Given the EU’s global leadership role, disinformation focuses on the EU as a whole attacking geopolitics, the history and legacy of integration and common principles.
This year’s European Parliament elections were marked by disinformation campaigns aimed at misleading EU citizens about cross-border issues such as climate change, Ukraine and immigration, according to a Blue OWL Group report on the recent EU elections, which analyzed the disinformation that characterized this process.
Following Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU imposed a series of sanctions on organizations and individuals supporting the Russian government. Some of these sanctions extended to media organizations that were seen as part of Russia’s information war… Russia has evolved its strategy to continue reaching European audiences by using a combination of disinformation tactics.
Following the EU sanctions against Russian propaganda media, Russia has evolved its strategy to continue reaching European audiences using a combination of disinformation tactics, including:
The use of “doppelgangers” by media organizations;
The deletion of information that disseminates content by obscuring its true source;
Political ads that have managed to circumvent efforts to moderate the platform;
Operations designed to confuse fact-checkers;
Kombat portal/Pravda ecosystem. The French government’s disinformation agency, Viginum, investigated the Pravda network in February 2024 and discovered a number of websites with a shared IP address that could be traced back to Russia. These sites, created in 2023 and activated in the second half of the year, aimed to spread pro-Russian propaganda in various EU languages, including French, German, Spanish and English. All Pravda websites were dated June 2024, which coincides with the EU elections.
By the end of March 2024, 19 EU countries (and regions outside Europe) had activated Pravda websites. All Pravda sites source content from state-owned or controlled Russian media, as well as from Russian Telegram accounts translated into local languages, which are also present on other social media platforms, notably X. The fact that content is republished from certain accounts suggests automation Coordination. Nevertheless, the impact of Pravda sites was minimal and engagement was low in most countries.
Another dimension of Russia’s information strategy is the creation of a comprehensive information system to purge and disseminate its disinformation. These systems bundle media organizations and social media accounts – they are part of a long-term, broader information warfare strategy.
How does data cleansing work?
Information is first introduced through one or more channels, which is then passed through intermediaries who hide their connections to key actors and remove traces of the original source of the content. Finally, traditional and legitimate media pick up and amplify sanitized content. The ultimate goal is to bring these conversations into the public discourse.
One of the most recent cases of information laundering to hit the headlines during the European Parliament elections was that of Voice of Europe. The company said it offered “uncensored news from Europe and the world” with accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. It even organized a debate in the European Parliament attended by MEPs from various far-right parties. At the end of March 2024, the Czech Republic uncovered a Russian network using the Voice of Europe media platform to try to influence the results of the European Parliament elections by bribing pro-Russian European politicians and spreading pro-Russian narratives. Following the Czech national sanctions, the European Commission also suspended the broadcasting of four media companies, including Voice of Europe, for spreading Russian propaganda and supporting the war against Ukraine.
EAD Stratcom and Spanish authorities carried out an analysis of a campaign they called “Operation False Front”. This involved a network of at least 23 inauthentic websites posing as Western media companies that began operating in August 2023. They used names and logos that appeared to be similar to Western media companies and are all visually similar. These websites translate content from state-controlled Russian media into English and other EU languages. They package information from various accounts on platforms such as YouTube, Telegram and X into articles tailored to target audiences in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Poland. The articles are amplified by Russian state-controlled media and other channels on Telegram and X and then integrated into the public discourse.
The role of Russian influence networks
Targeting fact checkers and media. While not as extensive as operations, another tactic is to directly overwhelm and undermine the efforts of fact-checkers and journalists.
The initial review found that Operation Overload created campaigns that coincided with major events and focused mainly on France, Germany, Italy and Ukraine. The main objective was to utilize the resources of fact-checkers, editors and researchers. Stories that appear authentic are disseminated on all platforms (especially Telegram and
The initial scan revealed coordinated efforts to target over 800 organizations via fake accounts on X.
Similarly, French company VIGINUM discovered a global organization called Matryoshka, which published fake content targeting media outlets, public figures and fact-checking organizations. In Europe, media organizations such as AFP, fact-checking or anti-disinformation organizations such as the EU Disinfo Lab and Fact Check Bulgaria, and individuals in the fact-checking field such as Alexandre Alaphilippe stand out as high-profile targets.
/TheGeopost