Lighting another Balkan fuse in Kosova

Exclusively for The Geopost: Janusz Bugajski

Washington and Brussels are lighting another Balkan fuse by exerting pressure on Prishtina to establish an Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM). Although the proponents of the ASM claim that it will not undermine Kosova’s constitution or threaten its independence and democratic institutions, in practice it can have serious negative repercussion both domestically and regionally.

Any arrangement based primarily on ethnicity in which a neighboring state fails to recognize Kosova’s independence is a recipe for conflict. The existing Serb-majority municipalities already provide the minority with local representation, the right to appoint police officers, education in the Serbian language, and numerous other benefits. At the same time, Belgrade undermines Kosova’s integrity through its “parallel” institutions in the north of the country and directly interferes in Kosova’s politics by controlling Srpska Lista, the party that has disproportionate powers in parliament and guaranteed ministers in government. Subversion is also evident in cross-border criminal networks, media disinformation, and facilitation of Russian penetration.

Given this context, the ASM would provide a deeper and broader opportunity to undermine Kosova’s statehood. The proposals presented to Prishtina by the US government and evidently devised by French and German bureacrats have at least three crucial weaknesses. First, they lack any credible guarantees that the new ASM institutions will not be infiltrated and dominated by agents or activists dispatched or recruited by Serbia. Second, there is no envisaged mechanism for the Kosova government to suspend or disband the ASM if its leaders violate the constitution through ethnic discrimination, division, or conflict at municipal levels.

And third, even without any ill intent the ASM can generate rifts and resentments between ethnic communities, especially where the Serbian minority is favored with separate institutions and increased governmental and foreign funding. One can also posit credible scenarios where municipal authorities at Belgrade’s behest provoke confrontations and claim that Prishtina is not fulfilling its obligations. Such maneuvers will be designed to indefinitely delay the US/EU objective of inter-state recognition.

The external impact of the ASM in Kosova could be even more explosive – by empowering Belgrade to interfere in the politics of its neighbors and stimulating separatist initiatives throughout the region. Ethnic groups forming majorities in several municipalities in other countries can demand special status or claim they are being discriminated against by the central government and therefore need their own institutions. They can also appeal to international actors for support, as a new precedent for such initiatives would have been established in Kosova.

Albanian leaders will argue that similar associations for their own ethnic communities should be established in the Presheva valley in Serbia, in northwestern Macedonia, and in southern Montenegro. Bosniaks can demand comparable arrangements in the Sandjak region of Serbia and Montenegro. Hungarians in Vojvodina are unlikely to remain on the sidelines, together with other national groups in the province. The Serbian population in Montenegro can demand distinct associations in parts of the country where they form majorities, which will seriously undercut Montenegro’s independence. And the ethnic inter-municipality experiment in Kosova will rebound negatively on Bosnia-Herzegovina by encouraging Croats to push for a separate entity and emboldening the separatist objectives of the existing Serbian entity.

If any kind of municipal association is to be accepted by Prishtina then at least three simultaneous policies must be adopted to help shield Kosova from instability. First, Serbia needs to take concrete steps in accepting Kosova’s independence even if there is no immediate formal recognition. This can start with amendments to the Serbian constitution that would no longer define Kosova as Serbian territory and the termination of all efforts to block Kosova’s international recognition and membership of multi-national organizations.

Second, the process of Kosova joining NATO must be significantly speeded up with a Membership Action Plan or some similar arrangement for Prishtina to fulfill the conditions for accession. Until this is accomplished, NATO should increase its force in Kosova to demonstrate that it will protect the state and its territory. And third, Russia’s subversion of the Western Balkan region must be comprehensively and systematically combated in all informational, economic, security, social, religious, and cultural domains. Without such decisive moves, the Balkan fuse will burn ever faster. /The Geopost/

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His new book is “Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture“.