Czech Intelligence Report Highlights Growing Hybrid Threats from Russia and China

The Czech Republic’s Security Information Service (BIS) has published its latest annual report, offering a grim assessment of the evolving threat landscape shaped by foreign disinformation, espionage, and hybrid tactics. The findings highlight how state actors – primarily Russia and China – continue to exploit vulnerabilities in Czech society through overt and covert influence operations.

Russia: Covert Influence Through Narrative Infiltration

Russia remains a central actor in efforts to destabilize public discourse in the Czech Republic. According to the BIS, Moscow has shifted from overt propaganda to more subtle manipulation of domestic political narratives through local proxies and collaborators. Rather than focusing on visibility, the Russian strategy aims to embed manipulated content in mainstream media and political discourse.

A prominent case described in the report is the “Voice of Europe” operation, which was run from Prague by Artem Marchevsky, a close associate of pro-Kremlin Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk. The operation involved conducting interviews and providing financial incentives to candidates for the 2024 EU elections. Czech authorities dismantled the network in spring 2024, and both Marchevsky and Medvedchuk are now on the EU sanctions list.

Telegram, the popular encrypted messaging app, has also become a key recruitment tool. Russian agents are said to have recruited so-called “Telegram agents” under the guise of online freelance work or side jobs. Many participants were reportedly unaware that they were working for foreign intelligence services.

China: Quiet Influence with Strategic Goals

China’s approach to influencing the Czech Republic is more subtle, but no less significant. The BIS warns that Chinese state-affiliated entities have funded individuals and media organizations to promote a positive image of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), preventing investigations into issues such as human rights abuses and Taiwan.

One particularly alarming case involved the Emposat satellite ground station project in South Moravia. Initially promoted as a harmless scientific endeavor, the BIS determined that the project — backed by a company linked to the Chinese state — had the potential to collect sensitive images and signals for military purposes. Authorities dismantled the station in May 2025.

China’s strategy also includes targeting Czech high-tech companies through joint ventures that conceal the transfer of intellectual property. Leaked data from the Chinese company i-SOON shows how seemingly private companies serve multiple branches of the Chinese state, including intelligence agencies.

Disinformation in the Czech Republic: Increased Activity, Steady Spread

In 2024, disinformation activity in the Czech Republic increased while its overall reach stagnated. Domestic disinformation actors – motivated by ideology or financial gain – remained the most active, but Russia and China continued to spread strategic narratives through these channels.

BIS emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between domestic anti-system sentiment, which can still be addressed democratically, and influence operations directed by foreign forces, which pose a direct threat and require targeted countermeasures.

Public Resistance and the Way Forward

The report acknowledges that most Czech citizens remain resistant to extremist and foreign narratives. However, the BIS calls for increased efforts in digital literacy, education on algorithms, and inclusive communication – especially with disaffected populations – to prevent long-term polarization and radicalization.

Enhanced Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Measures

BIS has intensified its counterintelligence and cyber operations in response to growing threats. The agency contributed to EU and NATO operations, including “Dying Ember,” which targeted the Russian cyber group APT28.

In a separate but notable effort, BIS also monitored 327,000 Ukrainian temporary protection permit holders. Contrary to some disinformation narratives, BIS did not detect any increase in crime attributed to this group, underscoring the stability and successful integration of Ukrainian refugees.