There is an unreality among Serbs that the Russians are their brothers. Of course, they do not have the experience of Russian occupation, like Czechoslovakia, for example, says František Šistek, Czech historian, professor of Balkan studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague, in an interview with Danas.
His research focuses on contemporary history and current problems of the former Yugoslavia and Czech relations with the Balkans. Šistek is also one of the few montenegrinists in the world..
The slogan “Same color, same faith” has become popular, especially among football clubs, which aim to highlight the closeness between Serbs and Russians.
Orthodoxy has given a strong component to relations between Serbia and Russia. Slavism, of course, as a kind of foundation and the huge money that has been invested from Russia in Serbia, of course, to those who it suits to build this story of Russia as a friendly country. You know, when I read these comments on articles from Serbia from nationalist portals that are linked to the war in Ukraine, I see how much nonsense there is.
Of course, this has been manufactured with some historical construction that ‘Russia has always been our friend’.
Firstly, Russia did something in the 19th century that coincided with the interests of the Balkan countries and states, but, of course, Russia has again used these countries for its own interests, and this is a kind of blind love, unreal.
And if we look back in time?
If we look at the period from the emergence of modern Serbia to today, I think that for most of that time Serbia did not have a special relationship with Russia. Russia is far away and Serbia is still weak in the middle of the 19th century.
Then you have the Obrenović dynasty, which is Austrophilic, there is no Russian influence there. And, of course, in the years before the First World War, the USSR came into being, we had the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Yugoslavs did not have relations with that Russia.
There is also an episode of Stalinism, which is relatively short-lived. From 1948 to the beginning of the 1950s, relations were quite cold. But in the 1990s and during the war in BiH, that narrative and what I have often seen in the commentaries – ‘Russia never betrayed us’ – started to emerge.
And it is true that Russia, together with the Western countries, often voted against the interests of Serbia, or indeed against ‘Milosevic’s Belgrade’. Because, for example, it is not in Serbia’s interest to help Radovan Karadzic. It is true.
Boris Yeltsin, as is well known, never liked Slobodan Milosevic. Even in the 1990s there were not great relations. The exception is the Russian soldiers who crossed into Kosovo. That was built up after 2000, and I believe that part of the Serbs are doing it out of anger, and people have turned against England, America and the West.
This is the ideology promoted by the church in terms of the corrupt West, homosexuals taking drugs …
Is it not surprising that a recent figure from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy says that only 12% of Serbian citizens say that Russia is to blame for the war in Ukraine?
Let me remind you that the headlines in Serbia around 24 February said that Ukraine had invaded Russia, and I suppose that many in Serbia hoped that Russia would soon defeat Ukraine. And that has not happened.
THE SERBIAN REGIME CAN CHALLENGE WHAT RUSSIA WANTS
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic seems to be “rooting” for the war in Ukraine to last as long as possible. He recently said that the war in Ukraine will last until 2023 and, as he often points out, this suits Russia too. We are also seeing an escalation of the situation in the region. In this context, should we be afraid of a war in the Balkans?
As far as war is concerned, I do not think there will be a general war like we had in the 1990s, because the demographic and economic picture in the countries of the former Yugoslavia is different. And I do not know who would go to war today.
There is a risk of some serious incidents. We see that the situation regarding Kosovo can also get out of control. The Serbian regime can provoke whatever Russia wants, and I do not rule that out. Because if you create a nasty atmosphere, of course, sooner or later, someone will take up arms and shoot someone.
As they say – ‘Russia is not to blame for the war in Ukraine’ – I think that is disinformation, that is easy to understand. Serbia being what it is, when you search, you will find the information you need. The majority of the population, as in any other country, depends on some major news, portals, and feeds on this information.
The Franco-German proposal for Kosovo is expected to be signed by the end of March at the latest. What is to be expected between now and then, a prolongation of de facto recognition with new tensions and strains?
In recent months, as far as I have been following, tensions of this kind have been rising steadily, and I believe that this will hardly change any time soon. There will always be some reason for tensions to rise, the number plates were something else, there will always be some reason for tensions to rise.
Podgorica’s Pobjeda recently reported that huge quantities of fertilisers from Russia have been entering Serbia via Drac and Montenegro for 13 months. Despite Montenegro’s imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation at the beginning of April, the transit of fertilisers through the Bozaj and Dobrakovo border crossings and onwards to Serbia has continued. Is this the open Balkans in practice?
You are right, this is the open Balkans in practice, and this is to be expected. Let me remind you that Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said that the Open Balkans is a useful idea. We know who this man is, we know how long he has supported the Putin regime, and if it is good for them, it is bad for the Balkans and for all of us.
I have not understood why, for example, America and Mr Gabriel Escobar are so supportive of the Open Balkans initiative, because it is something that suits Russia more than it suits America. Or is Escobar taking Russian money because he is implementing Russian policy in the Balkans?!
It is really strange to me that he is pushing through Open Balkans. And when there are problems in the region, as there are now, we have some general statements by Escobar which are worth nothing, such as – ‘we have expressed our concern’.
You said that the 42nd Government of Montenegro was ‘a bizarre episode in the history of Montenegro’. Which is the 43rd Government, which was voted against in August?
Even more bizarre. Especially since it is in a technical mandate, because it is a total mess. Dritan Abazovic may have the support of Serbia and Russia, but in Montenegro, his government has only 2% of the citizens.
This means that such a government, without any legitimacy whatsoever, is signing treaties such as the basic treaty, and the Open Balkans initiative is also set to be signed. If he signs it, he may later flee Montenegro or end up in prison.
I hope that as soon as a more normal government in Montenegro comes, above all a more legitimate one, that one day they will cancel it. They seem to be at their peak now, but as soon as he signs, he will be of no use to anyone.
Of course, he was preceded by the government of Zdravko Krivokapić, whom I criticised for some things, for example, his attitude towards the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Culture (FCJK), but in the end, it has to be admitted that the man had some reservations, and that he also had a more realistic view of the situation, he did not want to sign the Basic Treaty so easily, which is what this government, which was also supported by the DPS, has done. There should have been elections even then.
SPC is estimated to be the leading economic force in Montenegro. According to data, SPC is the third richest in Serbia. So quite a strong influence. How do you interpret that?
The situation is very difficult. We are at a moment when the SPC controls a lot of things in Montenegro, but also in Serbia and the BiH entity Republika Srpska. We know that economic flows have been hidden from us for a long time, they are not taxed, we see construction activity, a large number of monasteries, churches, and this economic power is the best indicator of how endangered the Serbs in Montenegro are.
This is a story of a threat. You do not have to be an expert, it is enough to go through Montenegro as a tourist and you will see a large number of new monasteries and, when you ask around, you will find out that the church is an investor and is building apartments.
Are certain centers in the region – Zagreb – Belgrade – Tirana, are they undermining stability in the region? How to counter them?
I think that intellectuals from the region, especially from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro, should unite. It is certainly more difficult to organise something like this, because it is not Russian money, not Serbian money, not Church money. I have no other recipe.
As far as Zagreb is concerned, Zagreb is, of course, very much involved in relations in BiH and has some interests of its own, together with the Serbian nationalists. It would not be a bad thing if Zagreb’s good intellectuals stood up and took up this issue.
Nationalism in Montenegro is clerical
Our interlocutor spoke about the rise of clericalism and nationalism in Montenegro at the Cetinje Forum “Open Europe or Closed Balkans”, organised in mid-December by the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature and the Montenegrin PEN Centre.
Nationalism, he said, can be both secular and clerical, and Šistek called the Montenegrin version of nationalism clerical because it is directly linked to the church. He also presented a number of examples that followed the social changes in Montenegro during the period of clericalisation, when the SPC became the main vehicle of identity.
Šistek is convinced that there is hope in the fight against clericalization, but that the fight must be conducted in different ways and that regional connection is necessary./Danas/