The tendency for intervention in Montenegro for Kosovo and Vučić's dream that remains unfulfilled

Serbia has treated Kosovo not only as a foreign policy issue, but as the axis of state identity and a key instrument for projecting influence in the region.

In the case of Montenegro, this appears repeatedly: whenever Podgorica consolidates its Euro-Atlantic course, Belgrade activates the “Kosovo front” to create political pressure, internal polarization, and room for maneuver for pro-Serb forces within Montenegro.

The recurring tensions between Montenegro and Serbia are once again entering a heated phase, where history, state identity, and the Kosovo issue are being used as tools of political pressure.

In Podgorica, statements by Serbian officials, from attacks on the recognition of Kosovo's independence to the relativization of Montenegro's statehood, are being seen as part of a broader strategy to maintain influence over Montenegrin decision-making, especially in foreign policy.

The latest episode with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić made this clash even more visible. Vučić declared that Montenegro “separated from Serbia,” which caused a strong reaction in Podgorica. Montenegrin authorities responded by emphasizing that Montenegro “has not seceded from Serbia and has never been part of it,” underlining that it has a state history and a separate identity long before the creation of the modern Serbian state, RTCG reports.

The official Montenegrin response emphasized that Montenegro was an internationally recognized state and that after 1918 it lost its independence under controversial historical circumstances, while the 2006 referendum was described as a restoration of state sovereignty. Montenegrin officials accused Vučić of distorting history and using nationalist rhetoric towards neighboring countries, demanding that relations between the two states be based on mutual respect and recognition of sovereignty.

This clash over history is not separate from the “Kosovo dossier.” On the contrary, it complements the logic of pressure: when Podgorica defends sovereignty and the Euro-Atlantic course, Belgrade expands the battle, sometimes by problematizing the state identity of Montenegro, sometimes by turning the recognition of Kosovo into a test of political and identity loyalty.

In the same vein, the statements of Aleksandar Vulin, leader of the Socialist Movement of Serbia, have been seen in Podgorica and the region as a continuation of the rhetoric with which Belgrade is exerting pressure on Montenegro regarding Kosovo. Vulin has sharply criticized Montenegro’s decision to recognize Kosovo’s independence, describing it as an action of a “pro-European and anti-Serbian government” and claiming that with this decision Montenegro “has lost its dignity and historical heroism.”

He added that the recognition of Kosovo, according to him, does not reflect the will of the Montenegrin people and constitutes a departure from the previous political tradition of the state. In Podgorica, this type of discourse is read as an attempt to delegitimize the decision-making of Montenegrin institutions, turning it into an "internal issue" and not state policy.

In practice, this is a well-known mechanism: to say that "the government does not represent the people", to attach the label "anti-Serb", and to create the impression that recognizing Kosovo is a reversible decision, it is enough to change the government.

In fact, this cannot happen and will never happen. Montenegro, after joining NATO, now aspires to integration into the European Union. So it is only a step before joining the European family. And knowing this, an aspiring country will never fall under Serbian-Russian influence to deny the independence of Kosovo.

The initiative of pro-Russian Milan Knežević

The Zeta Municipal Assembly has adopted a declaration that repeals the decision to recognize Kosovo, bringing one of the most sensitive political topics in Montenegro back to the center of debate.

Knežević has been using identity issues as a political tool for years. Whenever the political scene in Montenegro enters a period of tension or uncertainty, topics such as Kosovo, Serbia, NATO or relations with Russia return to the forefront. These issues continue to produce strong polarization in Montenegrin society and mobilize the Serbian nationalist base in the country.

In the background remains the ongoing clash between two visions for the future of Montenegro. One side supports the Euro-Atlantic course and integration into the European Union and NATO, while the other side seeks stronger political, cultural and strategic ties with Serbia and Russia.

Knežević is considered one of the leading figures of the pro-Serb and pro-Russian camp in Montenegro. For this reason, the initiative to "de-recognize" Kosovo is being seen more as a political signal than as a real institutional process.

Milan Knežević's name continues to be associated with the 2016 episode, when Montenegrin authorities claimed an attempted coup on the day of parliamentary elections, with the involvement of Serbian nationalists and Russian elements.

Although the court proceedings later ended with the annulment of the previous decisions, that event continues to be considered a symbol of the clash over Montenegro's strategic orientation between the West and Serbian-Russian influence.

For his supporters, Knežević is presented as a figure who opposes policies they consider imposed by the West. For opponents, he remains a symbol of a policy that is more in line with the interests of Belgrade and Moscow than with Podgorica's Euro-Atlantic course.

In this way, although Zeta's declaration has no practical effect on the status of Kosovo, it is being seen as a development with great political and symbolic impact in Montenegro, once again bringing identity issues, relations with Serbia, and the strategic direction of the Montenegrin state back to the center of the debate.

Why Montenegro is sensitive terrain

Essentially, these developments, from Vučić's statements about the history of Montenegro, to Vulin's rhetoric about "anti-Serb governments", to Knežević's local initiatives, are linked to a common goal: to keep Kosovo contested in the region and weaken its international consolidation.

Even when “de-recognition” cannot actually happen at the local level, the debate and political noise itself serve as propaganda: the idea is created that recognitions are shaky and that Kosovo's statehood can be reversed through political changes in neighboring countries.

Montenegro is a special case because within it there is a persistent division between forces that see Euro-Atlantic orientation as a strategic interest and those that seek greater rapprochement with Serbia and Russia. Therefore, any narrative conflict with Belgrade does not remain only in diplomacy, it enters into Montenegrin domestic politics and turns into an identity battle.

Podgorica, in its response to Vučić, framed this as a sovereignty issue, with relations based on mutual respect and recognition of sovereignty. But in the meantime, the constant pressure on Kosovo keeps the country in a “whirlpool” of debates that consume political energy and polarize Montenegrin society.

Belgrade, through a combination of high rhetoric (Vučić, Vulin) and the instrumentation of pro-Serb actors within Montenegro (such as the "municipality-parliament" initiatives), is attempting to keep a permanent front of pressure open, challenge Podgorica's political sovereignty and, in parallel, undermine regional normalization and the consolidation of Kosovo as a state.

In this panorama, Kosovo appears as a key issue not only for Serbia, but as a means to test and disrupt Montenegro's strategic orientation, a battle that, according to many observers in Podgorica, is not simply diplomatic, but deeply political and identity-based.

However, the noise from Serbia remains just noise. The end has come for Vučić and his regime.

The GeoPost