Russia uses Montenegro to irritate the West and NATO

“By trying to influence Montenegro as much as possible, Russia, above all, wants to reduce the influence of the West and provoke the West and NATO, and for this it has the support of the current government,” says long-time journalist and political scientist Ilija Despotović from Podgorica. He also recalls Russia’s influence throughout history. He emphasizes that most people in Montenegro, especially young people, still turn to the West.

Russia and Montenegro have had good relations throughout history, but even then Russia was mainly concerned with its own interests and made decisions to the detriment of Montenegro. However, the people, but also part of the Montenegrin government, still have the opinion that Montenegro should return to Russia, and not to the West. Russia uses this, trying to influence political and social events in Montenegro more through the church and Serbia. How much power does Russia have and is it dangerous for Montenegro? Has Russia's "malign" influence on Montenegro increased after Montenegro's entry into NATO?

It is true that Russia and Montenegro have had good relations in the past and that Russia has always taken its interests into account. Decisions regarding Montenegro were, above all, in the interests of Russia, and often, in essence, to the detriment of Montenegro itself. As an example, I mention the Peace Treaty of San Stefano, after the successful wars with Turkey, in the spring of 1878, by which Montenegro, with the consent of Russia, received a considerable territorial expansion, with borders longer than today. Already at the Congress of Berlin, in July of the same year, Russia accepted the decision of the great powers to annul the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano and to return Montenegro to the old borders.

However, the idea that we should have close relations with Russia, that is, much closer than with any other country, is still rooted in Montenegro, moreover, regardless of its relationship with Montenegro. The current government in Podgorica is very much in favor of this stereotype. Russia uses this, through efforts through the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbia to influence more political and social events in Montenegro and through this, in fact, to strengthen its position towards the West.

Montenegro and Russia have had interstate relations for more than three centuries, or rather a kind of connection between the last Montenegrin dynasty (Petrović) and the Russian court. Neither state, on the other hand, has ever had an official diplomatic representation in a country in a full diplomatic format. Montenegro and Russia exchanged their first ambassadors in the modern sense and with full diplomatic capacity in Podgorica, i.e. in Moscow, only after Montenegro's new independence, in the 2006 referendum, although the Russian embassy building in Cetinje was erected at the end of the 9th century.

Russia carried out its “diplomatic” cooperation with Montenegro, with the bishops in Cetinje, who personified the highest civil authority in Montenegro, through its emissaries who came to Montenegro from time to time, when it suited the Russian kingdom, mainly from Dubrovnik, where they had their headquarters. As a rule, they were always Serbs, not people from Montenegro itself, and they came to Cetinje when it was necessary, in the interests of Russia, to encourage the Montenegrins’ fight against the Ottomans, or when it was necessary to mediate in the resolution of some internal political disputes in Gora. The Russian emissaries from the tsars brought the so-called “gramata”, a kind of diplomatic letters, either with information about medals for prominent Montenegrins, or with instructions, or rather, certain, very specific, requirements in the fight against the Ottomans, and all in the first place in the interests of the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, when sea traffic improved, Montenegro occasionally received material aid from Russia, in the form of weapons and food. Some Montenegrin rulers also received financial aid and books, mainly liturgical, that arrived in Cetinje. Much later, at various times, some Montenegrins were educated in Russia. Some Montenegrin rulers sent requests to the Russian Tsar to take a certain number of Montenegrin families during the years of drought and famine, with the aim of permanently settling in Russia. A number of Montenegrins also moved to Russia. Some Montenegrin rulers also officially visited the Russian court, mostly of their own free will, and some of them were ordained as bishops by the Russian Orthodox Church. One of the bishops, Vasilije Petrovic, died and was buried in Russia. This tradition was interrupted by Prince Danilo Petrovich (from 1851 to 1860), who severed the ties between the state and the church, which, above all, angered Russia itself, and turned, as we would say today, more towards the West in terms of foreign policy. Russia, along with Serbia, as well as several other countries, is considered one of the collaborators in the campaign that preceded the assassination of Danilo Petrovich.

On the other hand, Russia's benevolence and assistance have almost always been conditioned by the fulfillment of certain military and state needs and interests of Russia. It can be said that it has never been unconditional. The Montenegrin bishops experienced this and, for the most part, were aware of such an attitude. Even if some of them showed dissatisfaction, they were "sanctioned" by the Russian Empire. One of them, Petar the Great Petrovich, moreover, was not approved for coming to Russia and Petar the Second Petrovich Njegosh himself had problems with the Russians.

According to some historians, in the first decade of the 20th century, Russia, together with Serbia, developed a plan to unite Montenegro and Serbia and, in effect, to destroy Montenegro as a sovereign state. That plan was realized, through illegal means, in 1918, when Montenegro was annexed by Serbia and in that “alliance” became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, losing its old name.

Despite all this, the Montenegrin dynasties had an uncritical attitude towards “cooperation” with Russia. Moreover, they idealized Russia, in fact the Russian tsars. Some of them were blindly convinced that Russia would have helped more if it had not been so far from Montenegro. Hence the expression “God is above, Russia is far away”, and if it were not so, Montenegro would be better off.

The remnants of such understandings, idealized notions, for Russia, exist even today and this is the possibility of influence in Montenegro. Even if the Montenegrin government is in power, which in essence, seen objectively and in a broader context, is not free from prejudices, old-fashionedness and prejudices, then one should not neglect the danger from the Russian factor. Montenegro, in the state-political sense, has never manifested such a radical step of foreign policy and, consequently, a position that is not in the interests of Russia, as when it joined NATO. And, of course, this hurt Russia the most. Montenegro was considered a “safe” pro-Russian state. The Montenegrin coast has long been considered almost natural, a destination for Russian ships sailing in the Mediterranean.

In Montenegro, however, a new awareness of the country's international position is maturing, new generations are coming of age, with much less burden compared to stereotypes about strategic issues.

Political forces that prioritize Montenegro's pro-European, Western orientation have also been significantly strengthened.

For the younger generation, even for those who are burdened with Russophilia, the ideal of modern life is not Russia, but the West. This is the potential for a policy that will not allow the decisive influence of the Russian factor. However, on the whole, the entire context of Montenegro-Russia relations is much more complex and much more complicated for practical political action in Montenegro itself. Of course, everything depends on relations in the Balkans, when it comes to Montenegro, and on the direction in which Serbia will move, in terms of domestic and foreign policy, in the coming period. The greatest effect in this sense will be if Serbia will give up its major state interests, projects and policies. To be honest, I am not very optimistic in this regard.

Therefore, taking all this into account, the “future” of Russian influence in the Balkans, but also in Montenegro, depends to a large extent, and very importantly, on the real European perspective of Montenegro, on when Montenegro will become a member of the European Union. Of course, also on the US policy in that context. There is no doubt about the power of NATO itself, not only in the military sense, but also in terms of its political supremacy as an alliance in the strategic sense. First of all, both NATO and the EU must remove as soon as possible any doubt about their existence and ability to “rule” in Europe and the world as a strategic project, policy and way of life, as a democracy and modern civilization.

Recently, cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields has intensified, the Russian ambassador visited the University of Montenegro and cooperation agreements have been signed. Could there be a negative impact in that area as well, considering that the rector of UMZ, Vladimir Bozhovic, is “pro-Russian and pro-Serbian”?

Russia has tried to directly, with brutal moves, influence us in political changes, whenever it gets the chance, in Montenegro, which would suit it (the attempted coup in 2016). It was, without a doubt, a desperate act to prevent Montenegro's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia had a "fifth column" in Montenegro to achieve that plan, which consisted of political forces led by the then opposition Democratic Front, which even today, whenever they get the chance, seek to at least relativize and compromise Montenegro's membership in NATO. Russia certainly encourages and encourages them in this, through various forms of hybrid action, either directly or in alliance with Serbia, which also sees Montenegro's membership in NATO as a "betrayal" to itself. Thus history repeats itself, because both Russia and Serbia perceived the decision of the Montenegrin prince Danilo to separate the church from the state and to renounce the title of bishop, in the mid-19th century, as an act hostile to them. Official Russian and Serbian policy simply believes that Montenegro is obliged to pursue their interests. This has been the case in the past, and such a relationship has not been eradicated to this day.

And, of course, when a brutal political force fails in its efforts to keep Montenegro obedient, then, in any case, the method of the soft variant of subversive action in Montenegro is used. So, we are going and will try, but Montenegro is kept obedient by acting through institutions. The visit of the Russian ambassador to the University of Montenegro is a very illustrative example in this context. Previously, because a person with undisguised pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political affiliation came to the head of the University, the Russian ambassador rushed personally and openly to promote “cooperation” between the educational institutions of the two countries. Concrete forms of that “cooperation” can be expected in the coming period, through exchange visits, perhaps in the form of the opportunity to study in Russia, or, for example, greater cooperation in the defense of doctoral dissertations. Culture is particularly suitable for camouflaged, “delicate” propaganda of Russia’s state interests, and, of course, media action will be used in this sense. There are already media outlets in Montenegro that are known as pro-Russian. The Russian television “Sputnik” can now be heard as the “Russian CNN”. It is symptomatic, for example, that the Minister of Culture, Education and Science, Vesna Bratić, visited Russia in the first year of the pro-Serbian-Russian government in Podgorica. The media emphasized that she participated in a debate in Moscow under the Serbian flag, without the Montenegrin flag.

The current government in Montenegro, as it has shown so far, will do everything to maintain a policy that will not openly offend the West and that will also not irritate Russia. In other words, it will try to convince Russia that the fact that it advocates a pro-European policy is, in fact, not an exaggeration, because it “inherited” NATO membership from the previous, extremely pro-Western government. Russia will try to use such a stance and policy of the Government in Montenegro for the strategy of action towards Montenegro. But, of course, not because Montenegro itself is important to it, but because it is convenient to irritate the West, above all NATO. And, given all of the above, Russia, on the example of Montenegro, has the opportunity to cover up its policy of undermining NATO and the European Union and present it as "cooperation" between two, as it is emphasized, Orthodox countries and states, which are also claims, having more than three hundred years of diplomatic relations behind them.

Due to EU sanctions against Russia, which are supported by official Montenegro, does Montenegro suffer much damage because it does not export its products to the large Russian market?

The issue of mutual economic sanctions between Montenegro and Russia, of course, should be seen in the context of the general interstate relations between the two countries and their position in the constellation of international relations. Therefore, economic sanctions have relative mutual importance. Their character has more of a political flavor. A good part of the Montenegrin public does not approve of the sanctions against Russia, but this is almost not discussed, except that here and there it is mentioned in parliament as a “sin” of the previous government. The story about the economic damage that Montenegro suffers due to the ban on the export of Montenegrin wines to the Russian market has long ceased. Montenegro also exported some processed meat products, but all this seems not to have serious consequences for Montenegrin producers.

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