
Russia did not become more actively involved, at least not publicly, in the presidential campaign ahead of the first round of elections. That will certainly change in the last week of the campaign for the second round, where they will be able to support the opponent of President Milo Đukanovic much more easily and simply, said Danilo Kalezic, senior researcher of the Historical Institute of Montenegro.
In an interview with The Geopost, Kalezic states that the main goal of the hybrid policy of Russia’s malignant influence in the Western Balkans is “the elimination of Djukanovic and DPS from political life because he is the embodiment of pro-Western politics, at least in Montenegro.”
He is convinced that Russian influence will strengthen as the date of parliamentary elections in Montenegro approaches on June 11, with the fact that the accent of Russian influence this time, he says, will not be exclusively related to the Democratic Front party.
Now it will be more fairly distributed among the other pro-Russian and Serbian parties in Montenegro, mainly among the Democrats, URA and the Europe Now movement, he emphasizes.
The Montenegrin researcher assesses that Western policy is very changeable and sometimes seems confused, and that it seems that the West has not yet made up its mind or determined what it really wants with Montenegro.
“It would be natural for the West in Montenegro to wholeheartedly support the pro-Western option – that is, DPS and coalition partners,” Kalezic assesses.
He believes that Aleksandar Vucic does not want to risk becoming more actively involved in Montenegrin situations until he assesses how much damage he can bring through negotiations with Kosovo.
“He left Montenegro to his inner circle of people, who are not always as effective as when he personally leads a campaign like the one for Niksic, which does not mean that he will not have an impact,” he believes.
“The behavior of Milorad Dodik, who is speculated to be supporting and sponsoring the ‘Europe Now’ party, is interesting. The distribution of influence is known, it is clear that official Belgrade, Banjaluka, parts of the Serbian Church have different candidates or favorites in Montenegro,” he adds.
The idea that Serbian society can break away from the clutches and embrace of Mother Russia is, in Kalezic’s opinion, naive, at least for now.
“Serbia is where it is, the transformation of society requires much more time than a few press conferences or cosmetic changes of ministers. I am afraid that our Western partners do not understand it very well. That the Western partners still have the illusion that this process, like some processes in Britain or America, can happen through a change in the law or a change in the media presentation. In this case, it takes several decades”, believes Kalezic.
When it comes to Russia after Putin, he points to the example of Serbia after the fall of Milosevic
“After the fall of Milosevic, you had a maximum of two or three years of stability in Serbia. This is the maximum you can expect for Russia as well, given that Russia is a country that possesses nuclear weapons. “No one, not even in the structures of the Russian deep state, would play for Russia to get a real democratic government,” he concludes.
Full interview
The Geopost: Montenegro is expecting a second round of presidential elections, soon after that, extraordinary parliamentary elections. Can we expect a stronger Russian hybrid influence in the period between the two elections?
Of course, Russia did not get more actively involved, at least not publicly, in the presidential campaign ahead of the first round of elections. That will definitely change in the last week of the campaign for the second round, where they will be able to support the candidate who is opposed to President Milo Djukanovic much more easily and simply, because actually the goal and the main goal of the Russian hybrid policy of malignant influence in the Western Balkans is the elimination of Djukanovic and the DPS from the political life because he is the personification of pro-Western politics, at least in Montenegro.
During the campaign for the parliamentary elections, that influence will strengthen as the date approaches, and unlike some previous times, I believe that the accent of Russian influence will be on parties other than the Democratic Front (DF). In 2016, you had all the resources put into the function of the DF.
Now it will be “more fairly distributed” to the other pro-Russian Greater Serbian parties in Montenegro, primarily to the Democrats, the URA and the “Europe Now” movement, which still wanders between what it is and what it would like to be. Because they present themselves to the public as European, civil and pro-Western, but the personnel structure, human capital of that party and the ideological matrix are far from that. And I think this is becoming clear to the majority of citizens in Montenegro, but precisely because of this lack of clarity, they are a very desirable partner for Russia in the Balkans.
The Geopost: You said that Russian influence will be more fairly distributed among several parties. Who is the favorite of the West among the parties in Montenegro?
Western politics is very changeable and sometimes seems confused. It would be natural for the West in Montenegro to more heartily support the pro-Western option – that is, the DPS and coalition partners. However, this hypothesized change of government, organized crime and corruption has significantly changed the attitude towards DPS and coalition partners.
However, I believe that DPS and that party expects the return of Western support right before the parliamentary elections and in the context of these events with Russian interference.
It’s no secret that Western politics in Montenegro tried to create that centrist third bloc. The negotiations, at least as far as the public knows, failed and this was best demonstrated on the eve of the presidential election campaign when the parties could not agree on a common candidate.
It will be similar in the parliamentary elections – one cannot expect that parties that are so futilely distant from each other can function together, least of all the more ideologically similar to DF. There are a lot more similarities than meets the eye and it’s becoming increasingly clear. So a very uncertain match for the parliamentary elections is expected with a very variable role of the West.
The Geopost: When it comes to influence from Serbia, can we expect a “Battle for Montenegro”? We already had “Battle for Nikšic”, “Battle for Budva”…
Aleksandar Vucic has an interesting dilemma at the moment. So, the support that Andrija Mandic and DF receives from Belgrade is clear. However, this support is not of the same intensity as it was on the eve of the parliamentary elections in 2020 or on the eve of some local elections.
The Geopost: Does it have anything to do with Kosovo?
Yes, it has to do with Kosovo. However, Aleksandar Vucic is weighing how the negotiations with Mr. Kurti and the Government of Kosovo will develop in order to redefine or define the strategy with Kosovo.
However, he does not want to risk becoming more actively involved in the Montenegrin situation until he sees, until he assesses, how much damage it can potentially bring him in the negotiations with Kosovo.
So I believe that his emphasis is now exclusively on negotiations with Kosovo, while he left Montenegro to his people from a close circle who are not always as effective as when a campaign like the one for Niksic is led by him personally, which does not mean that there will be no influence.
It’s interesting the behavior of Milorad Dodik, who is speculated to be supporting and sponsoring “Europe now”.
The dispersion of influence is recognized, it is recognized that the official Belgrade, Banjaluka, parts of the Church of Serbia have different candidates or favorites in Montenegro.
It wouldn’t be the first time, but I believe that this time it will be the most pronounced.
So we have to see what kind of result the pro-Western bloc will make and how much coalition capacity the pro-Western bloc will have after the elections. For now, that coalition capacity is small, almost non-existent. Dominant because the West still hasn’t decided or defined what it really wants with Montenegro.
The Geopost: The Hague Tribunal recently indicted Putin. What does this mean for Russia, and what for the Balkans?
No one assumes that the indictment itself will operationalize in the sense that Putin will actually be detained and brought before The Hague Tribunal.
However, on a symbolic level it means a lot. You have a president whose mandate is running out against whom the International Criminal Court brought an indictment of such content and on a symbiotic level discredits Russia from the international order and additionally creates pressure on both Serbia and the Western Balkan region to more strongly resist Russian influence and to move away from it more strongly.
First of all, I am thinking of Serbia, the other countries are very clearly classified and their adherence to Western values is unquestionable. However, this is an additional pressure on Serbia, but at the same time it can mean a facilitating factor for Aleksandar Vucic in his intention to break away from Russian influence.
The Geopost: Does it seem to you that Serbia has any intention of breaking away from Russian influence?
There are two dimensions. I believe that his physical intentions and desires exist, that he might personally and intimately want it. It’s a matter of possibility. Serbian society is deeply configured in such a way that it belongs to that civilizational code – from national institutions, churches, political parties, the intelligence community are absolutely under the control of Russia and, not least, the Russian intelligence services. Simply, the idea that you could tear such a society from the clutches and embrace of Mother Russia is naive, at least at this moment.
However, what is worrying is that Aleksandar Vucic is not taking significant steps in that direction. All those attempts that appeared from time to time, primarily through the media, to speak in a different way, to create a different narrative, say the war in Ukraine, failed. And whenever he started that way or showed his intention to go that way, you have those traditional Russian players, the church, through the SPS, the media under his control, who stop that process.
So, he can buy time for another period, but he simply cannot lead it to a sustainable political reality. It cannot create a new political reality.
Serbia is where it is, the transformation of society requires much more time than a few press conferences or a cosmetic replacement of ministers. I’m just afraid that our Western partners don’t understand it the best. That the Western partners still have the illusion that this process, like some processes in Britain or America, can happen through a legislative change or a change in media presentation. In this case, it requires several decades.
The Geopost: The impression is that the Western partners are treating Vucic today like they were treating Putin in 2014 when he annexed Crimea. What is your attitude?
The resemblance is unquestionable. The relationship with Vucic is the relationship with little Putin in the political and geographical sense.
It’s just a matter of when. Therefore, that policy opened the door for Putin to aggression against Ukraine and other similar operations in the surrounding area.
We will see what this policy will produce for the Western Balkans when it comes to Serbia. As with Milosevic, after the failed attempt to emancipate him politically, that policy was replaced by the policy of bombs. I don’t believe that at this moment, in this context, that policy will be replaced by the policy of bombs, but some more radical threats will.
It would be beneficial for Serbian society to finally free itself from the kind of political matrix it is in. But I repeat, it takes an awful lot of time and it cannot happen overnight. So I believe that change will come not as fast as the public in the region would like or as much as we might want to see a change in diplomatic rhetoric to begin with. But it is undeniable that the conversations behind closed doors are quite different from what Ambassador Hill shows in public.
The Geopost: More and more often we hear the thesis that the West is ready to make significant concessions to Vucic in the region – part of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina – in order to sign an agreement with Kosovo. How realistic are these estimates?
In the perception of parts of Serbian society, these are logical things. But the configuration of the Western Balkans itself has simply changed.
The Geopost: We hear from Serbia that they respect the territorial integrity of Montenegro, the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but we rarely hear that Serbia respects the sovereignty of neighboring countries.
Exactly. Territorial integrity is respected to the extent that paramilitary formations and tanks from Serbia no longer cross into Bosnia. But pops, intelligence agents cross over. So only the tactics have changed.
I do not believe in the theory of sacrificing Montenegro in favor of Serbia simply because Montenegro is a member of NATO, a very important part of the Adriatic coast geostrategically belongs to Montenegro at the moment. But, unfortunately, I see the potential to further destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I would not be so pessimistic to believe in that scenario that territorial concessions are made to anyone, but that the destabilization of Bosnia is tolerated, that is, the strengthening of the Republika Srpska in the political sense, that is very certain.
With Montenegro, the outcome of the presidential elections will determine the outcome of that policy, if it even exists as an idea.
The Geopost: How do you see Russia after Putin?
After the fall of Milosevic, you had a maximum of two or three years of stability in Serbia. That’s the maximum you can expect for Russia, and Russia is a country that has nuclear weapons. No one, not even in the structures of the Russian deep state, would play with Russia getting a real democratic government.
If it happens, and everything depends on how he leaves, in the perspective of the hypothetical scenario that he leaves by being replaced or betrayed by people from his environment, which is more realistic than the scenario that Russia experiences a democratic awakening of the people, a spring, a revolution.
So, if he were to leave, I believe that his departure would be related to changes at the top from his environment, which would guarantee the continuity of politics.
So, what is happening with Putin is similar to what happened with Milosevic – not to blame him for leading that war, but for not winning that war, and that opens the way for the Russian army, nationalists within the government, the Russian intelligentsia to be the ones who would carry out some kind of coup, but not in the traditional sense. /The Geopost/