Bulgaria’s Russia Dilemma

By Dr. Rumena Filipova-Chairperson, Institute for Global Analytics

Bulgaria has long been characterized by the division between pro-Russian and pro-Western forces, also more traditionally known as the division between the ‘Russophiles’ and the ‘Russophobes’. On the one hand, pro-Russian sentiments are present among a large section of the Bulgarian population based on cultural, historical, linguistic and emotional attachments to Russia. On the other hand, at least since the Revival period (19^th-century period of consolidation of national consciousness preceding the wars of liberation from the Ottoman Empire), Europe and the West have been perceived as the model of economic progress and political modernization that should be emulated and implemented. Therefore, a high approval rate of Russia does not necessarily equal anti-Westernism. Rather, positive views of Russia coexist with a favorable take on the European Union (EU) (yet less so on NATO), which underwrites a fundamental ideational ambivalence about Bulgaria’s positioning between East and West.

This ambivalence and Bulgarians’ long-standing Russia dilemma have been reactivated politically, societally and in foreign policy terms within the context of the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine. On the political level, a number of influential actors have opposed a more determined Bulgarian policy condemning Russia’s military aggression and committing wide-ranging aid to Kyiv. For instance, General Stefan Yanev was dismissed from his post as Minister of Defense due to his public espousal of the Kremlin line that it is conducting a ‘special military operation’ – rather than a war – in Ukraine. Such kowtowing to the official Russian view is arguably also shared by a section of the Bulgarian military elite, which has harbored pro-Russian ideological sentiments. In a show of support, the Reserve Officers and Noncommissioned Officers Union issued a statement deploring Yanev’s dismissal. Moreover, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) – which is one of the four parties constituting the coalition government of Bulgaria, is rhetorically opposed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while refusing to back sanctions on Russia as well as sending military support to Kyiv. Last but not least, far-right nationalist, pro-Russian party Vazrazhdane (translated as Revival) has lent vociferous support to the Kremlin’s political agenda, actively and continuously disseminating pro-Kremlin disinformation in Bulgaria.

On the societal level, opinion polls have consistently shown through the years that the Bulgarians are among the nations in Europe – but also in the world more widely, that hold some of the most positive views of Russia. It might be expected that at least a part of the pro-Russian section of Bulgarian society may rethink their positions in light of the Kremlin’s military aggression. Recent opinion polls show that while in the period between 2020 and2022, approval ratings of Russian President Putin among Bulgarians amounted to around 55%, in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine there has been a drastic change. Positive views of Putin have declined twofold, whereas, in a mirror image, negative views have increased more than twofold. Nevertheless, this may represent a short-term plunge since pro-Kremlin disinformation has proliferated exponentially in the Bulgarian (social) media environment. For example, conspiracy theories about supposedly US-operated bio labs in Ukraine, the wider post-Soviet space and in Bulgaria are rife. Anti-NATO propaganda has also been significantly amplified, further accompanied by the propagandist goal to establish an equivalence between weapons exports and Bulgaria’s direct involvement in a military conflict with Russia.

The proliferation of pro-Russian stances and sentiments in the realm of domestic politics and among society has also affected Bulgaria’s foreign policy behavior. Sofia has stated its adherence to a united EU and NATO response to Russian aggression and pledged humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But it has not committed itself to weapons supplies. Such a position distances Bulgaria from the EU’s historic decision to provide around €500 million in arms and other types of aid to Ukraine. Nevertheless, the announcement that Bulgaria will not renegotiate a new contract with Gazprom, thus not renewing the current contract for the supply of gas which expires at the end of 2022, signals a willingness to clamp down on the country’s dependence on Russian energy and start a gradual process of breaking Moscow’s economic sway.

Overall, the Russian war on Ukraine has reignited deep-seated Bulgarian dilemmas and doubts about the country’s situated-ness between East and West. Suggestions that Sofia should assume a ‘mediating’ and even neutral role between Russia and Ukraine, which would seemingly align with the country’s positive perceptions of Russia and political orientation to the West, in reality significantly undermine the quality of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU and NATO. An image of unreliability is further consolidated in the eyes of the country’s European and American partners. Hence, a rethinking of the domestic political and international implications of Russophile sentiments is paramount to forging a more determined presence of Bulgaria in the West.