Were the Russians in Chisinau preparing a scenario like the one in Podgorica in 2016?

On Monday, 13 February, on the same day that the President of Moldova, Maya Sandu, published worrying information about the existence of a subversive plan by Moscow to overthrow the Moldovan leadership, allegedly involving some Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, the Moldovan border police stopped a group of Serbian fans of the football club “Partizan” and ordered them to return to Serbia.

The action by the Moldovan Ministry of Interior and the Moldovan Intelligence Service (SIS) was, according to Western media, of a “preventive type”.

By banning Partizan supporters, they wanted to prevent foreign nationals from entering Moldova so that there would be no chance, as President Sandu had announced the day before, of causing protests in the country in collaboration with the Russian factor and people loyal to them, all in an attempt to overthrow a legitimate government and create an illegitimate government under the control of the Russian Federation.”

Officially, only twelve Serbian fans travelled to Moldova for the Conference League match between Sheriff and Partizan on a regular flight. In Chisinau they had further information and were afraid, after the announcement of the arrival of two or three more groups of “ultras” on 15 February. Therefore, on the orders of the local security services, the Football Federation of Moldova decided to play the conference league match without spectators.

According to information provided to Pobjeda by two Western security sources, the Ukrainian security service had previously warned the authorities in Chisinau of Moscow’s plans to destabilise the Moldovan authorities after exchanging operational information with their Western counterparts.

REACTIONS: PODGORICA, BELGRADE…

According to this operational information, the Russian network of malign influence has been well established for years in many countries of South-Eastern Europe, especially in the Western Balkans.

In addition to the GRU agents who have outposts in a number of European countries – even large sections of Special Unit 29155 in France – there is also an extensive network of collaborators, citizens of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, who ideologically subscribe to the idea of “Orthodox Pan-Slavism” practised by Vladimir Putin and who are ready to make themselves available when called upon by “Mother Russia”. These groups, which are often organised as fans or Orthodox brotherhoods, are real recruitment centres for people who are prepared to take part in specific subversive political operations.

This is why the announcement by the President of Moldova about the possible involvement of individual Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in “causing disorder and chaos” on the streets of Chisinau has attracted attention in Europe, and especially in Montenegro and Serbia.

Representatives of Podgorica and Belgrade, Montenegrin Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic and Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic, almost in unison, shouted that they “had no information” and asked the authorities in Chisinau for “further clarifications”.

The Montenegrin Prime Minister and Foreign Ministry Coordinator also expressed a certain degree of criticism of the Moldovan President’s statement.

It sounded a bit harsh to me because it gives the impression that Montenegro is participating in the problems that exist in Moldova. Montenegro has its own problems and we are here if we can help them – said Abazovic, stressing that Podgorica will try to get further clarifications from Moldova as soon as possible.

And the Serbian foreign minister, in a slightly harsher tone than Abazovic, demanded that Moldova “urgently provide all the information it has, because Serbia has not yet received such information from Moldova.” Dacic also instructed the Serbian ambassador in Chisinau to “urgently seek clarification of the Moldovan president’s statement from the Moldovan foreign ministry”.

And also to urgently provide us with all information on persons suspected of having participated in such acts of violence, Dačić said.

…AND – MOSCOW

Yesterday, a “first defendant” from Moscow also came forward, claiming that there is a political conspiracy against Russia and the Kremlin.

The claims from Moldova are completely baseless and unfounded – reads a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, reported by Reuters.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova went one step further.

The Moldovan President’s announcements are in the spirit of the classic techniques often used by the US, other Western countries and Ukraine. First, accusations are made regarding allegedly classified intelligence information that cannot be verified, and then they are used to justify their own illegal actions, Zakharova said, accusing the Ukrainian authorities of inventing the claim of an alleged Russian plan to destabilise Moldova in order to “drag it” into a confrontation with Russia.

RUSSIA VS MOLDOVA

Interestingly, spokeswoman Zakharova deliberately omitted to mention that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov – as recently as 2 February – described Moldova as “the next anti-Russian centre after Ukraine”. And in doing so, he stressed that “Moldovan President Maya Sandu is pursuing an openly hostile policy towards Russia”.

Is this not a clear sign that Moldova has long been ‘painted’ as an enemy of Russia?

For those who know Russia’s policy towards Moldova, Sergei Lavrov’s statement fully reflects the Kremlin’s hostile attitude towards the current government in Moldova.

Political analyst Ion Tabarta explains Moscow’s policy towards an independent Moldova for Pobjeda.

Since the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation has continuously tried to control the political power in Chisinau. Moldovan-Russian relations have only been good when pro-Russian political forces have been in charge. Incidentally, when pro-European forces came to power in Chisinau, relations became complicated and Moscow tried to put pressure on Moldova by various means – points out Tabarta, who is also President of the NGO NATO Info Centre .

He recalls that last year, in the midst of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, a scenario emerged of the overthrow of the pro-European government in Moldova with the help of Moldovan politicians from Transnistria, who are Russophile-leaning.

In autumn 2022, we saw a coordinated scenario from the Kremlin to overthrow the pro-European government in Chisinau. The scenario was that Russia’s Gazprom would exert huge energy pressure on the Republic of Moldova in order to increase tariff prices and, as a result, cause dissatisfaction among the population. Against the background of popular discontent, pro-Russian political forces in Chisinau, including the territories where the Russian-speaking population lives, have tried to destabilise the socio-political situation in the Republic of Moldova in order to cause the collapse of the pro-European government. The scenario failed because the government managed to resist socially and economically and the forces of law and order managed to keep the internal situation under control – says Tabarta.

On the risk of a new political attack on Moldova, Tabarta notes that there is virtually no new official information so far and that the only visible action – which would hint at the possibility of Balkan interference in destabilising the situation – in Ukraine has been the banning of a group of supporters from Serbia.

I do not exclude that more intensive talks are taking place between the Republic of Moldova and these countries at the level of special services. In general, the possible interference of people from the Balkan region in political events with the aim of destabilisation is now a top issue for the Republic of Moldova. As a rule, in such cases Moscow has used citizens from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, who are not under the control of the constitutional authorities – according to a political analyst.

It is therefore certain that there is no evidence so far that some citizens of Serbia or Montenegro have been engaged by the Kremlin through Russian intelligence structures to participate in the destabilisation of the political situation in Moldova.

However, the recent Montenegrin experience shows that we should not rule out the possibility that the Russian agency network is engaged in the Balkans as a means of exercising Russia’s malign influence.

THE “MONTENEGRIN CASE”

It is enough to go back six years, to the example of the attempted terrorism in Montenegro in October 2016, because it reveals the methods used by the GRU in attempts to carry out political subversion.

Pobjeda has extensively covered the events following the parliamentary elections – from the arrest of Serbian citizens on 16 October 2016, the day of the elections, through the actions of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and the cooperation of the Montenegrin security services with Western partners, and finally the trial for the attempted terrorism in 2017, i.e. the attempted coup d’état in Montenegro.

The role of the two GRU agents in terms of destabilisation, links with Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, political extremists, members of radical organisations and associations in Serbia, and their links with the leaders of the pro-Serbian and pro-Russian Dermocratic Front have been exposed.

For weeks and months, the outlines of an infernal scenario were being drawn up: the “16 October Action” was designed as a major attack on Montenegro, with the aim of permanently destabilising the country and society, both politically and in terms of security.

The whole operation was exposed from the moment Eduard Shishmakov (aka Eduard Shirokov, as his passport read when he was in Serbia) recruited Aleksandar Sasa Sindjelic, a former Serbian fighter in Crimea, the leader of the “Grey Wolf” group, who led the campaign to recruit Serbian “volunteers” for the mission in Montenegro.

The role of another GRU agent, Vladimir Popov, who once stayed in Belgrade’s famous Hotel Mažestik and was in charge of liaising with the strike units that were to operate in the field and was in charge of the procurement of communications equipment, was further clarified.

According to Pobjeda’s information, which the Montenegrin service received from his Serbian colleagues in the BIA, Vladimir Popov left for Zlatibor in the morning of 16 October with five other persons of unknown origin, foreign nationals, most probably members of the Russian army unit.

They sat in the bar for several hours, as if waiting for orders to disappear – somewhere around 3 p.m., when they broke into their action in Montenegro – in an unknown direction and skilfully avoided observation.

GRU: FROM MOLDOVA TO MONTENEGRO AND BACK?!

GRU agents Shishmakov and Popov never fell into the hands of Montenegrin investigators, nor attended the trial.

They left on time: five days after the failure of the terrorist attack plan and the break-in, they left Serbia on a state plane. The head of all Russian intelligence, General Nikolai Patrushev, arrived in Belgrade after them and took them to Moscow without customs checks!

But as their files began to unravel, it became clear that they were no strangers to organising espionage activities. Thus, while serving as Deputy Military Attaché in Poland, Eduard Shishmakov was tasked with infiltrating the top of the Polish army. He was expelled from Poland in June 2014 (declared persona non grata) after being exposed in a spying operation to recruit a powerful Polish general and several Polish businessmen.

And his comrade from the Operation in Montenegro, GRU agent Vladimir Popov, had a tumultuous past. The 40-year-old Popov had experience in secret ventures planned in Montenegro. And that – in Moldova!

In June 2014, Vladimir Popov was a key Russian actor in Moldova in a covert operation to organise pro-Russian opposition groups ready to overthrow the elected government. This operation was Moscow’s reaction to the Chisinau government’s plan to sign the Republic of Moldova’s European Union Association Agreement.

It turned out that the action in Montenegro was designed along the same matrix as in Moldova. Moscow then designed various scenarios in Moldova: from the management of civil disobedience actions, to the organisation of paramilitary groups, to the attempt to bribe members of the Moldovan Parliament to prevent the ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU …

The events in Montenegro were as intertwined as in the spring: Moscow’s geostrategic interests and domestic politicians dependent on Russian interests; agents of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) with domestic radical politicians supported by members of extreme nationalist associations from neighbouring Serbia …

It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the dangerous matrix, which has already been used twice, once in Moldova and Montenegro, has now been prepared again in Chisinau?

NEVER SAY NEVER

Politicians from Montenegro and Serbia have dismissed the possibility that points of Russian malign influence are under the radar of their intelligence services.

But the experience of recent years shows that Russian intelligence, especially in the Western Balkans, is not resting. On the contrary: in Montenegro, there is still a widespread network of radical pro-Russian groups, through the forms of various associations, the Orthodox confraternities of the Serbian Church, which, as has been seen in recent months, openly support Russian aggression against Ukraine. As well as the Russian agency network.

An international operation last September, in which the National Security Agency, led by Sava Kentera, took part, revealed that more than fifty people were covertly working in Montenegro for the interests of the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin’s military regime.

Therefore, for the sake of the safety of Montenegrin citizens, the question must be asked: is Dritan Abazovic, as the first man of executive power in Montenegro and head of the National Security Agency, who was put in place by the outgoing Prime Minister after Kentera was easily dismissed, really a credible guarantee that there are no active enclaves in Montenegro that are being used, or can be used, by the Russians for their political and geostrategic interests?

It is difficult for me to guarantee anything and to have any information from Western partners after the dismissal of Sava Kentera last October brought the Montenegrin intelligence and security sector back under the aegis of a Russian agency, amid an international investigation into a Russian spy network.

Fan leaders, crime and politics

The links of fan groups and their leaders with politics and organised crime and security services in the Western Balkans developed particularly at the end of the last century, when the “bloody break-up” of the SFRY began, and fan leaders became important actors and political agendas.

Certainly the most famous is Željko Ražnatović Arkan – who is from the leader of “Delije” (FK Crvena zvezda fan group), who in the late 1980s and early 1990s became one of the mafia leaders in the Balkans, a commander of paramilitary formations, and then an influential businessman.

Among the fans, the mafia also recruited the notorious Veljko Belivuk, known as Velja Nevolja, who was the leader of the FK Partizan fan group “Principi”, which was formed from the former “Janjičari”. He is on trial in Belgrade for serious crimes, brutal liquidations and many other crimes. And Belivuk has established strong links with politics and the security services in Serbia.

Last June, the Global Initiative to Fight Transnational Organised Crime conducted a study entitled “Dangerous Games: Football Hooliganism, Politics and Organised Crime in the Western Balkans”, which showed that football fan groups are mainly from Serbia, but also some from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina, have strong links with the mafia and political structures.

One of the authors of the study, Saša Đorđević, said that the tribune is a great place to send political messages, while fan groups are a source of mobilisation of people, providing security at political rallies or a sudden element that turns a peaceful gathering into a violent one through provocations.

Ruggero Scaturro, the leader of this study, said that “in terms of the number and spectrum of incidents, the most worrying groups are those in Serbia (mainly Delije, Grobari, Firma, United Force and Torcida Sandžak), followed by those in Bosnia and Herzegovina (mainly Ultrasi, Horde zla, Lešinari, Manijaci, Red Army i Škripari)”.

The media reported that the survey highlights that “thugs linked to football hooligan groups are involved in serious organised crime, but appear to enjoy a degree of political protection.”

The Janjičari, supporters of FK Partizan, have built close links with state officials (especially in the police) and with the “Kavač” clan, an organised crime group from Montenegro that specialises in trafficking cocaine from Latin America to Europe – according to the Global Initiative, Serbian media report.

The leader of the “Janjičari”, Aleksandar Stankovic, was killed in 2016 in what is believed to have been a mafia drug bust.

This fan group was succeeded by the “Principi” group, of which Belivuk was the leader. Serbian police arrested Aleksandar Kajmaković in February 2021, along with 20 other members of this fan group, and Kajmaković is suspected of “laundering” money for them, according to media reports.

The group has been accused of murder, kidnapping, torture, racketeering and drug dealing./Pobjeda/