Atlantic Initiative: Montenegro may become a dubious member of NATO and make slow progress towards the EU

Through political intermediaries, it has increased the power and influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and set the country on a precarious path that could have important consequences not only for Montenegro’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious balance and internal stability, but also for the Western Balkans more broadly, the study says.

Although it is unrealistic to assume that any new government will publicly renounce Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, given the strong influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (mainly, though not exclusively, through the DF), the country will be a somewhat dubious NATO member … and will continue to make slow progress towards EU membership, is one of the conclusions of the study “The Orthodox Church, Montenegro and the ‘Serbian World'”, by Vesko Garcevic, Professor of International Relations at Boston University and Kenneth Morrison, Professor of History at De Montfort University.

In the study, Garčević and Morrison provide an overview of the relationship between the state of Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church since the 1990s, with a particular focus on the events that followed the adoption of amendments to the Law on Freedom of Religion (2019).

In this part, they focus specifically on the litanies that were organised in 2020, the formation of the government of Zdravko Krivokapić, the forcible enthronement of Metropolitan Joanikijae Mićović in Cetinje and then the formation of the government of Dritan Abazović, who lost trust by signing the so-called Basic Treaty.

IMPLICATIONS

The authors of the study, while explaining the concept of a “Serbian world”, of which the Serbian Orthodox Church is a powerful weapon, stress that this project can never be realised without Montenegro.

As one of the consequences that Montenegro could face due to the events of the past years, Garčević and Morrison cite greater alignment with Serbia’s regional policy, including the “Open Balkans” initiative and the “dark Serbian world”.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine continues to cast a dark shadow, and while Montenegro’s position on this conflict may not change dramatically or suddenly, the new government may seek “procedural options” to slow down the implementation of unwanted or unpopular EU decisions against Russia – the studies point out.

In a detailed review of developments, the authors note that the Serbian Orthodox Church has strengthened its position in Montenegro since 2019.

Through political intermediaries, it has increased the power and influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, setting the country on an uncertain path that could have important consequences not only for Montenegro’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious balance and internal stability, but also for the Western Balkans more broadly – the study points out.

The relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state of Montenegro began with an exploration of the role of former Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic, who since his enthronement has been actively involved in political life and has campaigned against, as he put it, “pushing the Church out of real life”, including politics.

THE ROLE OF AMFILOHIJE

They recalled his attitudes towards Montenegrins, whom he did not consider a special people, and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which he said had a role to play in converting Montenegrins to Catholicism.

His role in the wars of the 1990s was also recalled, when he supported the Yugoslav/Serbian armed forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and blessed the reserve forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Montenegrin irregulars before the attack on Dubrovnik in October 1991.

With his consent, the Cetinje Monastery (seat of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral) hosted the Serbian warlord Željko Ražnatović Arkan and his “Tigers” on two separate occasions. On St Peter’s Day (12 July) in 1991, the Cetinje Monastery opened its doors to the armed “Tigers”, who turned the monastery into a “barracks”. He welcomed them back on Orthodox Christmas Day in January 1992 – Garcevic and Morrison recall.

They also stated that during the Amfilohije period, the Serbian Orthodox Church supported the Uniates in their campaigns for the restoration of Montenegrin independence, that it opposed the recognition of Kosovo and that it was actively involved in the propaganda campaign waged against Montenegro’s entry into the NATO alliance.

But, write Garcevic and Morrison, notwithstanding the numerous disputes with the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Montenegrin authorities have largely avoided discussing the pressing issues: the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the country, the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the question of property rights.

THE CULMINATION OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict between the state and the Church culminated in the adoption of the amendment to the law on freedom of religion, and the authors recall that in response to this, the Serbian Orthodox Church organised rallies that led to a change of government in the 2020 elections, and they also point out that the government of Zdravko Krivokapić was formed under the strong influence of religious organisations and was composed in the Ostrog monastery.

They also recalled the protests that followed the enthronement of Joanikije on Cetinje on 5 September 2021, when a “ceremony” took place.

The inauguration at Cetinje was, for those who stood on the barricades at Belvedere near Cetinje or supported the protests in Montenegro from their homes, another proof of the power that the Serbian Orthodox Church now had with the support of Belgrade – they stressed.

This was followed by a vote of no confidence in the Krivokapić government and the formation of the government of Dritan Abazović, who has made the signing of the agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church a priority issue for his action.

There is no doubt that Abazovic, by signing the treaty – which Milo Đukanović described as “the worst betrayal of national interests since 1918” – has embarked on a major political gamble, they stressed.

They stressed that insecurity in Montenegro has increased in recent months and pointed out that the country is plagued by a number of problems.

Weak institutions, corruption and partitocracy contribute to creating an environment that can be manipulated in favour of Belgrade’s regional ambitions, as well as those of the proponents of the “Serbian world” project in Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study found.

Sources of power

When talking about where power comes from, Garčević and Morrison explain that for Serbs in the Western Balkans, the Church is a constant, presenting itself as their authentic articulator of the soul.

Although its influence is realised relatively discreetly, it still exists. The Serbian Orthodox Church is not just an instrument of soft power; it is an important node in a network involving politics, traditional and social media and academia within a broader project called “the Serbian world”, the study states.

It also pointed out that the Church does not run away from controversy and listed the far-right movements and associations it supports – Naši, Narodna patrola, Ruski oslobodilački pokret, Otačastveni pokret Obraz, Tvrdoš, Stupovi, Miholjski zbor, Noćni vukovi./Pobjeda/