Russian “Cossacks” in the occupied territories of Ukraine: A threat to children’s identities

With the beginning of Russia's full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the occupation of parts of Ukrainian territory, one of the main targets of the Russian Federation has become Ukrainian children.

The next generation of the Ukrainian nation living under occupation has become a victim of the Russian authorities' social experiments, which aim to reshape the identity and conscience of children.

To this end, Russian officials have developed a number of specialized programs and created numerous paramilitary organizations, branches of which continue to be established in newly occupied settlements. Russia is deliberately turning Ukrainian children into a loyal human resource for its military.

Cossacks as a tool of militarization (2014–2022)

Even before the full invasion, the occupying authorities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine had begun to create military structures that included children. Among the most active groups were the so-called pro-Russian “Cossacks.”

These formations appeared as early as 2014 in the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People's Republic” (DPR) and “Luhansk People's Republic” (LPR).

The Don Cossacks – descendants of a military community that formed along the Don River since the 16th century, with its administrative center in Novocherkassk – experienced a revival in the 1990s, when Cossack movements in Russia gained momentum. Based on decrees signed by the President of the Russian Federation between 1996 and 1998, the Don Cossack Army received official state recognition.

The modern organization “The Great Don Army” was registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice in 1995 and is led by ataman Mykola Kozitsyn.

In 2014, Kozitsyn recruited fighters in Novocherkassk and sent them to Donbas, where the Don Cossacks became one of the main striking forces of what has been called the “hybrid invasion” of the Luhansk region in the spring of that year.

Their units took control of about 80 percent of the territory controlled by the newly created “LPR” structures. This was not a spontaneous action, but an instrument directed by the Kremlin: the recruitment of Cossacks had begun several weeks before the outbreak of fighting.

The formations of Ataman Kozitsyn in occupied Luhansk created the ideological and organizational basis for the systematic militarization of young people. After the beginning of the full occupation, Russian Cossack organizations began to actively recruit local teenagers and young people for both cultural and military purposes.

In the occupied Luhansk region, three Cossack Cadet Corps were created with the support of the “LPR” leader, Leonid Pasechnik, while “Cossack education” was expanded from kindergartens to universities.

In Crimea, the “Yunarmiya” organization – another tool for the militarization and indoctrination of children – had recruited around 29.000 teenagers by 2022.

After complete conquest

With the beginning of the large-scale invasion, the presence of “Cossacks” in the newly occupied territories increased significantly. As of April 2022, about 4.000 Cossacks were fighting in Ukraine, organized into the Don and Tavria units.

By the end of 2023, their number had increased to more than 25.000, mainly within the structures of BARS (Combat Reserve of the Russian Army).

Of the approximately 146.000 registered Cossacks in Russia, approximately 60.000 are of mobilization age, while another 29.000 are cadets enrolled in Cossack schools and are systematically trained for future military service.

For Ukrainians, the Cossacks – especially the Zaporizhia Cossacks – have immense historical significance and are considered a pillar of national identity. They were a self-governing warrior society that dominated the Ukrainian steppes from the 15th century and later created the Cossack Hetmanate, which existed for about 130 years.

The national anthem of Ukraine describes Ukrainians as people of "Cossack origin," while love of freedom, strength, courage, and democratic self-government are considered fundamental traits of Cossack and Ukrainian identity.

Russia appears to be exploiting the popularity and symbolic importance of the Cossacks among the local population in the occupied regions of Zaporizhia and Kherson – the historical cradle of the Zaporizhia Cossacks – to recruit them into its war effort.

For example, the “Dnipro” battalion uses images and symbols traditionally associated with the Ukrainian Cossacks.

In the occupied territories, Cossack units are tasked with maintaining “discipline” through mounted patrols. They also create cadet corps for children and organize firearms training courses for teenagers. Patriotic activities are carried out in cooperation with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.

These measures are not isolated local initiatives. They are consistent with the Strategy of Russia's State Policy for the Cossacks 2021–2030, approved by presidential decree in 2020.

Among its official priorities are the education of the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism and readiness to serve the homeland, the organization of military-patriotic camps and sports activities for young Cossacks before the age of conscription.

Cossack structures operating under the control of the All-Russian Cossack Society are clearly defined as institutions responsible for youth policy and patriotic education.

School as a weapon

Indoctrination – a term used to describe the coercive restriction of the right to education, identity, and free thought – as well as the militarization of young people in Crimea, began almost immediately after Russia's annexation of the peninsula and have continued unabated, becoming increasingly sophisticated and entrenched.

Igor (name changed for security reasons) was just six years old when Russia annexed Crimea, where he lived with his father. He told The Reckoning Project – a global team of journalists and lawyers who document, publicize and build cases for war crimes and atrocities – that from the first day of school he was educated according to Russian educational standards and exclusively in the Russian language.

Every week, teachers showed students Russian propaganda videos that distorted the image of Ukraine and its government, inciting hostility towards them. This practice was later institutionalized through the “Talking About Important Things” program, which is implemented throughout Russia and the occupied territories.

In fifth grade, Igor, along with his entire class, joined a cadet program.

The “Bring Back Every Child” report, prepared by the organization Save Ukraine in partnership with War Child UK and the Human Security Centre, based on interviews with 200 rescued Ukrainian children, found that 41 percent of children had been directly subject to militarization.

One of the main tools of this process is cadet programs, which provide preparation for future service in law enforcement and the military. According to the report, such programs first appeared in Crimea in 2015. During the 2023–2024 school year, 244 cadet classes were operating in Crimea in 78 schools. Similar programs have been introduced in other temporarily occupied territories, although on a smaller scale.

Igor says that theoretically he could have refused to join the cadets, but since all his classmates had enrolled, he felt that refusing would attract unwanted attention from the teachers.

Cadet sessions were held immediately after regular classes. The children learned to march, play chess, sing, and dance. Cadet meetings always began with the singing of the Russian national anthem.

"They told us: if you become soldiers, you will be an example for other children. You will be the best of all," he recalls.

At school, children also learned how to assemble and disassemble the Kalashnikov assault rifle during vocational classes and joined the Yunarmiya (Youth Army) organization, which claims to have around two million members and organizes various patriotic and military activities.

However, when Igor joined during junior high school, participation was largely formal: children were given badges confirming their membership and little more than that.

For the past three years, Igor has secretly attended online classes at a Ukrainian school, while telling his teachers and friends in Crimea that he was enrolled in a Russian online school.

Today he lives in western Ukraine after leaving Crimea with the support and blessing of his father, who managed to maintain his pro-Ukrainian beliefs and teach his son to resist propaganda and brainwashing.

Militarization is not an abstract threat. From February 2022 to July 2025, Russia forcibly mobilized more than 46.000 Ukrainians from the temporarily occupied territories. Among them were students from these territories and men who had previously been part of pro-Russian paramilitary organizations.

Today, they are either fighting against Ukraine, or have become victims of Russian aggression.

Who is responsible?

For Balkan readers, this topic is not abstract. The forced indoctrination of children in occupied territories is a familiar tactic from the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s.

The rewriting of identity through education, the replacement of symbols and language, and the creation of “new citizens” from children of other communities are phenomena that have been documented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo.

What distinguishes Russian aggression against Ukraine is its scale and institutional sophistication. Russia operates through formal state structures, funded by the federal budget, with a clear chain of command and inter-institutional coordination.

This is not a spontaneous process, but a state system of re-education of children.

The militarization of Ukrainian children through their recruitment into pro-Russian Cossack paramilitary formations is taking place under the direct supervision of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

This process involves several Russian ministries, the National Guard, regional governors, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Cossack organizations.

Their role is clearly defined in official documents, including the Cossack Policy Strategy 2021–2030 and the Action Plan 2024–2026, overseen by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

These documents provide for the inclusion of Cossack structures in reserve training and mobilization, the creation of military-patriotic camps for young people, the establishment of Cossack cadet corps, and the expansion of these structures in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Currently, the international community has not yet developed a unified response mechanism.

Personal sanctions against the officials involved remain selective and often do not encompass the entire network of individuals and organizations participating in this system.

Although some pro-Russian Cossack formations and individuals have been sanctioned, the main Russian state-supported Cossack organizations, which operate within the official system of patriotism and militarization, have largely avoided comprehensive sanctions.

Meanwhile, every year that passes without a meaningful response means that another generation of children is being taught to see their own country as the enemy. /The GeoPost/

Vladyslav Havrylov
Global Fellow at Georgetown University, OSINT expert at The Reckoning Project

Tatiana Vorozhko
Contributing editor at The Reckoning Project

Lesya Kesarchuk
Researcher at The Reckoning Project.