Interview with Former Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Russia Enver Halilovic (Part two)

The Geopost: In your book, you wrote about Kharchenko, Russia’s ambassador. How do you comment on his visit to the border between Kosovo and Serbia, and his visit to the Serbian army together with the Serbian Minister of Defense? 

Halilovic: Russia’s policy towards Kosovo is interesting and has at least two phases. One phase is the one before the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008, when Russia believes that negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade should take place and a joint satisfactory solution should be found, that these negotiations should not be limited in time, that Kosovo should not be recognized by the Russian Federation as an independent state, until the second period when the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo in 2008, when it is no longer possible to talk about how to resolve the dispute, the dispute has already been resolved by declaring independence, i.e. with the support of the Ahtisaari plan in the United Nations Security Council. Then comes a new situation, the question of whether or not to recognize Kosovo after the declaration of independence? In refusing to declare independence, Russia is guided primarily by two things – first, it represents the interests of Serbia and the protection, as they say, of Serbia’s political interests in Kosovo and the Balkans, and second – Russia is trying to gain recognition by negotiating that it should recognize Kosovo. One of the very important people of Russia’s policy towards Kosovo, but also towards the whole Balkans is Bocan-Kharchenko. Kharchenko was ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he has been involved in all political developments in the Balkans, especially since the 1990s. He was even very directly and indirectly involved in the negotiations and in connection with the Dayton Peace Agreement. He is one of the very influential figures within the diplomatic political clubs in Russian diplomacy. From then until today, he is very familiar with all the details that concern here, but he is also very committed to representing the views of the Russian Federation on the Balkans and the place of Serbia in the Balkans for the interests of the Russian Federation. The military neutrality of Serbia is the highest possible concession that Serbia has made and is making to Russia in the political sense. Serbia’s neutrality actually means the impossibility of joining the NATO alliance, and it is of the special interest and importance to the Russian Federation for any country, which has not yet joined the NATO alliance, not to join in NATO.

It happened quite surprisingly and unexpectedly, but something very interesting happened about Montenegro. I was the ambassador in Moscow at the time when Montenegro’s policy of obtaining consent for the Referendum was being pursued. At that time, the ambassador of Yugoslavia of the then Serbia and Montenegro was the Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Rocen, and then in fact the Russian Federation agreed to hold a referendum for two reasons. First, Russia was not so powerful militarily and politically then, then China was still much less powerful than it is today, and Russia could not in fact directly oppose the European and even American tendency, and especially the Montenegrin tendency to make a referendum on the separation of Montenegro from Serbia, and then the Russians had to accept that. The second reason was that Russia was promised that it would be able to buy properties in Montenegro, on the market as well as in some other areas. At that time, the first victim of that agreement with Russia was the purchase of a factory in Titograd. It was bought by Russian tycoons, and Russian tycoons are exclusively in Putin’s political function and in the diplomatic and political function of the Russian Federation as a whole.

When the Russians after the independence of Montenegro began to buy a large number of properties in Montenegro, when so many people emigrated to Montenegro, over 10,000 Russians, mainly in Budva, but also in other areas of the Adriatic coast of Montenegrin, when they began to build primary schools, high school, television in Budva, when it became clear where it was going, when Russian tycoons and even those who were not, bought more than 30,000 plots in Montenegro, then in fact the European Union realized that Montenegro could one day be bought by the Russian Federation. Djukanovic was then asked by the European Union: “Do you want to join the European Union?” You say you want to join the EU, and thousands of Russian tycoons and the Russian population are coming to Montenegro. There was a turnaround, the way of buying and selling changed, the Russians could no longer buy and transfer for themselves what they were buying in Montenegro, and that was a turnaround in Montenegrin politics. Since then, in fact, relations between Russia and Montenegro have detreated. By joining NATO, Montenegro went beyond the influence of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation then does everything in its power, through the civil society, with the support of separatist and nationalist circles in Montenegro, to restore the situation, at least when it comes to membership in the European Union, they restore the situation and bring Montenegro under control, indirectly under its control but directly under the control of Serbia.

Today, we are witnessing the presence of Serbia, that is, the influence of Serbia in Montenegro through the organization of protests, projects, and the appointment of the current government in Montenegro. That attitude of Serbia towards Montenegro is in fact an extended hand of Russian influence and relations with Montenegro, of Russia’s interest in going to another sea.

The Geopost: What do you think about Vučić’s visit to Putin before the elections in Serbia? Is there a lack of interregional cooperation against Russia, how to oppose Russian aggression against the Balkans? 

Halilovic: The visit seems tragicomic. The excuse that they were meeting to sign the gas deal did not stand. Such agreements are signed by officials, they are not even for the ministerial level, let alone for a presidential level. Obviously it was just an excuse for the visit. I do not think that Vucic’s visit has anything to do with the elections in Serbia. Vucic has full control there, he established a totalitarian system, a one-party system in Europe. I think that Vucic has no reason for any special support regarding the elections. I think that visit was mostly related to the talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the talks on Kosovo. These two issues are the key issues in the Balkans, at this moment, unfortunately, the situation in Montenegro has become more complicated, so that Montenegro is becoming a very important focus of political developments in the Balkans. I think that this was an agreement between the two presidents in case of unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if there are serious ones, how to act in that situation. That is the key thing.

As for the next question on how or what to do about the negotiations with Kosovo for the so-called Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo, it is in fact a Serbian project supported by Russia, to implement a Bosnianization of Kosovo, and to stop diplomatic settlement processes, to keep it in a kind of frozen conflict until a second notice. I think these are the main reasons for their meeting, and the gas deal was just excuse.

As for the formation of a kind of alliance between these countries, that are, we can freely say, politically endangered, under political pressure from Russia and Serbia together, primarily for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro. I think that the cooperation between the governments of these states is not enough and that synchronization is missing. Mutual support is needed in terms of public appearance I think that can be a very important factor in stopping the influence of that ideology. Serbian ideology, that is, Serbian leaders, must politically and academically accept the existence of other nations.

The issue of the status of Bosniaks in Serbia is not nearly as resolved as the issue of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The issue of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is far better resolved and resolved in a much better way in Bosnia and Herzegovina than, say, the issue of Bosniaks in Croatia. I do not dispute that Serbia has some historical reasons for its interests in Croatia, but Serbia disputes everyone’s interests in Serbia, it only considers legitimate its interests in other countries. This is a classic indicator and example of a nationalist attitude, i.e. a nationalist doctrine that has a centuries-old tradition from the so-called Eastern Issues to the moment when the question arises “how will the Balkans organize us?”