Vučić in Beijing: Complains about the EU, but ties Serbia ever more closely to China

Vučić went to Beijing with a double message: on the one hand, he presented himself as the leader of an EU candidate country that is being "pushed" and "conditioned" by Brussels, and on the other hand, he is seeking to transform China into an increasingly important pillar of Serbian politics and economy.

This is the essence of the contradiction, the more it complains about European pressure, the more it gives Beijing space to entrench its influence in Serbia.

The narrative of “EU pressure” serves Vučić on several fronts. Domestically, it justifies the slowdown in the integration process: it is not Belgrade’s fault, but Brussels’ “excessive demands.” On the diplomatic front, the complaints create the idea that Serbia is forced to look for other partners because the EU imposes conditions that conflict with the way Serbia is governed and political decision-making is done. This allows Vučić to sell the balancing act between West and East as a “realistic” policy, not as a gradual departure from the European path.

China, in this scheme, is the ideal partner, offering investments, loans and infrastructure projects without the strong transparency mechanisms that the EU requires. When a government can sign direct agreements, without tenders and without lengthy public debate, it gains political speed. And speed is the golden coin for a leader who measures success by “work done” and visible projects. This is also the explanation why Chinese loans are seen as more attractive: not necessarily because they are better financially, but because they are simpler politically.

But here begins the problem for European aspirations. The EU accession process is not just a path for funds, it is a path for standards. If Serbia gradually replaces the European model of financing (with rules, tenders, transparency) with the Chinese model (with direct agreements and political pragmatism), it is not simply “balancing” the EU, but is building a parallel system that weakens the logic of integration.

Even more significant is that ties with China are no longer limited to the economy. Cooperation has expanded into the military field: arms supplies from China, joint training of special units, a rapprochement that creates not only contracts, but also dependence and interaction of security structures. The moment cooperation takes this form, the relationship with China is no longer “business”, it is a strategic orientation. This makes it more difficult for Serbia to be seen as a candidate country that is gradually harmonizing with the EU and the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

In Beijing, Vučić may present “EU pressure” as a reason to demand more economic and political space from China. But the reality is that much of this pressure stems from Serbia’s inconsistency with EU foreign policy, especially in relation to Russia.

The rejection of sanctions against Moscow puts Belgrade on a different course from Brussels. This choice then produces consequences, stagnation in integrations, less political trust and more demands for alignment. Vučić presents this as unfair pressure; the EU sees it as a lack of coherence from a candidate country. Here, Beijing offers Vučić a way out, support that does not require alignment with European standards.

Another node where the Serbia-China rapprochement naturally strengthens is the language of sovereignty. Serbia seeks support for its position on Kosovo, knowing that China does not recognize Kosovo and, in return, expects support for the “one China” principle and for its stance on Taiwan. Therefore, this creates a pure alliance of interests as each side uses the other to strengthen its argument in the international arena. In this context, Vučić sells China as a partner that “respects our path”, a deliberate contrast to the EU, which conditions.

Even the symbolism that Vučić raises by going to China after Trump and Putin is part of internal and external communication. He seeks to appear as a high-ranking leader, with access to global centers of power, to send a message that Serbia is not dependent on a single axis. But this symbolism does not change the main fact, the agreements that are expected to be signed and the investments that are promised deepen Serbia's inclination towards China, while the path towards the EU becomes more unclear.

In the end, complaints against Brussels in Beijing are not just diplomatic “ventilation”. They are part of a strategy, to normalize the idea that Serbia can move towards the EU only nominally, while in practice building economic, technological and security dependence on China. And the more this dependence grows, the more difficult it will be to turn back without political costs, without economic costs and without clashing with EU expectations.

The GeoPost