affinity Partners, founded by President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, withdrew its Belgrade-based luxury development project. The lithium mine project would have brought in about $3 billion in much-needed foreign investment and the hotel construction about $500 million.

For Vučić, the loss of these “beloved projects” not only hurts Serbia’s economy, but also deeply hurts his political ego. Moreover, the political benefits – namely, garnering additional votes through the announcement of large-scale investment projects – remain an unfulfilled dream for the coming year.

The most pressing economic challenge Serbia will continue to face this year concerns its sole oil refinery. NIS, majority-owned by Russia’s Gazprom Neft, has been under U.S. sanctions since March, with full enforcement effective October 2025. Although OFAC, the Treasury Department’s watchdog, granted NIS a special license to continue operations until January 22, this does not change the requirement that Russian ownership be reduced to exactly zero percent. Negotiations are also due to be finalized by mid-March – most likely with Hungary’s MOL buying the Russian stake – but the transaction still requires U.S. approval.

The US’s firm stance on NIS shows that Washington’s primary concern is not the interests of the Serbian government, but rather removing Russian influence in energy and expanding American energy interests — such as liquefied natural gas, or LNG, and small nuclear power plants — throughout Europe, including the Balkans. This goal leaves little room for Vučić, despite his strong pro-Trump support.

These demands and strict deadlines caught Vučić by surprise. He had hoped that Trump’s return to the White House would pave the way for a golden era of bilateral relations, bringing political and economic benefits to Serbia. Like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Bosnia’s Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska, Vučić had high expectations of a Trump presidency. Instead, the US administration has so far remained pragmatic, prioritizing its broader strategic interests over personal affinities in the Balkans.

The US continues to support mutual recognition as the desired outcome of the Serbia-Kosovo normalization talks, despite Vučić’s hope for a more “pro-Serbian” stance. Furthermore, the bipartisan Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act, reiterates the importance of mutual recognition and also names Serbia as a country where democracy is deteriorating and electoral conditions are unfair.

There is still strong bipartisan support for preserving existing borders, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and for regional stability. This stance has been supported by Trump himself, who counts Serbia and Kosovo among the eight wars he claims to have ended by 2025.

In the European context, Serbia’s prospects for EU accession have never been bleaker. A more open European Commission and more vocal member states have begun to challenge the government, despite acknowledging Serbia’s geopolitical importance for the region. In addition to rule of law issues, Serbia’s reluctance to align with the EU’s common foreign and security policy has become particularly costly. By 2022, Vučić could have succeeded with his balancing strategy, but Russia’s war against Ukraine has made foreign policy alignment a key criterion even for candidate countries.

Meanwhile, Serbia's neighbors are slowly but steadily progressing on their path to EU membership, with Montenegro and Albania as prime examples. Serbia under Vučić can expect to continue the same stagnation in its EU membership efforts as last year.

Under Vučić’s rule, Serbia has developed a system of state capture characterized by deficiencies in the rule of law and a significant decline in all major democratic indices. The long-standing balancing act between East and West – maintaining the facade of EU aspirations while deepening ties with Russia and China – is increasingly difficult, especially in the face of global change and U.S. foreign policy interests.

The problems of the past year have not abated; they have only intensified. Domestic pressures – particularly student-led protests – could force Vučić to call early elections by the end of 2026, as a last-ditch effort to cement his reign.

At the same time, disillusionment with U.S. foreign policy toward Serbia — characterized by self-interest and pragmatism rather than favoritism — has further weakened his position. Amid domestic challenges and miscalculations about global political shifts working in his favor, the Serbian strongman may continue to do what he has done for much of the past year: pursue a wait-and-see policy, hoping to ensure his survival.

Ferenc Németh is a PhD candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest. He has previously conducted research on the Western Balkans in Toronto and Skopje, worked as a research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and interned at EULEX Kosovo. His areas of expertise include the Western Balkans, EU enlargement, and regional security. Ferenc was a Denton Fellow at CEPA in 2024./TheGeoPost.

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