
The influence of external actors in the electoral processes in Kosovo continues to be a major concern, especially through propaganda and disinformation. It is Serbia that, through the Serbian List, aims to maintain its influence in Kosovo, says university professor Festim Rizanaj in an interview with The Geopost.
According to him, through disinformation and propaganda before and after the February 9 elections in Kosovo, Serbia has tried to influence the shaping of political perceptions and undermine democratic processes in Kosovo.
Festim Rizanaj, who is also a senior researcher at Hibrid.info, also shares his observations on the efforts of Russian media to influence Serbian public opinion in Kosovo. He talks about the role of Telegram, the spread of manipulative narratives, as well as the latest trends in disinformation during and after the election campaign.
Full interview:
The Geopost: You published a report on your one-year work, which also includes the elections in Kosovo. What irregularities did you identify in these elections?
Rizanaj: Yes, we published an annual summary in which we tried to present the state in Kosovo in general. Even in this period, from April 2, 2024 to April 2, 2025, you can see that there were several issues going on.
In the first half of the year, the armament of the KSF was one of the disinformation topics. There were various claims about the arming of the KSF with heavy artillery, although it is officially known that, for example, tanks and other equipment were not supplied to the KSF, which is publicly and officially known. As for the second part, from the moment the President of the Republic, Vjosa Osmani, announced the election date, we noticed that many different pages, especially on TikTok, were opened, different accounts that published information within which various disinformation was contained, even until the election period on February 9, 2025, there were various disinformation, and this topic was the topic that dominated our monthly reports on disinformation, where, as I mentioned, there were different accounts, different users with names that supported different parties. In addition, different users or accounts were opened in the name of prime ministerial candidates where they posted political accusations as well as different disinformation.
A key element observed during the elections were the fake polls published on social media. This is because it has become an established practice in our country that during elections, polls are published by companies and agencies that measure public opinion. However, old, manipulated and edited polls are circulating on social media, i.e. polls designed to manipulate public opinion. There have also been some clickbait headlines circulating in the media about the inclusion of one party or another in the list of candidates, and this is in a way a reflection that can be presented specifically with regard to the elections.
As far as external influence during the elections is concerned, it has been observed that Serbia has made several attempts to influence Serbian public opinion in Kosovo, particularly through institutional government representatives, but also through the media. For example, financial support for the Serbian community here. Also the call to vote for the Serbian list, claiming that only the Serbian list is the main representation of Kosovo Serbs. At the same time, by voting for the Serbian list, the aim is for Serbia to remain in Kosovo. In this context, there was also a denigrating portrayal of the candidate or another party who held the post of Minister of Return and Municipalities, Nenad Rasic, thus a denigrating propaganda against him because he is Kurti’s man and thus does not represent the Serbs of Kosovo, etc.
Similarly, Russian media, the Serbian-language service Russia Today Balkans and Sputnik, have published various information and disinformation about the elections in Kosovo, with the idea that Kurti will manipulate the elections to the detriment of the Serbian list, that Kurti will invent phantom voters to harm the Serbian list and prevent it from entering parliament.
The Geopost: With regard to the Telegram channels, have you noticed increased activity during the Kosovo elections, even though we know that much of the propaganda and manipulation by Russia is done through these channels?
Rizanaj: These channels have in a way reinforced the narratives published by Serbian officials and Serbian and Russian media in Serbian. That is, these were also posted on Telegram channels such as Bunt, Korridar and others, which in a way try to influence Serbian public opinion through these narratives in which the statements of the media and Serbian officials are both published and reinforced. Even in these elections, there was a narrative in these Telegram channels that the Serbian list should be voted on, which means that this idea was promoted and a kind of campaign was conducted against it, as I told Minister Nenad Rasic on Telegram.
The Geopost: And what does the latest monitoring report for this month tell us?
Rizanaj: As I mentioned earlier, in the past few months, especially in February, January and December, the primaries and the election campaign contributed to this issue, disinformation or misinformation, being so dominant. In March, there was something else, if you can call it that: There were some political accusations circulating on social media, because usually it’s a way of expressing an opinion where they manipulate some videos or post some photos with the intention that this politician or that official said this or that about this issue. In other words, this was the dominant topic.
In addition, various fraudulent text messages are circulating on social media to manipulate the audience, for example as a competition or with the promise of various loans, etc.
One of the topics was once again the armament of the KSF. There was speculation about how many helicopters the KSF would receive. Misinformation also circulated on social media that the KSF would be supplied with anti-aircraft guns from Turkey, although it is not officially known what or how. This was one of the topics on which there was the most misinformation in March. If we now turn to our monitoring of the Serbian media and look at the misinformation spread there, there are conspiracy theories about the chaos in the Serbian parliament. The assumption is that this is happening with the support of Prime Minister Kurti or that his idea of creating such chaos in parliament is being taken up and that he is very pleased that there is such chaos in parliament and that the opposition is in some way serving him. There were also conspiracy theories related to the narrative that the defense agreement concluded between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia was interpreted there as a form of endangering Serbia or that Serbia was the main target in relation to this agreement, meaning that such a narrative was constructed. The soccer qualifying match between Albania and England was also used and disinformation was published that English fans had chanted “Kosovo is Serbia”, which turned out to be false. It was also claimed that the red and black fans of the Albanian national team were hanging on a banner that read “21 years we are here together”, implying that 21 years was the genesis of the fan base. They linked this to the fact that 21 years in some way coincides with the mention of the March riots of 2004, implying that 21 years is the year they commemorate the March riots. Such disinformation had no basis in fact.
/The Geopost