Natalia Steblina: “Russians skillfully manipulate professional journalism standards to abuse freedom of speech”

The Geopost presents to its readers the book “Deconstructors of Truth” — a project of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy (Ukraine). The authors are Natalia Steblina, media analyst, doctor of political sciences, professor of the Department of Journalism and Social Communications of the Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University, and Iryna Avramenko — journalist, media trainer, media expert of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy.

The Geopost: How and why did the idea to undertake this work arise?

Natalia Steblina: The idea to investigate Russian liberal media arose a few days before the start of the full-scale invasion. At the Department of Journalism, students and I discussed the topic of propaganda and thought about how to properly analyze it in the media space. For example, I suggested investigating the Dozhd TV channel. This raised the question: “Why do you call this propaganda? These are good Russians, it seems, they are against Putin.”

However, when we delved into the content, we saw that there were also manipulative techniques. One of them is a well-known method of Kremlin propaganda, the so-called “versioning”. When an event occurs, the Russian media creates numerous, often absurd versions of what happened. This distracts attention and creates chaos in the information space. The average non-media literate viewer, of course, will never try to figure out where the truth and where is fiction. Thus, these media work for an audience that perceives information uncritically. We noticed this together with the students.

Later, a full-scale invasion began. I had hoped that the Russians would somehow react, express support or do at least something. However, when I began to analyze their media, it became obvious: this did not happen. On the contrary, in many cases, one or another Kremlin narrative continued to be heard there.

This prompted me to write articles on media outlets like Meduza and Dozhd, as well as analyze other cases. I am joined by Ms. Iryna, to whom I now give the floor. She will talk about her journey to debunking Russian myths and manipulations.

The Geopost: Iryna, what is the difference between “good” and “bad” Russian media and Russians in general? Why such a division?

Iryna Avramenko: First of all, it is a great honor for me to work in the team of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, in particular with Ms. Natalia. Now a few words about the phenomenon of the so-called “good Russians”. When I joined this project, I did not even realize how significant this problem is. At first, I also had certain hopes for “good” Russians. Like many people in the West, I believed that the bearers of great culture would eventually come to their senses and resolutely say “no” to war.

However, having begun a detailed study of this topic together with Ms. Natalia, I realized one important thing. We are all witnesses to a kind of global show. This is a show with “bad Russians”, so to speak – with official Kremlin propaganda, and with, so to speak, “good Russians”, who supposedly oppose the regime. It reminds me of what police officers play when they need to somehow influence a person they suspect of something. Some have their own methods, others have their own methods. In fact, the goal is the same: to preserve this imperial formation that exists in Russia today by any means. This regime is a bloody dictatorship, and this is obvious.

And in fact, as you can see, they have exactly this goal. This is especially noticeable in the content of the “good Russians” themselves. Although they declare their opposition to Putin, at the same time they do not oppose the imperial idea in general. For example, Ekaterina Shulman says that everything was “good” before Putin. They say that the problem is only in him, and without him Russia will again have peace, harmony and “chewing gum”.

Another illustrative example is an interview with Nobel laureate Dmitry Muratov. When Dud asked him about his attitude towards Putin, Muratov replied that he was “surprised” by the attack on Ukraine. He recalled how he met with Putin a year before the war, and that he seemed adequate to him, even promising that he would not annex the so-called “DPR”. At the same time, Muratov does not mention the occupation of Donbas, the annexation of Crimea, or other crimes. One gets the impression that Putin alone is to blame for the war, and if he is “dealt with”, everything will be fine again. And I also noticed that the West hopes that Russia can change. The “good” Russians of the past — Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Tchaikovsky — have become symbols of this hope, as have the “good” Russians of today. However, one of our tasks was to show that neither the “good” Russians of the past nor the “good” Russians of the present are a guarantee of change in Russia. On the contrary, they are a guarantee that everything will continue according to the old imperial scenarios.

The Geopost: What methods does Russian propaganda use to cover its aggression against Ukraine? How does it manage to convince its audience?

Natalia Steblina: We have repeatedly noticed that the strategic Russian narratives and messages that official propaganda spreads around the world are also found in a milder form in the media we monitored. Ms. Iryna can tell in detail how even Russian liberal media are involved in shaping the narrative about “Nazis in Ukraine”.

If we talk about the coverage of the occupied territories, we can see that these media support the narrative that Ukrainians in the occupied territories are supposedly joyfully welcoming Russia, want to be part of it, and support Putin. The frank hate speech that is openly heard in the Kremlin media also appears from time to time in the so-called “good” Russian liberal publications. They do not object when these are voiced that Ukrainians are potential terrorists or something similar.

However, the specificity of these liberal media is not only in their periodic support of Kremlin narratives. It is also in the fact that they insist, even more than the official Kremlin, on the concept of “not everything is so clear-cut”. This is their key message. For example, if there is shelling of Ukraine, as a result of which a Russian missile hits a high-rise building and civilians are killed, these media present it as two different versions. The first version is that a Russian missile struck. The second is that NATO warehouses were allegedly there, which became a target. At the same time, no explanations, background or evidence are provided.

This explains why, for example, part of the audience of “Meduza” supports the war. After all, they are fed similar content: there are two sides, both are shooting, everyone is guilty. So they come to the conclusion that it is impossible to find the truth, and if everyone is guilty, then why change anything? Instead of building the truth, these media blur and destroy it.

That is why our study was called “Deconstructors of Truth.” In the era of digitalization, polarization, and the plurality of discourses, when it is difficult to distinguish truth from fake, Russian liberal media, which position themselves as high-quality and adhere to standards, actually knock the ground out from under the feet of their audience. Instead of providing guidance, they offer chaos and a sense of uncertainty.

The Geopost: At a journalistic conference in Bratislava, a German journalist strongly recommended that Ukrainian media outlets maintain a balance of opinions in covering the war in Ukraine. He asked: why, for example, only Ukrainian sources comment on the events in Bucha, Irpin, and other cities that suffered from the occupation? Why don’t Ukrainian journalists give the floor to Russians? There was also a recent scandal when Canada tried to push the film “Russians at War” by former Russia Today employee Anastasia Trofimova to an international film festival.

Natalia Steblina: This film shows an interesting manipulation technique used by Russian propaganda. For example, a Russian woman claims that she “didn’t see Russians committing war crimes.” And this is the whole point of modern Russian propaganda: if I didn’t see it, it means it doesn’t exist. As a result, the impression is created that “everyone has their own truth.”

There was an example in Ms. Iryna’s research that struck me. Meduza reported that even the kidnappers of Ukrainian children have “their own truth” and are even given a platform. But when we talk about the balance of opinions, it is worth understanding that there is freedom of speech, but there is its abuse. This is also clearly spelled out in international law. As Russian propaganda researcher Peter Pomerantsev notes, the Russians skillfully manipulate professional standards of journalism, in particular the balance of opinions, in order to abuse freedom of speech. He gives an analogy: if in a report they give 5 minutes to Hitler and 5 minutes to a Jew, this is not balance, but a distortion of the truth. The same goes for the events in Bucha: for example, the Dozhd channel had an interview with a Russian military man who was allegedly in Bucha. However, during the conversation, he stated that there were no Russian military there, which means that there were no crimes either. The conversation ended there. This is a classic “they are not there.”

In the context of professional standards of journalism during war, we should remember that during war we should convey the truth as much as possible and check the facts, and not give the floor to liars and terrorists. Because this nullifies the work of a journalist.

The second part of the conversation with the authors of the book “Deconstructors of Truth” will be released in a week.

/The Geopost