A Serbia without Vučić, but with the same policy towards Kosovo?

The Student List victory may weaken Aleksandar Vučić's personalized power model, but it will produce an immediate strategic shift in Serbia's foreign policy. The continued stances on Kosovo, Russia, and NATO show that the new Belgrade can change the way it communicates with the West, without giving up on the objectives that have defined Serbian politics for more than a decade.

For Kosovo, this could mean a dialogue with less public tension, but not necessarily more willingness for normalization.

The lack of a classic party structure, uncertainties about future leadership, and limited institutional experience may make the transition more difficult than the election campaign itself. And the students' victory is not just a shift in the parliamentary majority, it is a challenge to a system where political power, state institutions, the media, and relations with international partners were largely concentrated around a single figure. And the dissolution of this model does not mean that the interests that have guided Serbia's foreign policy will disappear with it.

For Kosovo, the election result in Serbia should be read more carefully than as an automatic opportunity for improved relations. In the program and statements so far of the Student List representatives, there are no signs of a fundamental change in the position towards Kosovo's independence. On the contrary, their position remains based on the Constitution of Serbia and on opposition to Kosovo's membership in international organizations.

In a statement after the elections, the Student List candidate, Dejan Šoškić, referred to the Serbian Constitution and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, reiterating Belgrade's official position on Kosovo. Meanwhile, there is no fundamental difference between the positions of the old and new government on the status of Kosovo.

This is a signal that Pristina should not ignore. The student movement won the political battle mainly through demands for fighting corruption, institutional accountability and state reform, and not through a program for resolving the issue with Kosovo. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that the change of power will automatically produce a change in Belgrade's policy towards Pristina.

In some respects, the new government's approach may be even more difficult to predict. Vučić had built a system where important policy decisions were often concentrated in his office, allowing him to control the pace of negotiations and send different messages to Brussels, Washington and Moscow. A new government, with a more heterogeneous composition and without a single dominant figure, may have less room for political compromises that do not enjoy support within the parliamentary majority.

This is particularly important for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. The European Union has made it clear that the change of leadership does not abrogate the obligations undertaken by the parties and that the agreements reached, including the Roadmap to Normalization Agreement and the Ohrid Annex, remain part of the process.

For Kosovo, the first test will not be whether the new government uses more moderate language, but whether it is willing to implement existing agreements, drop obstacles to Kosovo’s international integration, and embrace a process that leads to the normalization of relations. Until then, a change of tone should not be confused with a change of attitude.

KOSOVO

If there is room for revision of economic agreements with China, the limitations are much greater with Russia. Belgrade continues to rely on Moscow on the Kosovo issue in the UN Security Council, while energy dependence and political and social ties make a quick break difficult.

The first statements from the Student List representatives indicate that there is no plan to impose sanctions on Russia. Jovo Bakić has stated that Serbia will not change its policy towards Moscow, while the stance on military neutrality and opposition to NATO membership remain part of the movement's program.

This puts the incoming government in a difficult position vis-à-vis the European Union. Brussels has linked Serbia's progress towards membership to the harmonisation of its foreign and security policy with that of the EU, including its stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has warned that without this harmonisation, Serbia's progress in the integration process will be very difficult.

So, the new government will face a choice that it cannot avoid for a long time, namely to seek the economic and political benefits of rapprochement with the EU, while maintaining a foreign policy that on some of the most important issues conflicts with Brussels' positions.

However, the internal factor should not be underestimated. The Student List is a broad movement, where different political positions coexist, including nationalists and voters traditionally close to Russia. A decision to impose sanctions on Moscow could create divisions in the new majority and weaken the government's legitimacy at a time when it needs to prove that it is capable of governing.

The most noticeable change may occur in relations with China. During Vučić's government, cooperation with Beijing became one of the pillars of Serbian foreign policy, including investments in infrastructure, industry, mining and technology. Through intergovernmental agreements and large projects, Chinese companies gained an important position in the Serbian economy.

But here lies one of the problems that brought the student movement to the center of politics. The collapse of the Novi Sad train station shelter, where 16 people died in November 2024, became a symbol of demands for transparency, accountability, and investigation of public contracts. The renovation project involved a Chinese consortium and is now part of the debate on institutional responsibility and oversight of foreign investment.

Related to this, the Student List demands a review of public contracts and spending, as well as an investigation into corruption cases that may have been overlooked during the previous government. This makes it possible to expect greater control over projects by Chinese companies, especially in the areas of procurement, environmental standards and working conditions.

However, a break with China is not a realistic scenario in the short term. Investments, trade deals and infrastructure projects are part of the Serbian economy, while Beijing continues to be important to Belgrade on the Kosovo issue. It is more likely that the relationship will shift from a partnership built primarily through political ties between leaders to a cooperation where the new government seeks more transparency and institutional control.

For Kosovo, this has direct relevance. Even if Belgrade revises economic agreements with China, there is no sign that it will give up Beijing's diplomatic support on the Kosovo status issue. On the contrary, as long as non-recognition remains Serbia's strategic objective, China will continue to be important for its diplomacy.

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE USA

The Student List's victory gives the European Union an opportunity to reopen relations with Belgrade, but also puts it to the test of the credibility of its policy towards Serbia. For years, Brussels has cooperated with Vučić's government, despite harsh criticism of the state of democracy, media freedom and the concentration of power. Now, support for the new government will have to be measured by concrete results in the rule of law, the independence of institutions and the fight against corruption.

This is also why the students' victory should not be seen as an automatic victory for the pro-European orientation. The movement has expressed readiness for the continuation of European integration, but at the same time maintains its positions against sanctions against Russia, against NATO membership and against Kosovo's independence. These contradictions will determine the limits of rapprochement with the West.

For Washington, a more reform-oriented government could create opportunities for greater cooperation in security, energy, and technology. But the US will also face the same dilemma: how to support democratic change in Serbia without downplaying the importance of normalizing relations with Kosovo and without leaving Russian influence in the region intact.

Belgrade's influence is not limited to Kosovo. For years, Vučić's relations with Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially Milorad Dodik, as well as relations with Viktor Orbán's Hungary, have been part of a regional policy built on political alliances and shared interests.

A new government may seek less confrontational relations with its neighbors and rely more on institutional cooperation. Such an approach could affect relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia. But here too, the change in rhetoric must be followed by a change in political practice.

For Kosovo, this is important because regional stability does not depend only on bilateral dialogue. It is also influenced by the way Belgrade behaves towards Kosovo institutions, towards Serbs living in neighboring countries, and towards political structures operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A less confrontational Serbia could create space for reducing tensions, but only if this is reflected in concrete actions and not just diplomatic communication.

Beyond foreign policy, the Student List must prove that it can control the institutions that have operated under the SNS's dominance for 14 years. On October 29, the movement demanded the resignation of senior officials in the police, intelligence services and judiciary, while also demanding the preservation of documentation and the investigation of suspected cases of corruption. And of course, one should not forget the “Banjska” case, for which it remains to be seen whether measures will be taken against the criminal mastermind Milan Radoićić and his group, who carried out a terrorist attack in northern Kosovo.

This is why Vučić's departure should not be equated with the end of the political model he represented. His party remains an important parliamentary force, while the administration, security institutions, and political networks built over the years do not disappear with an election result.

For Kosovo, the outcome is more complicated than the expectation of a new Belgrade. A government that may be more open to reform, less leader-centered, and more cautious in its relations with the West is not necessarily a government that will change its policy toward Kosovo. On the contrary, if it maintains the same objectives of non-recognition, opposition to membership in international organizations, and support for Russia and China, then the change will be largely in method.

Serbia may be entering a post-Vučić era, but that does not mean it is also entering a post-Vučić era of Kosovo policy. This is the distinction that Pristina, Brussels, and Washington should keep in mind when assessing the next government in Belgrade.

The real test will not be how quickly the new government's language will change, but whether it will be willing to change the decisions, practices and policies that have kept the conflict with Kosovo unresolved. /Telegraph/