Romania: Determined Action on the Ukrainian-Russian Frontline

By Dr. Rumena Filipova, Chairperson, Institute for Global Analytics

The enormity of Russia’s war on Ukraine has represented a magnifying glass for countries’ internal consensus or contradictions with respect to relations with Moscow. In Romania’s case, the war prompted a vigorous and concerted response aimed at deterring and minimizing the Russian menace, which has been in line with both the long-term and more recent historical patterns of Romanian foreign policy towards Russia and Bucharest’s stance in (regional) European affairs. Romania has traditionally exhibited a heightened threat perception of the Kremlin informing political-elite and public distrust of Russian motivations and actions. A significant reason for that is rooted in Moscow’s incitement of conflict and division within Moldova – which shares substantial cultural and ethnic affinities with Romania, particularly through the unrecognized, Russian-dominated breakaway region of Transnistria. Wariness of Kremlin policies has additionally shaped a determined Romanian focus on Black Sea security aimed at countering hybrid and conventional military risks emanating from Russia by advancing increased NATO presence. More generally, Bucharest’s circumspection with regard to Moscow’s influence activities has recently been paralleled in a decisive political push focused on limiting the negative repercussions of China’s political and economic initiatives, all of which amounts to an intensified vigilance of foreign authoritarian-state designs.

In accordance with established trends and practice, a number of key Romanian policies have followed since the start of the war in Ukraine. Bucharest lent quick humanitarian and military assistance to Kyiv through active participation and cooperation within EU and NATO structures. Romanian society mobilized to support Ukrainian refugees via on-the-ground practical aid and coordinated action via social media networks. On the political level, the authorities have swiftly acted in line with European Council provisions, granting temporary protection of refugees by offering simplified administrative procedures and immediate access to humanitarian assistance. The Romanian authorities also requested and received operational support from the European Union Agency for Asylum. In recognition of these efforts, the UN Refugee Agency’s Assistant High Commissioner has lauded Romania’s robust emergency response to handling the large refugee flows. Militarily, Bucharest pledged and provided military equipment, including ammunition, to Ukraine within days of the start of the war. Moreover, for the first time in its history, NATO activated the NATO Response Force for collective defense and deterrence, sending units to Romania to reinforce the Alliance’s defense posture in the eastern flank.

In regional affairs, Romania has engaged with Bulgaria, whereby the two countries’ Presidents vowed to increase bilateral connectivity and jointly tackle the economic, social and defense challenges entailed in the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine. Bucharest has also positively responded to Sofia’s goal to forge a collaborative Balkan policy with respect to Russian aggression and its consequences. In addition, Romania’s geographical straddling of Southeast- and Central Europe and its close cooperation with Poland – whereby both Warsaw and Bucharest share a decidedly pro-Atlanticist and Kremlin-wary stance, make Romania a potential connecting link and participant in the different sub-regional groupings in Central and Eastern Europe.

In terms of informational policy, Romanian authorities have demonstrated a growing awareness of the importance of addressing hybrid threats. As a member of the EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Team (alongside Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland), Romania has participated in the first deployment of the unit aimed at providing cyber support to the Ukrainian government. The Romanian National Directorate for Cybersecurity (DNSC) also acted rapidly to implement the decision of the Council of the EU to block access to Russian propagandist media outlets RT and Sputnik. Yet, the impetus to tackle Kremlin disinformation was also utilized for domestic political purposes, as the DNSC blocked domains that belonged not only to the Russian media in question but also to websites critical of the Romanian Ministry of Defense. Aside from such cases of political misuse, however, Romania has striven to forge a whole-of-government and whole-of-society response to disinformation by establishing a Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is tasked with analyzing and building capacity against influence operations.

On the whole, Bucharest’s political, social, informational and military reaction to the war in Ukraine has been both timely and determined, carried out in coordination with its EU and NATO partners. The negative historical loaded-ness of Romanian-Russian relations has thus allowed Romania to play a constructive role in the current crisis, unhindered by the ambivalence that legacies of pro-Russian orientation have conditioned in other countries of Europe.