The invasion of Ukraine accelerated the weakening of Russian influence in Europe

Vladimir Putin, defining Russia's policy in neo-imperial terms, sought to restore lost influence throughout the post-Soviet area and restore Russia's status as a global power.

In the long run, however, the invasion of Ukraine not only failed to achieve these goals, but also accelerated the erosion of Russian influence on the international stage. Moscow's actions strengthened internal cohesion within the European Union, encouraged NATO expansion, and intensified transatlantic cooperation, which in turn weakened Russia's influence in Europe and beyond.

The geopolitical emancipation of Central and Eastern Europe
The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point for the entire region, clearly reexamining the historically entrenched division between a “civilized” Western Europe, long perceived as united, developed, and politically strong, and a “backward” Central and Eastern Europe, long operating in the shadow of Russian influence. This is why the states of Central and Eastern Europe were often treated as peripheral within the broader European system. The conflict has significantly helped to deconstruct this narrative, strengthening the strategic role of the countries of the region and demonstrating that they are capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy.

Growing external and internal pressures on Russia's foreign policy
Faced with the changing international order, the Russian Federation faces a number of challenges that could soon shape its foreign policy in the future. First and foremost, Russia's growing international isolation, especially following its aggression against Ukraine and the imposition of economic sanctions by the European Union and the United States, has already forced Moscow to adjust its foreign policy priorities.

Moreover, growing social resistance to the country's authoritarian model of governance, coupled with deepening economic difficulties, could generate domestic pressure that could ultimately lead either to political reforms or a redefinition of foreign policy priorities.

A tale of two geopolitical visions for Europe
At the beginning of the 21st century, two major geopolitical visions emerged in Europe, both of which could gain importance in the future, especially after the end of the war in Ukraine. The first concerns the ambitious aspirations of Germany and France to create a distinct European geostrategic sphere independent of the United States, relying on the economic potential of the European Union.

In practice, this vision would mean the emergence of two central geopolitical centers in Europe, headquartered in Berlin and Paris, which would shape the direction of European integration while competing for strategic dominance in the region. At the same time, the common objective of the two capitals would be to balance the dominant position of the United States.

Especially in the period before 2014, both Paris and Berlin seemed largely willing to accommodate Russia’s expectations regarding the restoration of its lost influence in Eastern Europe, including Belarus, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. Western European capitals, aware of the potential consequences of Moscow’s provocation, pursued a policy of appeasement, effectively blocking further expansion of NATO and the European Union, especially for Ukraine.

A clear example of this approach was the decision at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where both Germany and France opposed granting a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such actions were motivated by the desire to maintain regional stability while avoiding further eastward expansion of NATO, which could have been perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its geostrategic interests.

The second geopolitical vision was represented by the United Kingdom, several Central European countries, and the Baltic states, which prioritized stronger transatlantic ties and a stronger US military presence on the European continent. In this concept, the United States would serve not only as a security guarantor against potential Russian aggression, but also as a protection and counterbalance to excessive French and German influence on European integration processes.

These concerns were particularly pronounced among post-2004 EU member states, which feared German dominance in the region and across the European Union as a whole. In particular, political elites in Central and Eastern Europe were wary of a possible revival of geo-economic cooperation between Berlin and Moscow “over the heads” of their countries.

In this context, the deepening of energy cooperation between Germany and Russia, especially through projects such as the Nord Stream pipeline, represented a tangible threat to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which feared that their interests might be set aside in favor of closer economic and political ties between the two great powers.

In response to these concerns, Central and Eastern European countries sought to deepen regional cooperation as a counterweight to a broader trajectory of European integration, perceived as dominated by Germany. This second geopolitical vision therefore relied on strengthening transatlantic ties, while simultaneously deepening regional cooperation among the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe.

Its supporters advocated a more decentralized model of integration, opposing attempts to centralize the European Union and transform it into a quasi-federal superstate potentially dominated by its largest Western members. Instead, they proposed a model of a “Europe of nations,” in which cooperation between member states would be based on subsidiarity, with respect for national sovereignty and diversity within common political structures. For them, such a model would minimize the risk that decision-making within the Union would be dominated by a few of the most powerful member states.

The GeoPost