Serbian and Slovak Far-Right Strengthen Ties

The reconnection of far-right groups in Slovakia and Serbia after nearly two decades of silence raises a key question: why is this happening right now? The answer seems to lie less in genuine ideological alignment among extremists and more in instrumental cooperation within the broader pro-Kremlin ecosystem of disinformation and influence.

Over the past two and a half decades, cooperation between far-right actors in Slovakia and Serbia has gone through several stages – from open contacts and joint public appearances in the early 2000s, through a period of silence and withdrawal from public view, to a sudden revival in 2024 through political, media, and subcultural channels. This shifting dynamic reflects both the adaptation of the far-right to new circumstances and goals, as well as broader processes within the pro-Kremlin network of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. In the remainder of the text, we will examine in detail how the cooperation between Serbian and Slovak far-right developed and what is the main driving force behind their renewed connection today.

From 2007 to Silence: The Disappearance of Far-Right Links

In October 2007, Serbian police in Novi Sad detained and deported eleven Slovak citizens during a memorial event organized by the far-right group “Obraz” in honor of King Stefan Vladislav. Initially, the Slovak citizens claimed they were tourists on their way to Kragujevac, intending to make a short stop in the city. However, it turned out they were connected to Slovak extremist organizations such as “Slovak Brotherhood” (Slovenská pospolitosť) and the “Slovak Renewal Movement” (Slovenské hnutie obrody), and were in fact planning to attend the rally organized by Obraz. This incident represents one of the few publicly known examples of cooperation between the Slovak and Serbian far-right, which attracted public attention mainly because of police involvement and diplomatic reactions. Nevertheless, it happened almost two decades ago – long enough that neither Obraz nor Slovak Brotherhood exist today in their former form.

After the arrests in Novi Sad, contacts between Serbian and Slovak far-right groups began to fade and soon almost completely disappeared. Although occasional symbolic gestures of cooperation could be found on the internet, there were no serious attempts to reconnect. This withdrawal was the result of the transformation of the Slovak far-right – from street movements, poorly organized and on the margins of political life, into formal political actors, i.e., parties participating in regular political processes. This change is largely credited to Marian Kotleba, former leader of Slovenská pospolitosť, who managed to unite various far-right groups, movements, and individuals into the political party “People’s Party Our Slovakia” (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko – ĽSNS). The party quickly entered parliament after its founding, and Kotleba shifted the focus from international cooperation to domestic politics aimed at gaining the support of local voters and succeeding in elections. The activities of the Slovak Brotherhood quickly died down, and even symbolic attempts at international cooperation completely disappeared.

Although narratives related to Serbia – especially the issue of Kosovo and NATO bombings – remain present in the broader far-right discourse in Slovakia, they are now mainly used as a means of expressing anti-Western attitudes rather than as evidence of genuine solidarity with Serbian nationalists. Public gatherings and support campaigns almost completely disappeared by the end of the previous decade, and the topic of Slovak-Serbian cooperation vanished from the media and political rhetoric. Occasionally, as in 2019, photos of graffiti shared by the Serbian organization “Junak Foundation” would appear, symbolically linking Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, with inevitable mentions of Kosovo. However, such content did not reach the wider public nor spark serious debates on the topic.

2024: Revival of Ties Through Politics, Media, and Subculture

The long period of silence was broken in 2024 by a series of events indicating an interest in renewing cooperation between the far-right in Slovakia and Serbia. The most notable among them was the joint appearance of the Slovak political party “Republika” – a breakaway faction from Kotleba’s ĽSNS, with a pronounced neo-fascist and pro-Russian orientation – and Serbia’s “Zavetnici” at the Sofia Conference, organized by the Bulgarian far-right party “Revival” (Възраждане / Vazrazhdane).

Topics such as Kosovo, NATO aggression against Serbia, and the victimization of Serbs have been present in far-right narratives for many years, and Slovak extremists, even without deep ties to these issues, readily adopt them.

Both political actors signed the Sofia Declaration, thereby formally joining a broader pan-European nationalist coalition currently led by “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD) through the “Europe of Sovereign Nations” group in the European Parliament. Although this cooperation was not further promoted in the media after the conference, the joint appearance of far-right extremists at the event was a symbolic act of reviving cooperation between the far-right in the two countries, but now at a somewhat higher political level.

At the same time, the political group “Domov – National Party” (Domov – Národná strana), led by Pavol Slota, allied with Republika for the 2024 European Parliament elections. In January that year, Slota and his associate Rene Poluh met with representatives of the Serbian political party “Dveri,” including party vice-president Ivan Kostić and head of the information service Miodrag Preković, as well as Aleksandar Pavić from the movement “We – The Voice of the People.” According to Slota, the purpose of these meetings was to establish closer political and media cooperation between the far-right parties of the two countries. The meetings were mediated by Igor Marinković from the organization “SNP Naši” and the online media platform “Helmcast.” Slota and Poluh also appeared on the far-right YouTube channel “X33” hosted by Vuk Rosandić, former frontman of the Belgrade pop group “Ruž.” The Slovak delegation also appeared on the “Srbin-info” podcast, where the main messages were pro-Russian in orientation, strongly anti-EU, with heavy speculation about Europe’s political transformation.

In the realm of political-cultural symbolism, cooperation was promoted through music: Domov’s political representative Denis Domaracki and Slovak musician Karol Jedlovski, who had publicly supported candidates from the ĽSNS list as early as 2020, appeared in a music video together with Škabo from the Serbian group “Beogradski sindikat.” The video was released on March 23, 2024, although the song had initially been launched at the end of December the previous year. Its focus was on Slavic unity, pro-Russian messages, and spreading disinformation about the World Health Organization, the European Union, and NATO. It is likely that the release date was chosen deliberately, one day before the anniversary of the start of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. Nevertheless, despite this public activity, none of the actors continued to promote the cooperation or made new announcements, reminiscent of the similar pattern of behavior and silence as in the case of Republika and Zavetnici.

The sudden return of visible cooperation between Slovak and Serbian far-right seems more like an action synchronized and coordinated from the Kremlin than genuine solidarity.

In the sphere of subcultural activities, signs of revived cooperation were also visible during the “March of Independence” (Marsza Niepodległości) in Warsaw in November 2024. For the first time in many years, the small Slovak group “Vindenland” (Windenland), connected to the Czech group “Nationalists” (Nacionalisté), as well as to the international networks “White Lives Matter” and “Active Club,” marched side by side with the Serbian organization “Serbia Division,” alongside radical groups from Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, France, and Germany.

Why Now? Instrumental Solidarity in the Pro-Kremlin Ecosystem

The reconnection of Slovak and Serbian far-right groups after nearly two decades of silence raises a key question: why is this happening right now? The answer seems to lie less in genuine ideological alignment among extremists and more in instrumental cooperation and alignment within the broader pro-Kremlin ecosystem of disinformation and influence. Topics such as Kosovo, NATO aggression against Serbia, and the victimization of Serbs have been present in far-right narratives for many years, and Slovak extremists, even without deep ties to these issues, readily adopt them. Therefore, the sudden return of visible cooperation between the Slovak and Serbian far-right seems more like an action synchronized and coordinated from the Kremlin than genuine solidarity. Especially given the fact that Slovak far-right parties Republika and Domov pursue an explicitly pro-Kremlin policy and act as important transmitters of pro-Russian narratives on social media. Republika, through the work of Milan Uhrík and Milan Mazurek in the European Parliament, regularly supports Moscow’s narratives and interests through votes and public statements. In addition, frequent visits by Pavol Slota to Russia clearly indicate his ties to the Kremlin’s political and security structures.

The revival of ties between Serbian and Slovak far-right thus resembles more a geopolitical maneuver by Moscow than a spontaneous ideological movement, and such an arrangement will last only as long as it serves the Kremlin’s interests.

These synchronized messages of the Serbian and Slovak far-right are part of Russia’s broader strategy to exploit historical traumas and nationalist narratives across Central and Eastern Europe – a strategy Moscow has intensified after the invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin consistently uses topics such as Kosovo and the 1999 NATO bombing to portray the West as aggressive, hypocritical, and morally decadent, and Slovak far-right regularly reproduce these messages and narratives. As already noted, the motivation for such behavior lies less in a genuine sense of connection with Serbia and Serbian far-right, and more in the strategic benefits for Slovak far-right that participation in the pro-Russian discourse brings.

For parties such as Republika and Domov, which have significantly lost political influence after the last parliamentary elections in Slovakia, this type of transnational engagement offers the opportunity to remain relevant, amplify anti-EU and anti-Western narratives, and gain visibility within the regional far-right network, which in recent years has been increasingly shaped by influences from Moscow. The Serbian far-right, already deeply integrated into the pro-Kremlin information space, represents a suitable and ideologically compatible environment for such positioning by Slovak far-right. The revival of ties between Serbian and Slovak far-right thus resembles more a geopolitical maneuver by Moscow than a spontaneous ideological movement, and such an arrangement will last only as long as it serves the Kremlin’s interests.

/radar.nova.rs/