Institutional collapse and the blocking of Serbia’s European path

Confronted with increasingly serious and almost insurmountable challenges both domestically and internationally, the regime of Aleksandar Vučić has opened a direct front against those segments of the prosecution and judiciary that it does not control.

This conflict has reached the point where pro-government media are openly announcing the abolition of the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime (TOK), disguised as an alleged “reorganization” of Serbia’s prosecutorial system.

However, despite these announcements, the authorities have not yet dared to formally present such a proposal before parliament. Instead, one of the regime’s well-known figures associated with shady political dealings, acting in the capacity of an MP, has submitted an initiative to amend justice-related laws.

Although this proposal does not explicitly mention TOK, it is clear that it represents a “trial balloon” by the authorities to test reactions from the domestic public and the European Union. Given the Vučić regime’s well-known modus operandi, there is a reasonable fear that, in order to avoid a strong public backlash, the attack on the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime could be carried out later through the introduction of additional amendments. These amendments could be added at a later stage to the proposal submitted by the former hunger striker from the so-called “Ćacilend” tent, MP Uglješa Mrdić.

It is equally possible that the entire proposal could be withdrawn or rejected if the authorities assess that an open confrontation with TOK would provoke extremely negative reactions from the European Union and the domestic public.

Meanwhile, alongside Mrdić’s political performance in parliament, the regime suffered a significant defeat in the elections for members of the High Prosecutorial Council, where candidates backed by the authorities were decisively defeated. Through a series of obstructive actions—including complaints by the losing candidates and attempts to block the functioning of the Council—the regime is now trying to contest the electoral process and impose a repeat of the vote.

Nevertheless, prosecutorial organizations are strongly resisting these efforts, and it is becoming increasingly clear that the prosecution may turn into an even greater obstacle for Vučić than the universities, which have long been targets of political pressure.

What has truly alarmed Vučić regarding the work of the prosecution are the investigations launched by the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime into the regime’s attempts—through the state-owned Telekom and its director—to shut down the last media outlets in Serbia that are not under the direct control of the authorities. These investigations have triggered an open clash between TOK and the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade, which is controlled by Vučić, over parallel investigations into the case involving the audio recording of a conversation between Telekom Serbia’s director, Vladimir Lučić, and United Group CEO, Sten Miller.

In this recording, the director of the state telecommunications operator, acting on behalf of the President of Serbia, asks the head of the competing company to remove “undesirable” staff from the media outlets owned by that company. While what is publicly known as “Vučić’s prosecution” is attempting to cast doubt on the authenticity of the recording, TOK has focused on the existence of serious abuses suggested by its very content.

As with the police—whom Vučić is subjecting to a deep кадров “purge,” or more precisely, contamination with loyal cadres—his fear of TOK stems from the fact that this prosecution office possesses a significant amount of evidence regarding links between the regime and organized crime. Politically weakened, Vučić has become aware that the era of impunity is nearing its end and that he, along with members of his closest circle, including family members, could easily face criminal liability once they lose power.

The regime’s struggle against the independence of the judiciary has also been accompanied by a court decision to dismiss further proceedings against Vučić’s ministers, who are considered responsible for the collapse of the shelter in Novi Sad, where 16 people lost their lives. This case demonstrates that, through courts it controls, Vučić is attempting to remove from investigation those suspects through whom the tragedy—and the corrupt links that led to it—could directly implicate him.

Here again, the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime has become an obstacle to the authorities, as it is conducting a parallel investigation into corruption throughout the entire Belgrade–Subotica railway construction project—an affair in which familiar government figures once again appear as suspects, including Goran Vesić and Tomislav Momirović.

At the same time, Vučić has also faced the collapse of the process to select a new council for the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), as well as the continued refusal by most EU member states to open Cluster 3 in Serbia’s EU accession negotiations.

Beyond control over the state’s coercive apparatus and the justice system, control over REM—which by law should be an independent regulatory body for electronic media—is vital to the survival of Vučić’s regime. Through this institution, he not only controls the public broadcaster by directly influencing the appointment of members of the RTS Governing Board, which selects the director-general, but also controls the allocation of public frequencies to “suitable” media outlets and blocks their allocation to media that are not aligned with the authorities.

However, the European Union insists precisely on the liberation of Serbia’s captured media scene as a fundamental precondition for holding free and fair elections and for stabilizing the country’s internal situation. Such a process would essentially mark the beginning of the end of Vučić’s regime and open the way for examining his legal responsibility.

Confronted with the reality that neither he nor his regime have a place in a rule-of-law state that is a member of the European Union, Vučić has chosen to sabotage Serbia’s further progress in the European integration process and to push the country toward self-isolation. Although, like his authoritarian counterparts in Georgia, he still does not dare to openly reject Serbia’s European path, through continuous obstruction he achieves the same practical effect.

And that effect is a direct blow to Serbia’s future, which—if it remains isolated and outside the European Union—faces a real risk of gradual disappearance from the map of independent and stable states. /TheGeoPost.