Artificial Intelligence as a tool of russian propaganda in Kosovo’s electoral process

“Serbophobic,” “persecution of Serbs,” “Albanian criminals,” and similar phrases are among the expressions appearing in articles that mention Kosovo across several media outlets and social media channels that disseminate Russian narratives online, on the eve of elections in Kosovo.

In the days leading up to Kosovo’s early parliamentary elections on December 28, a number of pro-Russian media and social media channels have been flooded with messages portraying Kosovo as a corrupt country, directed by the West and hostile toward Serbs.

In nearly all posts that mention Kosovo, its statehood is denied: its name is placed in quotation marks or it is described as a “quasi-state” or a “so-called state.”

Articles and commentaries published since early December have amplified calls urging Kosovo Serbs to view the Serb List— the largest Serb party in the country, with well-documented ties to Belgrade— as their only political alternative.

In addition to Russian state media such as Sputnik and RT, headlines and posts related to Kosovo, and especially to the year-end elections, have also been shared on pro-Russian channels on the social media platform Telegram.

According to experts, many of these channels amplify and magnify narratives, “particularly influencing the Serb electorate in northern Kosovo.”

Disinformation or manipulative content, they warn, becomes even more dangerous with the involvement of artificial intelligence.

What was said about Kosovo?

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty monitored and analyzed content related to Kosovo and the elections in several Russian media outlets, such as Sputnik and RT, as well as on pro-Kremlin Telegram channels like “Balkanar” and “For Serbia in Russian.”

On December 21, 2025, the “Balkanar” channel published an article stating that “if democracy is measured by the number of criminals on the ballot, then Kosovo’s political system emerges as a European leader.”

The article referred to a report by the Kosovo Institute for Justice (IKD), according to which 28 parliamentary candidates in the December 28 elections are involved in criminal offenses.

However, the article offered no comparative analysis with other European countries, instead claiming that the report revealed “the true face of Europe’s youngest democracy.”

A day earlier, on December 20, the same channel wrote that “Dialogue with the Serbs has ended – the Kosovo issue is now being resolved through the U.S. defense budget.”

The article criticized the U.S. administration for requesting, in the National Defense Authorization Act adopted in December, the implementation of the agreement reached between Kosovo and Serbia in Ohrid in February 2023.

“U.S. authorities are transforming the issue of Serbia’s sovereignty from a matter of negotiations into a binding law for all of American foreign policy,” the post stated.

Meanwhile, on December 19, another post claimed that “in ‘Kosovo,’ the authorities have shown that public relations matter more to them than action, especially when it comes to addressing violations of Serbs’ rights,” without providing any evidence for these assertions.

The post referred to the opening of a new pedestrian bridge connecting South Mitrovica, predominantly inhabited by Albanians, with North Mitrovica, where Serbs form the majority.

The “Balkanar” channel is linked to the well-known Russian propaganda network “Pravda,” which, among other things, also posts content in the Albanian language.

According to a report published in June by the fact-checking platform Hibrid.info, this network has disseminated Russian propaganda narratives to Albanian-speaking audiences as well, through various websites “disguised as news portals.”

In a post dated December 26, the Albanian-language Pravda portal described Kosovo’s acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti as a “Serbophobe” who “engages in anti-Serb deception.”

“All 10 mandates”: The Serb List’s political campaign promoted by RT and Sputnik

Meanwhile, within the editorial line of Russian media in Serbian and Serbian pro-Kremlin outlets, the Serb List is presented as an instrument of “unity” and as the only “safe” option for the Serb vote.

On December 23, 2025, RT published an article titled: “Đurić: Serbs must vote… it is important for the Serb List to win all 10 mandates.”

The same call was echoed by Sputnik, which in the same reporting cycle also published stories about the Serb List’s on-the-ground campaign activities.

None of the news published by these Russian media outlets mentioned other parties competing in the elections, whether Albanian or Serb.

In addition to the Serb List, other Serb political entities competing in the December 28 elections include the Party for Freedom, Justice and Survival, and the Kosovo Alliance, a party formed in June of this year with the support of Serbian MP Žarko Ristić.

The Kosovo Assembly has 120 seats, 10 of which are reserved for representatives of the Serb community.

Traditionally, all 10 mandates have been won by the Serb List, except in the most recent elections in February of this year, when one seat was won by politician Nenad Rašić.

Officials from the Serb List have publicly described Rašić as “a Serb suitable for Pristina” who “does not represent Serbs.”

These statements were also posted on Russian channels in the final week before the elections.

Channels as “Narrative multipliers”

Jeta Loshaj from the Kosovo Center for Security Studies (KCSS) told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that media such as RT Balkan and Sputnik Srbija, in the case of Kosovo, “are not so much primary sources of information as they are ‘narrative multipliers,’” because their content is reproduced by tabloids or portals in Serbia and then “penetrates and circulates in northern Kosovo and in local media.”

According to her, at sensitive moments such as elections, these media frame the situation along two axes: “the victimization of the Serb community in Kosovo” and “the antagonization of the West (EU/NATO),” narratives that are then “appropriated by local actors… ‘influencers,’ and others.”

Loshaj warns that the impact of the spread of Russian narratives “is not linear… but potentially cumulative,” as these narratives aim to overlay “existing grievances, feelings of discrimination, fear, and mistrust.”

She adds that during electoral periods, these narratives turn into political instruments, seeking “to delegitimize democratic processes and to undermine trust in electoral institutions and international partners.”

“Propaganda as fuel for Artificial Intelligence”

Abit Hoxha, an assistant professor at the University of Agder and the University of Stavanger in Norway, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that many networks spreading disinformation or manipulative content do not necessarily target human readers.

“A characteristic of Pravda is that it is not a network, it is not a movement. It is a kind of organization, most likely made up of a few clever individuals who have found a loophole in the system, and are not directly involved in disinformation in the way, for example, Sputnik is,” Hoxha said.

According to the professor, who studies media, democracy, and more recently the impact of artificial intelligence on society, such networks “are providing material to feed artificial intelligence.”

On the other hand, researcher Loshaj notes that new technologies, especially artificial intelligence, increase both the speed and the reach of disinformation.

“[They enable] the massive and rapid production of synchronized content in local languages, imitation of local styles to increase credibility, the creation of audio and video deepfakes, and the automation of networks of fake accounts that simulate artificial public support, especially during electoral periods,” she said.

Russian media outlets such as RT and Sputnik are sanctioned in Kosovo, based on U.S. and European sanctions imposed on Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022.

However, their online access has not been fully blocked.

Kosovo’s Regulatory Authority of Electronic and Postal Communications (ARKEP) told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that all internet service providers and mobile operators are obliged to block the websites of Russian media in accordance with the sanctions, but that “due to the dynamic nature of the internet, the availability of these websites may vary.” /RFE/