Interview with the former Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Russia, Enver Halilović (Part Two)

The Geopost: In your book, you wrote about Kharchenko, the Russian ambassador. How do you comment on his visit to the border between Kosovo and Serbia, his visit to the Serbian army together with the Minister of Defense?

Halilovic: Russia's policy towards Kosovo is interesting and has at least two phases. One phase is before the declaration of Kosovo's independence before 2008, when Russia thinks that negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade should take place and a satisfactory joint solution should be found, without any specific time, so that Kosovo is not recognized by the Russian Federation as an independent state, until the second period when the declaration of the Republic of Kosovo is made in 2008, when there can no longer be any talk about how to resolve this dispute, which has already ended, with the declaration of independence, that is, with the support of the Ahtisaari plan in the United Nations Security Council. Then comes a new situation, the question of whether to recognize or not to recognize Kosovo after the declaration of independence? Russia is guided by two things in rejecting the declaration of independence – firstly, it represents the interests and protection of Serbia, as they say, of Serbia’s political interests in Kosovo and the Balkans, and moreover – Russia is trying to benefit by accepting the negotiations that it should recognize Kosovo, it responds with a demand. One of the very important people of that policy of Russia towards Kosovo, but also towards the entire Balkans is Bocan-Kharchenko. Kharchenko was ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he has been involved in all political developments in the Balkans, especially since the 1990s. He was even very directly and indirectly involved in the negotiations and in connection with the Dayton Peace Agreement. He is one of the most influential personalities within the diplomatic political clubs in Russian diplomacy. He is a very dedicated advocate of the views of the Russian Federation on the Balkans and Serbia’s place in the Balkans for the interests of the Russian Federation. Serbia’s military neutrality is a favor that Serbia has done and is doing to Russia in a political sense. Serbia's neutrality actually means the impossibility of membership in the NATO alliance, and this is the special interest and importance of the Russian Federation for any country that has not yet joined the NATO alliance, not to join NATO.

It happened quite strangely and unexpectedly, but something interesting happened that has to do with Montenegro. I was the ambassador at that time in Moscow when the policy of winning the referendum in Montenegro was being pursued. At that time, the ambassador of Montenegro and the then Serbia was the Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Roqen, and then in fact the Russian Federation agreed to hold this referendum for two reasons. First, Russia was not so powerful militarily and politically at that time, then China was also less powerful than it is today, and Russia could not actually directly oppose this European tendency, even American, and especially the tendency of Montenegro to hold a referendum on the division of Montenegro with Serbia, and then the Russians had to accept this. The second reason was that Russia was promised that they would be able to buy property in Montenegro. The first victim of this agreement with Russia was the purchase of a factory in Titograd. It was bought by Russian tycoons, and Russian tycoons are exclusively in Putin's political function and in the diplomatic and political function of the Russian Federation as a whole.

When the Russians after the independence of Montenegro started buying a large number of properties in Montenegro, when so many people immigrated to Montenegro, over 10,000 Russians, mainly in Budva, but also in other areas of the Adriatic coast of the Montenegrin part, when they started to build primary schools, secondary schools, televisions in Budva, when they saw where things were going, then the European Union actually realized that Montenegro could one day be bought by the Russian Federation. Then, Djukanovic was asked a question by the European Union: “Do you want to join the European Union, you say you want to join the EU, while thousands of Russian tycoons and citizens are coming to Montenegro”. There was a turning point, the way of buying and selling changed, the Russians could no longer buy and translate for themselves what they were buying in Montenegro, and then there was a turning point in Montenegrin politics. Since then, in fact, relations between Russia and Montenegro have cooled. Montenegro, by joining the NATO alliance, came out of the framework of influence of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation then does everything in every way, through the civilian government, with the support of separatist and nationalist circles in Montenegro, to restore the situation, at least when it comes to membership in the European Union, they restore the situation and put Montenegro under control, indirectly under its control and directly under the control of Serbia.

Today, we are only witnesses of this presence of Serbia, namely Serbia's influence in Montenegro through the organization of protests, projects and the appointment of the current government in Montenegro. That attitude of Serbia towards Montenegro is in fact an extended hand of Russia's influence and relations with Montenegro, Russia's interest in having another outlet to the sea.

The Geopost: What do you think about the meeting between Vučić and Putin before the elections in Serbia? Is there a lack of interregional cooperation against Russia, how to counter Russia's aggression against the Balkans?

Halilovic: The visit seems tragicomic. The excuse that they were meeting to sign the gas agreement did not hold up. Such agreements are signed by officials, they are not even for the ministerial level, let alone a presidential level. It was definitely just a justification for the visit. I don't think Vučić's visit has anything to do with the elections in Serbia. Vučić has complete control there, he established a totalitarian system, a one-party system in Europe. I mean, I think that visit had mostly to do with the talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the talks on Kosovo. These two questions are the main questions in the Balkans, at the moment. Unfortunately, the situation in Montenegro has also become more complicated, to the point that Montenegro is becoming a very important focus of political developments in the Balkans.

As for the other question of how or what to do regarding the negotiations with Kosovo for the so-called Association of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo, it is actually a Serbian project supported by Russia, to achieve a Bosnianization of Kosovo, and to stop the processes of diplomatic settlement, to keep it in a kind of frozen conflict until further notice. I think these are the main reasons for their meeting, and the gas agreement was just an excuse.

As for the formation of some kind of alliance between countries that are really, we can say freely, politically endangered, under the political pressure of Russia and Serbia together, mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. I think that cooperation between the governments and states of these is not enough and that synchronization is missing. Mutual support is necessary in terms of public appearance. I think that this can be a very important factor in stopping the influence of that ideology. The Serbian ideology, that is, the Serbian leaders, politically and academically, must accept the existence and legitimacy of other peoples.

The issue of the status of Bosniaks in Serbia is not even close to being resolved in the way that the issue of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been resolved. The issue of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is much better resolved than, say, the issue of Bosniaks in Croatia. I do not dispute that Serbia has some historical reasons for its interests in Croatia, but Serbia opposes the interests of everyone in Serbia, considers only its own interests legitimate. This is a classic indicator and example of a nationalist stance, that is, a nationalist doctrine that has a centuries-old tradition from the so-called Eastern Question to the moment when the question “how will we organize the Balkans?” is raised.