Is the EU moving towards a veto-free order – and why does that matter?

On Good Friday, Germany's Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul revived a debate that should have been resolved when Russia first invaded Ukraine: how can the European Union (EU) act decisively in times of crisis?

Russia, China and increasingly the United States are raising the stakes; the EU must take action. Wadephul's solution, to move from unanimity to qualified majority in foreign policy decisions, is sound, but not new.

Few would argue that a country the size of Cyprus should have the power to veto decisions adopted by the other 26 members to determine whether the EU has a future in a geopolitical era. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is the most prominent arsonist, but certainly not the only one who sees the value of using the veto as leverage over Brussels, Berlin and Paris. He will leave office in the coming weeks, but the question of unanimity remains. The question remains how to get EU member states to give up their veto. Germany must provide an answer to that.

Germany should lead this debate because unanimity is also an insurance against German power and the dilemma of a country “too big for Europe, too small for the world.” Chancellor Friedrich Merz promised German leadership to build the continent’s strongest conventional army and deter Russia, but he did little to allay fears of German dominance over its neighbors. Some might counter that Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, argued that he fears German power less than German passivity. He clarified, however, that this applies “as long as Germany is in the EU and NATO.”

And others are more skeptical: smaller countries, among them the Baltic states, Austria and Slovakia, remain wary of giving up their veto power. There is strong demand in Europe for Germany to take action, but also serious concern that Berlin could outdo its neighbors.

Before asking others to give up their veto, the Merz government needs to define what acceptable German leadership looks like. This debate needs to take place first within the cabinet, then with the German public and finally with its neighbors. So far, there are few signs that Berlin is seriously addressing this issue.

Qualified majority voting would give larger member states greater influence over the EU’s foreign and security policy, but with great power comes great responsibility. The US maintained its influence on the continent not just by size, but by carrying the burden of security and prosperity. For decades, Germans have eschewed the traditional tools of power that true leadership requires. Instead, they idolized moral absolutes and the virtues of being a “civilian power,” which gave rise to the infamous policy of Wandel durch Handel (change through trade) with Russia.

If Germany is sincere about its ambitions to take responsibility for Europe, it must become more familiar with the language and use of power to deter, coerce, and secure European interests through diplomacy, geoeconomics, and credible military defense. The evolution of its aid to Ukraine, from an initial 5,000 helmets to tens of billions of euros in financial, humanitarian, and military aid, is a promising sign; its response to Greenland and Iran has been less impressive. Germany must be consistent in its stances and show that it understands power—the ability to make hard choices without the luxury of avoiding them. Only then will Germany’s neighbors be willing to entrust their security to it.

The disconnect between Germany's aspirations and reality is twofold: on the one hand, there is a lack of credibility about its willingness to lead and bear the costs. On the other, there is a lack of certainty that leadership will not amount to dominance.

In Foreign Affairs, Liana Fix proposed a series of “golden handcuffs” to calm concerns about the latter. She rightly points out that the history of European integration is full of compromises that allowed Germany to accumulate power in exchange for restraint by European institutions. Fiscal integration, common debt, and the consolidation of the continent’s defense industry are certainly tools to align Germany’s interests with those of the EU. The Merz government should take these steps seriously, as they are a small but necessary price to pay to make the EU a stronger geopolitical actor.

Apart from raising the white flag, the alternative is to double down on coalitions of the willing, which offer flexibility to act when crises arise. They have been successful on several issues, including organizing aid for Ukraine to bypass Hungary’s veto. But while such groupings are useful in the short term, they risk undermining the EU in the long term. If subsequent decisions are taken outside EU structures and lead to institutional or political deadlock, the European project loses its purpose, hollowing out the EU from within.

Germany must communicate what it wants and what it is willing to give in return.CPD.

The Geopost