The West to make maximum effort so that Montenegro does not completely deviate from the path towards the EU

Written by: Ivo Goldstein

On Sunday 19 March, Montenegro will hold the first round of presidential elections (with a possible second round on 2 April). Their importance on the Montenegrin political scene goes far beyond that of regular elections, and they have a big importance on the international political scene.

Following a referendum, Montenegro declared independence in 2006. The coalition led by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) under the leadership of Milo Đukanović won four parliamentary elections between 2002 and 2012. Montenegrin national policy in those years was oriented towards EU and NATO accession: the EU membership application was submitted in 2008 and accession negotiations started four years later. By all accounts, it looked like it would be a success story.

The situation is complicated by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, when Montenegro, in line with EU policy, imposed sanctions against Russia. The following year, at a mass protest in Podgorica led by the pro-Serb and pro-Russian Democratic Front (a coalition of opposition parties and organisations), the government was accused of corruption and crime (which was a major problem), and also opposed to NATO and EU approximation. It should be said – at that time, Russian influence in the country was already extremely strong – with the immigration of Russian citizens and their extremely large investments, especially in tourism (which also accounted for a significant part of the money laundering).

The situation escalated before the national elections in October 2016. Then, two operatives of the Russian secret service GRU, with the help of the pro-Serbian opposition, attempted to stage a coup d’état and prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. 14 Russian, Serbian and Montenegrin citizens, including Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, two leaders of the Democratic Front, were sentenced to several years in prison. However, this verdict was later overturned in court. A month after the failed coup, Montenegro was admitted to NATO, and then, in the first round of the 2018 presidential elections, Milo Đukanović won, with 53.9% of the vote. The situation has only temporarily calmed down.

It was a time of growth of pro-Serbian (and pro-Russian) parties, but also of identity turmoil. Namely, the number of Serbs in Montenegro has been growing exponentially since World War II – according to the first post-war census in 1948, there were 6,700 (less than two percent, there were about a hundred more Croats then!), in 1971 there were already 39,512 (7.5% ), in 1991, 57,453 (or 9.3%), and in 2003, even 198,414 (or 32%). For those who identified themselves as Serbs, this was due to the understanding that Montenegrin is only a regional characteristic, while Serbian is a national definition. In this sense, these people see Montenegro as another Serbian country. As a result, they advocate pro-Russian policies and are largely opposed to Montenegro’s entry into Euro-Atlantic integration.

Yet, despite all its imperfections, Montenegro has developed as a society in a long transition as a relatively stable multi-ethnic democracy until 2020. It is the only one of the five post-Yugoslav countries (plus Albania) to have opened all and closed some negotiating chapters in its accession negotiations with the EU.

At the beginning of that year, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in Montenegro launched a series of protest rallies, a clear signal that it will actively engage in the campaign for the parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of August. The elections were narrowly won by the pro-Russian pro-Serb coalition, which won only one more MP in the Montenegrin Parliament than the opposition (41:40!). Under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapic, ministers were mostly chosen as non-party figures, but according to the criteria of SPC loyalty and proximity to the conservative right.

The composition of the government was largely in line with the wishes of the then Metropolitan Amfilohije Radovic, the most influential advocate of Russian interests in Montenegro. The Democratic Front became the strongest in the Assembly, forming a coalition with the groups around Democratic Montenegro and the groups around URA (United Reform Action). The latter two groups are declaratively pro-Western and in the elections (falsely) committed themselves to fighting corruption, clientelism and crime (“the fight against the mafia is a fight for an honourable Montenegro”, etc.), but in the following months they actually joined the implementation of the pro-Russian and pro-Russian project.

Serbia also interfered more or less directly in internal Montenegrin affairs, both in the electoral process in August 2020 and in the local elections the following year (senior officials of Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party, for example, engaged in “vote-buying” in the local elections in Nikšić). Towards the end of 2022, it was announced that Serbia would spend three times as much money in 2023 as the previous year on various Serbian organisations in neighbouring countries. On the same days, representatives of six Montenegrin municipalities from the Democratic Front reported to the Diaspora Committee of the Assembly of Serbia on the situation of Serbs in their local governments. Among other things, they said that Serbia is their “mother country” and pointed out that the tricolor flag and the Cyrillic alphabet have been returned to government premises. They also presented plans to further strengthen the Serbian national identity in Montenegro, behaved as representatives of the Serbs, even though they are not or should not be.

Krivokapić’s government did not even last a year and a half, as the Assembly voted no confidence in it in January 2022. The consequences of this government have been catastrophic – Montenegro’s progress towards EU membership has been halted, the country has regressed economically, in health, education and culture. However, this was less the result of ignorance and more the result of an organised effort to destroy Montenegrin institutions and to portray Montenegro as a dysfunctional state.

The government crisis in Montenegro was resolved in April 2022 with the help of the US administration, when a new government was elected with minority support. Dritan Abazovic, President of the URA and Deputy Prime Minister and coordinator of all security services in the previous government, became Prime Minister. However, instead of unblocking the negotiation process with Brussels and stabilising the pro-Western policy, Abazovic continued with the policy of dismantling Montenegrin institutions.

In doing so, he has, by all accounts, consistently followed the instructions of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. This is the implementation of a broader plan – for although Vucic rejects it, he is in fact clear that he thinks that the independence of Montenegro, part of Kosovo and part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) are temporary.

This claim is well illustrated by the fact that he is not acting as President of Serbia, but as President of all Serbs, and he is making this known not only to Montenegro, but also to other neighbours, including Croatia (let us recall his wishes for a private visit to Jasenovac, his unacceptable statements about Oluja, the announcement by the National Bank of Serbia that it would prevent Croatia from placing Tesla on the euro coin, the production of the films “Oluja” by Miloš Radunović and “Dara iz Jasenovca“ (Dara from Jasenovac) by Predrag Antonijević, etc. While his narrative is diplomatic, his closest associates speak openly about the realisation of a “Serbian World” project (along the lines of Putin’s “Russian World” project).

A modified and well-disguised economic version of this project is the “Open Balkans”, promoted by Vucic together with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. Although it presents itself as a project of regional economic integration, it is in fact an attempt to prepare the ground for a new territorial demarcation of Serbs and Albanians at the expense of third parties (Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims/Bosnians, and partly also Croats and Croatia).

Patriarch Porfirije, who showed a moderate face while serving as Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana, shocked by taking part in the helicopter landing on Cetinje on the occasion of the enthronement of the new Metropolitan Joanikije in September 2021, which was declared by neutral analysts to be more of a political demonstration than a religious event.

In March 2022, Joanikije, Metropolitan of Montenegro declared that Montenegro “is meant to be a small Ukraine” and that a month later, during a visit to Moscow, he would preside at a liturgy with Patriarch Kirill of Russia and advocate “overcoming the temptations and for a just solution to these temptations that today concern the Russian Orthodox Church, the people and the country”. In Montenegro, the SPC has formed a number of paramilitary “brotherhoods” whose members promote ultra-Orthodox views, glorify the Russian aggression against Ukraine and incite hate speech against members of minorities, the LGBT population, etc. Dritan Abazovic was filmed just a few days after the start of the Russian aggression as a participant in one of these ultra-Orthodox rallies. After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the activities of these groups intensified.

In addition, Russian citizens established more than 50% of new businesses in Montenegro in 2022 (4000 out of a total of 7000). Abazovic’s government wants to take over majority ownership of the Bar port, which raises doubts that the port could be available to Serbian and Russian interests. Serbian-Russian poltroons virtually control the entire media scene in the country, the University of Podgorica and the Academy of Sciences, as well as a number of other institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and the National Security Agency.

One day before the presidential elections, Montenegro is almost in disarray: the Government is in a technical mandate, the Assembly has lost its legitimacy and does not have a stable majority, the Constitutional Court has been blocked for a long time. Recently, with an unconstitutional law, passed despite the directly contrary instructions of the Venice Commission, an attempt was made to collapse the last legitimate institution in the country – the institution of the president, which failed.

After two and a half years of organised subversion of the state, it is clear that the presidential elections have the potential to determine the political direction and fate of Montenegro for a long time to come, and to have a significant impact on relations in the wider region.

According to the relevant opinion polls, there is no doubt that the predominant orientation of Montenegrin citizens is pro-Western – more than 70% of them support Montenegro’s accession to the EU in the polls. This pro-Western majority, however, lacks adequate political articulation. Under the influence of Russian and Serbian propaganda, a false impression is being created that the pro-Western opposition parties are in fact promoters of “Montenegrin nationalism”, while the SPC-controlled parties (Democratic Montenegro, Evropa Sada and URA) are supposedly pro-Western parties of the centre.

All opinion polls say that the incumbent President Milo Đukanović will definitely make it to the second round. His rivals will be Democratic Front leader Andrija Mandić and Jakov Milatović of the growing political party Evropa Sad, which won the local elections in Podgorica. It is difficult to predict who has a better chance of finally winning in the second round.

Western diplomacy and politics have in recent years stressed that corruption and crime are the key problems in the Western Balkans, with the expansionist policies of Serbia and Russia being of incomparably lesser importance. This view was slowly changing, but then Russia’s aggression against Ukraine changed everything.

It would therefore be essential for the West to make every effort to ensure that Đukanović wins, so that Montenegro does not completely derail from the path to the EU and does not become a colonial outpost of Russian (and Serbian) interests. It cannot be indifferent to the West whether Russia and Serbia will jointly, strongly and definitely come directly to the Mediterranean Although for the most part Croatian politics behaves as if it does not concern it (with the exception of the two meetings between Đukanović and President Milanović in 2021), the possible defeat of Đukanović would have multiple bad consequences for Croatia as well./AntenaM, Express, 24 sata/