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Espionage of serbian citizens by russianintelligence structures

The Geopost January 2, 2026 4 min read

Ex KGB FSB secret police agent using mass propaganda technology tools on laptop to influence population minds. Russian spy silencing online opposition voices using notebook device

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The cyber-espionage operation directed against the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) is far more than an ordinary security incident; it represents a threat with direct consequences for the security of Serbia and its citizens.

The price is the loss of autonomy, the normalization of surveillance as a political tool, and strategic subjugation to a foreign power.

On August 27, 2025, a message arrived on Signal from an account claiming to belong to Sergei Tikhanovsky, a Belarusian opposition politician and the husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian opposition leader in exile.

The message did not appear suspicious. On the contrary, it was professional and calm, written in the language of people accustomed to international cooperation. The proposed topic was cooperation in the field of anti-corruption activities in Eastern Europe. The contact details had allegedly been obtained through a European organization with which BCSP regularly cooperates. A short video call was suggested. Nothing in the message warranted additional verification. A link was sent. The call never took place. There was no error message. No one had shared their phone number with the so-called Tikhanovsky, writes Nova.

It then became clear that the message was not an invitation to cooperation, but an entry point for espionage.

It was later discovered that this message was not an isolated incident, but part of a much broader and earlier operation. A forensic analysis conducted by a major IT company showed that the compromise of BCSP’s system had not begun in 2025, but during the summer and autumn of 2024, with confirmed traces of unauthorized access dating back to September 2024.

The first phase of the attack involved gaining access to the internal network using compromised VPN accounts — legitimate entry points to BCSP’s server used for remote work. This allowed the attackers to log into the system as “regular users,” without triggering alarms or raising suspicion.

One group conducted long-term, discreet espionage: invisible reading of emails and documents. The other employed more aggressive techniques, including taking over administrative accounts and exerting broader control over the digital infrastructure.

The second phase involved the takeover of administrative accounts across the entire system. In practice, this meant full control over servers, workstations, internal documents, archives, and communications. Tools characteristic of serious espionage operations were installed — password extraction tools, remote command execution capabilities, and mechanisms for long-term, covert presence in the system.

Only then did the third and most sensitive phase begin: the systematic surveillance of all BCSP communications.

Between November 11 and December 8, 2025, more than 28,000 individual accesses to the emails of BCSP employees were recorded. These accesses were not the result of automated processes, security scans, or technical errors. They were real openings of messages, including archived correspondence. Access was not limited to current communications; older correspondence, internal documents, and communications with domestic and international partners were also accessed. Multiple user accounts were accessed at different times throughout the entire period. In parallel with email access, attempts were recorded to establish contact with BCSP staff through various channels, including email and messaging applications, using false or unverified identities.

The analysis showed that this was not the work of a single actor, but of two different hacker groups known as Midnight Blizzard and Forest Blizzard. These groups are linked to Russian intelligence and security structures — the former to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the latter to the Military Intelligence Service (GRU), which security experts believe is even embedded within the GRU’s command structure.

The operation did not stop with internal systems. A fake website of the Belgrade Security Conference was created, presented as an official registration platform. At the same time, guests and participants of the conference received emails with supposed registration links, aimed at expanding the infiltration to international participants — representatives of governments, international organizations, the academic community, and civil society. On the fake espionage conference website, journalists from pro-regime television outlets Pink and Kurir were also “accredited” to follow the conference proceedings.

Official Serbia has for years openly cooperated with Russian security services, not only through formal agreements but through direct cooperation between two authoritarian regimes. As early as 2021, the existence of a joint body to combat so-called “color revolutions” was confirmed. That same year, Russian opposition politicians were surveilled in Belgrade, including Vladimir Kara-Murza and Andrei Pivovarov. Both were later arrested and sentenced in Moscow. After a prisoner exchange with the United States, they publicly accused Serbian security services of handing over to Russian authorities materials collected through surveillance conducted in Serbia. These accusations were never seriously investigated.

More than a year has passed since the collapse of a reconstructed canopy at the Novi Sad railway station, which triggered mass civic protests demanding accountability from the authorities. As public pressure grew and protests became increasingly widespread, efforts to delegitimize them also intensified. In this context, a statement by Russia’s SVR in the summer of this year was particularly noteworthy, accusing several independent local media outlets in Serbia of promoting a “Ukrainian Euromaidan scenario” in the country. No Serbian state institution responded to this extraordinary interference in the country’s internal affairs. On the contrary, the only reaction was a statement by the President of Serbia thanking the Russian SVR for providing information about an alleged plot to overthrow the government — fabricated accusations that were never substantiated.

Tags: Rusia Serbia

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