Biserko: Serbia controls the vote of Kosovo Serbs through pressure and blackmail

Without pressure from Serbia, Kosovo Serbs would certainly articulate their interests better, being aware that the Serbian List primarily represents the interests of Aleksandar Vučić's regime. This is what the president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Sonja Biserko, stated in an interview with RTKLive.

However, Nenad Rašić's mandate, she says, shows that a part of the Serbian electorate does not vote according to Belgrade's instructions and that there is a real possibility that Serbs in Kosovo will elect their own political representatives. Ultimately, Rašić's mandate proves that Belgrade's dominance is not absolute, she says.

"The European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, in the report on Kosovo prepared by Riho Terras, assessed that Kosovo has lost an important year due to the political blockade, warning that the coming months could also be affected by the electoral process."

The Chairwoman of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Sonja Biserko, tells RTKLive that this assessment first and foremost confirms the concern of European partners about the institutional paralysis in Kosovo and its impact on reforms, European integration and the country's international position.

“The European Union expects functional institutions that are capable of making decisions and implementing reforms, while the prolonged political stalemate sends the opposite message. It is difficult to say whether the core of the problem facing Kosovar society is only the personal stance of the opposition towards the incumbent Prime Minister, Albin Kurti. Although there are undoubtedly political tensions and a high level of mistrust between Kurti and opposition leaders, in my opinion the core of the disagreement is deeper,” says Sonja Biserko.

RTKLive: In what deeper sense is the essence of the dispute?

Biserko: I think it is about different political approaches to state governance, the relationship with the dialogue with Serbia, cooperation with international partners, as well as the struggle for political dominance in the political space of Kosovo. During his mandate as Prime Minister, Albin Kurti has built a policy that insists on greater sovereignty and independence in decision-making, for which there have often been disagreements with international actors.

However, international actors have long made concessions to Belgrade and have often punished Pristina, not Belgrade, for not implementing the Ohrid and Brussels Agreements. They also considered that the Kosovo Government should coordinate any action with them. Albin Kurti’s governments, however, have shown more independence and initiative, which in my opinion significantly contributes to his popularity among the citizens.

On the other hand, the opposition criticizes Kurti for his lack of willingness to compromise and for his governing style, which it considers too confrontational.

RTKLive: Are they right?

Biserko: Even if they have, that is not the core of the problem. Whatever the reasons, I think the opposition has not shown that it understands the international circumstances, which are currently not favorable for either the region or Kosovo itself.

Kurti and his supporters consider the opposition to represent the continuation of old political structures and that it often puts short-term political interests ahead of state priorities. It is for this reason that the political deadlock in Kosovo is not only a consequence of personal antipathies towards Kurti, but of deeper political and strategic differences about the path that Kosovo should follow and the way it should define its relations with Serbia, the European Union and the international community in general.

I fear that the coming months will really depend on the electoral logic, which makes it even more difficult to achieve the necessary political consensus. Kosovo is suffering the consequences of the prolonged political blockade. Institutional instability slows down important decision-making, reforms and progress on the European path, while at the same time negatively affecting the economic climate and citizens' trust in the political system. This is precisely what the European Parliament warns about when it talks about a "lost year".

RTKLive: So you don't expect the situation to stabilize significantly after June 7?

Biserko: This will depend primarily on the willingness of political actors to overcome mutual conflicts and reach a minimum consensus on key state priorities. The election result is also important and whether it will give the current governing majority, in case of victory, more room for action.

If there is no greater willingness to compromise after the elections, there is a risk that the political deadlock will continue, which would further slow down European integration and the dialogue with Serbia, which in the current domestic political circumstances is not ready for talks. The dialogue is currently taking place behind the scenes and in a non-transparent manner. Peter Sørensen is trying to prepare a framework that would accelerate the European integration of both Kosovo and Serbia.

RTKLive: The report confirms the importance of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue as part of the European integration process. At the same time, it calls for those responsible for the terrorist attack in Banjska to be brought to justice and expresses concern about the lack of criminal prosecution of Milan Radoicic. How interested is Serbia in continuing the dialogue?

Biserko: The question arises whether this process is still an instrument of normalization or has it become a framework where crisis points are minimized without a real political will for a final agreement.

Kosovo and Serbia are formally oriented towards European integration, but in practice this process is increasingly hampered by mistrust, incidents on the ground and the lack of clear accountability mechanisms. Kosovo's society and political elites are sincerely oriented towards integration, while the current government in Serbia is essentially not interested in EU membership, which is also evidenced by the fact that for years there has been no progress in reforms and Serbia is increasingly leaning towards authoritarianism.

The Banjska case is a key test.

RTKLive: In what sense?

Biserko: The September 2023 attack has been described in most international reports as a serious security escalation, and the expectation that the perpetrators and organizers will be prosecuted has become a political and legal condition for Serbia's credibility in the normalization process.

In this context, the lack of criminal prosecution of Milan Radoić, his public appearances and the political messages that followed are perceived in Brussels and in some EU member states as Serbia's lack of readiness to prosecute him. One can also ask whether, in the general chaos we are witnessing, Vučić has the strength and power for such a step.

Belgrade formally remains oriented towards the EU – Vučić does not miss the opportunity to emphasize this – but in essence it seeks support from the US and China, because this is the framework that opens the doors to European funds, political communication with the EU and maintaining the position of a “constructive actor” in the region. However, Belgrade no longer enjoys that position.

RTKLive: How does it look now?

Biserko: Belgrade is viewed with suspicion. It should be borne in mind that the fundamental problem for Belgrade is that concluding the dialogue with a legally binding agreement would imply implicit or explicit acceptance of the reality of Kosovo's statehood, which in the internal political context of Serbia still remains dangerous.

Vučić has surrendered Kosovo, but continues to control the Serbian List to prove that Kosovo is not capable of statehood, while at the same time keeping alive the narrative that “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia”. In this sense, the Banjska issue is not only a matter of security or justice, but also evidence of a lack of political will. As long as key cases remain unresolved or insufficiently processed, there will be a perception in the EU that Serbia is acting more tactically than strategically in the dialogue.

RTKLive: In the last parliamentary elections, the Serbian List did not win all ten seats in the Kosovo Assembly, although Vučić strongly supported it. Does Nenad Rashiqi have a chance to repeat the result?

Biserko: The Serbian List has been a political instrument of Belgrade in Kosovo for years, and its monopoly on the “ten mandates” has served to control the Serbian political body, through pressure, blackmail and other means. In this way, any attempt at pluralization within the Serbian political spectrum in Kosovo is hindered, which would mean even less control over negotiations and local political processes.

Nenad Rašić represents an alternative to this structure: he participates in Kosovo's institutions independently of Belgrade, and that is precisely why he is a political problem for the Serbian List. His mandate shows that a part of the Serbian electorate does not vote according to Belgrade's instructions and that there is a real possibility that Serbs in Kosovo will elect different political representatives themselves.

However, Rašić's political space is limited, because he does not have the media support and political protection that the Serbian List enjoys. I think he has a real chance of winning the mandate again, but this depends on the turnout of Serbs in the north of Kosovo – where the pressure from Serbia is stronger – as well as on the political pressure from Belgrade itself.

Rašić's mandate shows that Belgrade's dominance is not absolute. Without pressure from Serbia, Kosovo Serbs would certainly articulate their interests better, being aware that the Serbian List primarily represents the interests of Aleksandar Vučić's regime.

In a political sense, the Serbs are hostages of Belgrade, just as the Serbs in Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been. In this way, the consolidation of not only Kosovo, but also the entire region is hindered. However, I think that the Serbs are gradually breaking away from Belgrade's influence and will increasingly aim for the independent resolution of their interests.