The Architecture of Propaganda: How Pro-Vučić Media Keeps the Anti-Kosovo Narrative Alive

In Serbia, politics is not fought only with votes, statements and institutional decisions. It is also fought through information. Every day, millions of citizens are confronted with a media narrative that defines who is a threat, who is a traitor, who is an enemy and who is presented as the defender of the state.

At the center of this mechanism lies a powerful media ecosystem built and consolidated during the years of Aleksandar Vučić's rule, where the line between political propaganda and informative reporting often becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish.

Freedom House's 2026 data describes the Serbian media environment as characterized by extreme propaganda and manipulation of facts on certain topics, including politics toward Kosovo. The organization also highlights the influence of the state and the ruling party over private media, through advertising, indirect subsidies, and economic relations.

However, this does not mean that every media outlet in Serbia is part of the same scheme. The problem lies in the structure, because when a large number of platforms with a wide audience repeat the same political framework, the space for a real and pluralistic debate narrows.

In this system, Kosovo remains one of the most powerful tools of emotional mobilization.

Modern propaganda doesn't always need to invent an event. It often suffices to choose which element of it to put in the spotlight.

An incident in northern Kosovo can be reported as a security issue, a political dispute, or an episode in a broader conflict. But when the same event is repeatedly described using words like “terror,” “cleansing,” “attack on Serbs,” or “provocation by Pristina,” the audience receives not only information, but also a ready-made interpretation.

However, the debate about propaganda should not be limited to the question of whether a headline is false. The more important question is what reality is constructed when thousands of headlines, photos, statements, and comments repeat the same idea, periodically manipulating it.

One of the most powerful mechanisms of this machine is the personalization of politics.

A Raskrikavanje analysis of media coverage during 2025 highlights the extent of propaganda and manipulation in a section of the Serbian traditional media. Monitoring of six newspapers considered close to the government – ​​Alo, Informer, Srpski telegraf, Politika, Večernje novosti and Kurir – identified 1,863 manipulative texts on the front pages alone during the year.

In this media mosaic, Aleksandar Vučić occupies an extraordinary space. The Serbian president appeared more than 1,000 times on the front pages of these newspapers, but what is particularly striking is the way he was presented. None of these appearances were negative.

The newspaper figures are also significant. Alo leads with 529 manipulative texts, followed by Informer with 399, Srpski telegraf with 294, Politika with 253, Večernje novosti with 197 and Kurir with 191.

These data suggest that we are dealing with more than isolated cases of biased reporting. They demonstrate the existence of a recurring editorial pattern, in which the government, especially President Vučić, is systematically presented in a positive light, while political opponents and actors perceived as a threat to it are placed in a significantly more negative frame. In this sense, the front pages of these newspapers function not only as an information space, but also as an instrument for shaping public perception and the political agenda.

This suggests the construction of a political figure who is simultaneously presented as a guarantor of stability and a victim of constant attacks. On the one hand, he is presented as a leader who “defends Serbia,” while on the other hand, he is presented as a politician who constantly faces pressure from outside and internal opponents.

When this logic is extended to Kosovo, every crisis can serve as new evidence that Serbia is surrounded and that the government needs support.

Kosovo has a propaganda advantage that few other topics have, because it combines history, national identity, territory, security, and emotion. For this reason, a development in Kosovo does not necessarily need to be major to gain extraordinary weight in Serbian discourse. It only needs to fit into an existing narrative.

In this narrative, Serbs in Kosovo are presented as a vulnerable community, Pristina as the main source of pressure, and the West as an actor that tolerates or supports this situation.

The Banjska case in September 2023 showed how quickly a political interpretation can be constructed around a security event. Instead of the public debate focusing solely on verifiable facts, the media space was filled with emotional headlines, accusations, and interpretations that placed the event within a broader narrative of Serbian victimization.

Another important element is the use of alarmist language. Words determine the public’s reaction before they have time to analyze the event. An alarmist headline does not require reflection, but an immediate reaction. This is why wording that suggests war, terror, attack, betrayal, or catastrophe appears so often in political tabloids. They shift attention from facts to emotion.

In the case of Kosovo, this strategy has a dual function, because it strengthens the sense of threat and at the same time legitimizes the need for strong leadership. Propaganda does not just say that “Kosovo is a problem.” It builds a broader equation, according to which Kosovo is presented as a threat, Serbia as a state under pressure, and Vučić as the only possible defender.

If a media outlet repeats an accusation against Kosovo for days, even critical media outlets are forced to talk about it. This is the true power of propaganda, because it does not necessarily convince, but rather determines what needs to be talked about.

Freedom House finds that journalists in Serbia face threats, editorial pressure, economic problems, and pressure from political actors and media outlets connected to the government.

In June 2025, Vučić described the reporting by N1 and Nova S as “pure terrorism,” mentioning the possibility of prosecutorial intervention. This caused concern among journalists’ organizations and the Council of Europe Platform for the Safety of Journalists.

However, this does not bother Vučić at all, as he continues to act in the same way, with the same scenario. He wants to maintain power at all costs.

One of the paradoxes of this narrative is that its relevance does not always depend on real developments in Kosovo. It returns whenever the government needs a mobilizing theme.

Raskrikavanje's analysis shows that the same logic was not only used against Kosovo, but also against student protests and the opposition, which were often presented as a threat and as part of a wider conspiracy.

This system also includes the influence of Russian narratives.

Narratives that portray the West as hypocritical, NATO as a threat, Ukraine as an instrument of foreign powers, and Kosovo as the product of a Western conspiracy create a terrain where Moscow's and Belgrade's propaganda interests can align.

For Kosovo, the challenge is not just what the pro-Vučić media says about it. The challenge is the fact that a large part of the Serbian public may be constantly exposed to a narrow version of reality, where Pristina is almost always presented as the source of the crisis and any compromise is seen as weakness.

Dialogue requires at least a minimum of shared reality. When parties are not only debating solutions, but also the basic facts themselves, compromise becomes much more difficult.

In this sense, propaganda is not simply a media problem. It is also a political problem, because it affects the space within which a solution for Kosovo can be thought about and discussed.

The pro-Vučić media does not need to invent a new story about Kosovo every day. It is enough to keep alive the idea that Serbia is always under threat, that Serbs are always victims, and that power is always the last resort.

This is how the propaganda machine works, not by producing a single, big lie, but by producing a small reality every day, which is repeated so often that it begins to seem irrefutable.

As long as Kosovo remains one of the most powerful symbols of identity and uncertainty in Serbian politics, it will continue to be one of the most important fuels of this machine.