Janusz Bugajski for The Geopost: Intra-Albanian conflicts are intensifying

Although Albanians frequently display their national unity in flag waving, grand speeches, and symbolic gestures, in reality conflicts over power and statehood simmer just below the surface. In the case of Albania-Kosova relations, the political tensions and conflicting ambitions are now boiling over and the effect will primarily favor Serbia’s regional agenda.

Kosova’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti has publicly criticized Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama for supporting President Aleksandar Vučić by helping to draft a statute for an autonomous Serb entity in Kosova without consulting Prishtina. He also stressed that Rama has failed to make a reciprocal proposal for Albanians in the Presevo valley, even though article eight of the Albanian constitution obliges Tirana to protect the rights of Albanians in all countries, especially in the Balkans.

In fact, Prishtina has an accumulation of grievances against Tirana and particularly against the current Socialist government. Kosova leaders have raised serious questions over Rama’s support for the Open Balkan initiative – a format that favors Serbian business and expansionist objectives. The government in Tirana also demonstrates little public solidarity with Prishtina on vital questions in the dialogue with Belgrade. Indeed, it often seems that personal ties between Rama and Vucic override any concerns over Kosova’s security and international integration.

However, a deeper game is also at play. Rama believes Tirana should be the center of the “Albanian world” with Prishtina as a provincial capital. Such goals are resented by almost all political leaders in Kosova who view the state as their crowning achievement after years of subordination to various iterations of Serbia-Yugoslavia. Although Kurti has expressed potential backing for a single Albanian state through democratic procedures and an open referendum, it is difficult to imagine his acceptance of a merger with Albania in which Kosova’s status is downgraded to a province. Moreover, the longer that Kosova exists as a state the deeper is the sense of distinctiveness among its population and unwillingness to be subordinated again.

Rama displays a Tirana-centered view of pan-Albanianism in which deals can be made over the heads of elected leaders in Prishtina. Hence, the tacit support by Tirana for Kosova’s partition during the Trump administration, in which the north would revert to Serbia and the rest to Albania. Although the secret deal was not made public, enough details were leaked out over border changes that implicated both Serbia and Albania. The Trump proposals were finally shelved when they encountered stiff international resistance and threatened to inflame the region.

The newest project envisages redividing the region without changing borders and has evidently gained approval in the Biden administration. The Western Balkans are to be apportioned into three distinct spheres of influence, whereby Belgrade, Tirana, and Zagreb would gain political and economic influence over smaller neighbors, including Kosova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Under international pressure the weaker states would be expected to comply in order to supposedly ensure regional stability.

Kurti’s criticisms of Rama indicate that the plan is well-known in Prishtina and is further souring relations between the two Albanian states. Paradoxically, having displayed staunch resistance to Belgrade’s dominance for several decades, Prishtina now has to demonstrate its resistance to Tirana’s “big brother” syndrome. Kosovars will oppose attempts to limit their independence or schemes such as the Serbian “municipal association” that is certain to make the state politically dysfunctional. Indeed, Kurti should consider calling snap elections to demonstrate how much public support the government actually has in resisting pressures to concede ground to Belgrade. This would also send a strong signal to Albanian citizens that Kosova’s development cannot be decided in Tirana.

Disputes between Albania and Kosova and between Albanian leaders across state borders can be constructive if they lead to novel initiatives and involve the public in both countries in discussions about a common future. However, the current discord primarily serves the interests of the Vučić administration in three ways. First, support from Tirana strengthens Belgrade’s hand in the dialogue with Prishtina. Second, it diminishes Kosova’s standing in both Washington and Brussels while raising Rama’s reputation as a regional problem solver. And third, it feeds into Serbian stereotypical accusations that Albanians are incapable of governing themselves and need a regional master.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His recent book is Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture. His forthcoming book is titled Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Strategic Player.