Moldova, the first “domino” in Russia’s plan to escalate the conflict in Europe

One of the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine is that the Kremlin has lost much of its influence in former Soviet countries. This creates opportunities to limit Moscow’s ability to use the dominant role it once had to advance its war aims. However, this also means that Russia will likely seek to escalate tensions and confrontations in the region.

In recent weeks, Moldova has been at the centre of such efforts by the Kremlin. And this is just one indication of how Russia envisions the next phase of its confrontation with the West.

Even before the war in Ukraine began, there were signs that Central Asian countries were beginning to assert their individual and collective interests more strongly, a trend that has accelerated since February 2022. In particular, as China’s role in the region has grown, partly as a result of the vacuum created by Russia, the US has rekindled its relations with key Central Asian partners, notably Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in another sign of Russia’s declining status.

In the South Caucasus, Turkey has challenged Russia’s former dominance in the region. Ankara has openly supported Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia (a Russian client) in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkish control of key pipeline infrastructure, such as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline linking Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz region to the European Trans-Adriatic Pipeline on the Greek-Turkish border, provides a critical alternative to oil and gas.

At the same time, the European Union has played a more proactive role as a mediator in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is to the detriment of Moscow, which was once the main power broker in the conflict.

The limits of Russian influence have become apparent in Georgia recently. The government there, after three days of increasingly violent protests, was forced to withdraw a bill in parliament that would have severely curtailed civil and political freedoms in ways reminiscent of Russia’s foreign agents law.

Moreover, Russia appears to have overplayed its hand in the Balkans. The Serbian government, one of Moscow’s longtime allies in the region, had no hesitation in February in cracking down on pro-Kremlin protesters who tried to storm government buildings in the capital Belgrade.

Because of the costs of the war in Ukraine, Russia may be limited in the extent to which it can stop – or even reverse – this loss of influence. But it would be wrong and dangerous to underestimate Russia’s efforts to do so. This has already been most visible in Moldova. There, Russia has engaged in protracted destabilisation efforts aimed at undermining Maia Sandu’s pro-Western government and thwarting the country’s efforts to join the EU.

Russia’s efforts to create instability in Moldova and the breakaway region of Transnistria rely heavily on disinformation, spreading rumours such as the idea that Moldova and Ukraine have conspired to invade Transnistria. The Kremlin has also managed to exploit an economic crisis in Moldova – caused by high inflation caused by the war in Ukraine – and question the competence of the government and the legitimacy of its pro-European course.

Moscow has also played on uncertainty, claiming an imminent Ukrainian attack on Transnistria or the use of a “dirty bomb” by Ukraine on separatist territory. At the same time, however, there is also a risk that any military assets Russia controls in Transnistria could be used to create a second front in the war against Ukraine.

Although unlikely, this scenario has forced Ukraine to concentrate some of its forces on the border with Transnistria. Because, however small at this point, there is a risk of an unintended escalation that could quickly involve Transnistria and Moldova and draw in neighboring Ukraine and Romania, a NATO member and key ally of Sandu’s government and one with strong historical ties to Moldova. .

Russia has invested heavily in its efforts to destabilize Moldova. While it might seem that this investment has not yielded much in the way of results, this would be a wrong conclusion. Moscow has found it relatively easy to capitalize on the frustrations felt by many ordinary Moldovans by spreading a narrative that deflects blame and exacerbates fear and insecurity.

Russia has carefully used its relations with its established allies in the Moldovan political system, such as Irina Vlah, the newly elected leader of the autonomous Gagauzia region, or the pro-Moscow Shor opposition party. This means that the Kremlin maintains a disproportionately malign influence in a country with extremely weak institutions.

These levers of Russian influence are prominent in Moldova, but they exist elsewhere. The recent failure in Georgia does not mean that Russia will avoid using this influence again. On the contrary, even the defeat suffered by the pro-Russian coalition of political parties, the Georgian Dream, over the “law on foreign agents”, which has already been withdrawn, fits into a foreign policy agenda that focuses primarily on promoting instability. .

An unstable post-Soviet zone may not be Moscow’s first choice. However, from the Kremlin’s point of view, it is preferable to a “neighbourhood” in which Russia is surrounded by strong, well-governed countries with a pro-Western orientation.

Such a prospect does not bode well for countries that are heavily dependent on Russia economically or militarily, including Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Nor even for countries with significant ethnic Russian communities, such as Kazakhstan, or even in NATO member countries like Latvia and Estonia.

This makes current events in Moldova even more significant. And if this is a test of a new version of the old Russian playbook for destabilising its neighbours, all the more important is stopping the Kremlin’s diabolical plan in Moldova./Euronews.al/