After the expiration of New START, Putin's weapons under scrutiny: Propaganda or military reality?

When the New START Treaty between Russia and the US expired on February 5, it marked the first time since the 1970s that there was no mechanism in place to limit Moscow and Washington's nuclear arsenals.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to test nuclear delivery systems under combat conditions in Ukraine, launching the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile at targets near the Dnipropetrovsk regions (November 21, 2024) and Lviv (January 8, 2026). Other examples of Putin’s new “wonder weapons” include the Burevestnik nuclear missile, the Poseidon nuclear-armed unmanned torpedo, the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, and the Kinzhal and Zircon air- and sea-launched hypersonic missiles.

However, despite high praise from pro-Kremlin media, these systems have proven to be of little practical value, either failing to deliver on their exaggerated promises or proving completely useless. In fact, they have made Russia less secure: by expanding the boundaries of what is permissible in the nuclear sphere, Moscow is giving its American adversary the green light to test weapons of a similar class.

Since late October 2025, Vladimir Putin has been regularly reporting ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) on Russia's successful development of cutting-edge weapons, which, according to him, are unmatched in their technical and tactical characteristics. If one were to believe Putin's words, Russia's achievements in armaments would be truly astonishing:

A task once considered “unattainable in the near historical future” has been accomplished.
“Strategic security and parity have been ensured for decades — one can say with conviction for the entire 21st century.”
The innovations will find application in the country's "national economy", the lunar program, Arctic exploration, the electronics industry and the development of supercomputers.
“We have amassed a veritable treasure trove of materials, technologies, unmanned systems, software, and new digital solutions and components.”

All of these achievements were named with reference to the Burevestnik missile and the Poseidon underwater vehicle projects. Alongside them, Putin regularly mentions other “unparalleled” weapons. At an expanded meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry board in December 2025, he announced the deployment of the Oreshnik land-based mobile missile system on combat duty and spoke of a weapon that “no one else in the world possesses” – the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.

Putin first spoke about Russia’s array of new “wonder weapons” in 2018, during a speech to the Federal Assembly. He accompanied his speech with animated clips depicting the possible use of the missiles, while suggesting that he was ready to negotiate with Russia’s Western partners on an “up-to-date and visionary system of international security and the sustainable development of civilization.”

Since then, the Burevestnik, Poseidon, and Avangard intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Kinzhal and Zircon air- and sea-launched hypersonic missiles, have consistently served as instruments of Kremlin power. During the war in Ukraine, the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile was added to Putin’s arsenal of “wonder weapons.”

Since 2018, Putin's "wonder weapons" have served as a tool of Russian foreign policy.

The problem is that, despite rhetorical claims of extraordinary combat capabilities, the true military value of these “Putin-Waffen” remains questionable. The use of the Oreshnik and Kinzhal in the war against Ukraine has so far had no significant impact on the course of the conflict, and some of the promised missiles do not yet exist in the form of tested and ready-to-deploy systems, according to available reports. However, even in this state, Russia’s “wonder weapons” pose threats that the United States and Europe cannot ignore.

Vladimir Putin personally announced the first combat use of the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile in a “hypersonic, non-nuclear configuration” in a special speech on November 21, 2024. According to him, Oreshnik was launched into Ukraine “in response to the use of American and British long-range weapons on Russian territory” – in other words, as a signal to Kiev’s Western allies.

According to the Russian leader's account, Oreshnik possesses the power of a kinetic impact comparable to that of a meteor, powered by nuclear warhead elements that heat up during flight to temperatures matching those on the surface of the Sun:

“As for the rocket we used, its destructive elements are quite powerful, heating up to a temperature of 4,000 degrees [°C]. I’m not sure – you can look it up on the Internet – but on the surface of the Sun, I think, the temperature is 5,600–6,000 degrees. So it’s comparable to the temperature on the surface of the Sun. The kinetic impact has a powerful impact, like a falling meteorite. We know from history how and where meteorites fell and what the consequences were. That was enough to create entire lakes, right? What resulted in the Tunguska event? It’s widely known. The same applies to our rocket. The damage is very serious: everything in the center turns to ash, disintegrates into its constituent elements, and objects located three or four – maybe even more – floors below ground level are also affected. And these are not just ordinary floors – these are reinforced structures. "The force of the blow is colossal."

The Insider analyzed in detail why Putin’s claims about the Oreshnik’s characteristics are dubious at best. In November 2024, inert nuclear warheads were used as the missile’s payload, and despite the appearance of very impressive footage showing the separation of the nuclear warhead from the individually reentry vehicles (MIRV) over the city of Dnipro, no significant damage was caused to the declared target, the Yuzhmash missile enterprise. Notably, satellite images of the site taken after the attack show neither a lake nor buildings reduced to ashes.

However, Putin was so enamored with the new missile’s capabilities that he first declared – at a meeting of the Russian Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, surprisingly – that Russia no longer needed to use nuclear weapons provided it possessed a sufficient number of Oreshniks. Then, during his end-of-year conference call in December 2024, he proposed holding a “high-tech duel of the 21st century”:

“Let [Ukraine's Western allies] set a target to hit, say, Kiev — concentrate all their air and missile defense forces there — and we will carry out an attack with Oreshnik and see what happens. We are ready for such an experiment.”

In June 2025, at a meeting with graduates of military academies, Putin said that Oreshnik had “proven itself very well in combat conditions.” A month later, he announced the production of the first serial Oreshnik system and its first serial missile.

The second combat use of Oreshnik took place on the night of January 8-9, 2026. Unlike the first time, the target was not a strategic enterprise, but an aircraft repair plant in Lviv. As before, the attack was declared a “response” to actions by Ukrainian forces – specifically a drone raid on Putin’s residence in the Novgorod Region on December 29, 2025 (an alleged attack unsupported by objective evidence). As in the case of the Dnipro Pivdenmash plant, there have been no reports of critical damage to the facilities in Lviv – let alone the emergence of a lake in its place.

According to expert assessments, the Oreshnik missile has limited combat benefits in a non-nuclear configuration due to its high cost and low accuracy. Furthermore, both launches were carried out from the Kapustin Yar test range (although the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the attack on Lviv was carried out by a mobile ground-based system), which means that its use with a nuclear warhead is so far limited to fixed test sites. The mobile Oreshnik launchers still lack the infrastructure necessary for full deployment, suggesting that Russia’s recent announcement that it will be deployed in Belarus under “combat-ready” status is little more than a political gesture.

However, even the nominal deployment of the system on Belarusian territory poses a challenge to European security. While it remains unclear how much independence the authorities in Minsk might have when it comes to decisions regarding the use of the system, in December 2025 the Russian state news agency TASS published – and later retracted – a report that said Belarusian authorities could independently determine the targets for Oreshnik.

Burevestnik: “A flying Chernobyl”

On October 26, during a visit to the command post of a military unit fighting in Ukraine, Putin received a report on the successful tests of the 9M730 Burevestnik missile (NATO reporting name: SSC‑X‑9 Skyfall) from Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. According to their conversation, the missile had traveled 14,000 kilometers and stayed in the air for 15 hours. Putin asked him pointedly if this was the maximum result that could be expected from the Burevestnik, and Gerasimov immediately confirmed that “it was not the limit.”

Because it is powered by an integrated nuclear unit, the Burevestnik is often described as an “unlimited-range missile.” In his address to the Federal Assembly in March 2018, Putin described it in the following terms:

“A low-flying, barely noticeable cruise missile carrying a nuclear warhead, with a virtually unlimited range, an unpredictable flight trajectory, and the ability to bypass interception lines, is invulnerable to all existing and future missile defense and air defense systems.”

Putin announced a “successful test” of the Burevestnik as early as October 2023, and two years later the final stage of testing of the missile appears to have taken place. Although Norwegian intelligence confirmed a test launch from a range on Novaya Zemlya, no radioactive traces were detected after that. However, it cannot be ruled out that Russian engineers managed to solve the problem of contamination caused by the “flying Chernobyl”.

According to some calculations, a system matching the Burevestnik's claimed parameters would violate the laws of physics. A similar American project – Pluto, developed in the 1960s – was canceled because the rocket was too expensive and too complex to operate.

So far, the greatest threat posed by the Burevestnik has been to Russia's own population, not to foreign adversaries. In August 2019, an explosion apparently linked to tests of the missile's nuclear power unit occurred in the Arkhangelsk Region, killing at least seven people (five died on site, while two later died of acute radiation sickness). Several others were exposed to significant doses of radiation, which increased in the Severodvinsk area as a result of the accident.

So far, the greatest threat posed by the Burevestnik has been to Russia's own population.

According to US estimates, of at least 13 tests that took place between 2016 and 2019, only two were even “partially successful”. However, from the Kremlin’s perspective, a missile like the Burevestnik is necessary in a context where the US is expanding its missile defence capabilities. However, even by Putin’s own account, putting the Burevestnik into combat duty will require significant adjustments to the available nuclear infrastructure, and possible scenarios for its use in war still need to be “worked out”.

Poseidon: "A megaproject that loses endless money"

In March 2018, Putin called the upcoming Poseidon (an unnamed system at the time) “fantastic”:

“Russia has developed unmanned underwater vehicles that can operate at great depths — very great depths, I would say — and at intercontinental ranges at speeds many times higher than those of submarines, the most advanced torpedoes, and all types of surface ships — even the fastest ones. They are simply fantastic. They are low-noise, very maneuverable, and practically invulnerable to the enemy.”

In October 2025, Putin added the following details to the description:

“Poseidon’s power far exceeds that of even our most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, the Sarmat… Moreover, in terms of speed and operational depth, there is nothing like this unmanned vehicle in the world, and none is likely to appear in the near future, nor are there any means of interception.”

The 2M39 Poseidon system (NATO reporting name: Kanyon) is an autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle (AUV) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Russian propaganda regularly uses Poseidon when making explicit threats – most famously Dmitry Kiselyov’s 2022 monologue in which he painted a vivid rhetorical picture of the United Kingdom sinking into the “abyss of the ocean”:

“A Russian unmanned underwater robot, Poseidon, approaches its target at a depth of one kilometer at a speed of 200 kilometers per hour. There is no way to stop this underwater drone. Its warhead has a power of up to 100 megatons. An explosion of this thermonuclear torpedo off the coast of Britain would raise a giant wave – a tsunami up to 500 meters high. Such a wall of water would also carry extreme doses of radiation. Sweeping through the British Isles, it would turn whatever might remain of them into a radioactive desert, unsuitable for anything for a long time.”

The Kremlin likely believes that a “nuclear super-torpedo” could cause damage on such a scale, but according to calculations and modeling, an underwater nuclear explosion could not produce a catastrophic radioactive tsunami. Nor could Poseidon be tested as a complete weapons system, rather than being tested as individual components.

Poseidon is incapable of causing anything resembling a catastrophic radioactive tsunami.

Moreover, the project appears to be one of the most expensive and resource-intensive in the modern history of Russia’s defense industry, and is therefore often described as a “megaproject that wastes money endlessly.” In addition to massive investments in research and supporting infrastructure, Poseidon requires the use of colossal special-purpose nuclear submarines (SSGN-type carriers) as launch platforms. During the war against Ukraine, the fleet received the first such submarine, the BS‑329 Belgorod, and two more carrier submarines, the Khabarovsk and the Ulyanovsk, are currently under construction.

Theoretically, a system like Poseidon represents a new class of nuclear weapon, combining the functions of an unmanned underwater vehicle and a torpedo. However, there is still no confirmed evidence of its existence as a fully operational system.

Putin himself stated that, so far, it has only been possible to launch Poseidon from its carrier submarine and then activate the vehicle’s onboard nuclear power unit, which kept the torpedo moving for “a certain period of time.” Pavel Luzin, a visiting scholar at the Fletcher School at Tufts University and a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, told The Insider that Poseidon should not be considered a weapon, but rather a deep-sea robot.

Avangard: “A sliding Eskimo pie”

In his address to the Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018, Putin described the Vanguard as follows:

“Unlike existing types of warhead delivery vehicles, this system is capable of flying in dense layers of the atmosphere at an intercontinental distance at hypersonic speeds, exceeding Mach 20. While moving towards its target, the glider… performs deep maneuvers – both lateral (over several thousand kilometers) and in altitude. This makes it absolutely invulnerable to any air and missile defense systems… It moves towards the target like a meteorite, like a burning sphere, like a fireball. The temperature on the surface of the vehicle reaches 1,600-2,000 degrees Celsius, while the glider remains reliably controllable.”

Later, Putin commented that the hypersonic glide vehicle resembles an Eskimo pie — a chocolate-covered piece of vanilla ice cream that was invented in South Dakota in 2021 and became popular in the Soviet Union — in its characteristics:

“The first gliding flying vehicles were developed back in the 1980s. We called this Avangard… In the late 1980s, we tried to create such a system. We failed because we didn’t have the right materials – that was the problem. It melts in flight like an Eskimo pie, yet the control signals still get through. These are the results made possible by new materials.”

The Insider has examined which known laws of physics would be dangerously violated by such a system. First, it is unclear how to maintain “reliable control” over a missile warhead moving inside a plasma cloud impenetrable to any external signals. Second, such a construction would have difficulty accelerating to speeds exceeding Mach 20 once it enters the dense layers of the atmosphere – and its stated maximum speed is an almost inconceivable Mach 27, approximately 33,000 km/h (20,505 mph).

The 15P771 Avangard missile system consists of a booster rocket – namely, the modernized UR‑100N intercontinental ballistic missile (NATO reporting name SS-19 Stiletto) – and the 15Yu71 hypersonic glide vehicle. Officially, the system’s test cycle was completed after its fifth launch on December 26, 2018. Since 2019, Avangard systems have entered service with the 13th Missile Division of the Strategic Missile Forces. As Luzin emphasized to The Insider, even if the real characteristics of Avangard match the declared ones, the actual use of the weapon “makes little sense.”

Sarmat: "A powerful fighter with complex electronics"

The 15A28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile is a truly unique military system: very few, if any, strategic weapons are adopted and put into combat duty after just a single test. Officially, this test took place in April 2022, and no further attempts have been reported since then. Putin observed the launch from a distance, declaring at the time that “there is nothing like it in the world and there will not be for a long time.” Naturally, the successful test of the missile was treated as a signal to the “collective West”:

“This truly unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our Armed Forces, reliably ensure Russia's security from external threats, and make those who try to threaten our country in the heat of furious and aggressive rhetoric think twice.”

It was the Sarmat that, in December 2022, inspired what may go down in history as the most clichéd music video of all time. In it, camouflage-clad State Duma deputy Denis Maidanov sings his patriotic ballad “Sarmatushka,” in which the missile is described as “a powerful fighter with complex electronics.”

In addition, Russian cities regularly organize motor rallies of so-called “Sarmatmobiles”: inexpensive compact Russian cars that carry a model of a Sarmat missile on the roof — emblazoned with the words “To Washington!” When one of the “Sarmatmobiles” was involved in a traffic accident in December 2023, the news attracted the attention of federal media.

Six launches were planned as part of the Sarmat flight design test program: one in 2021 and five in 2022. Although only one test had been reported up to that point, in February 2023 Putin announced that the missile was entering combat duty, and in September of the same year Yuri Borisov, head of the Roscosmos space agency, reported that the system had been put “on duty.”

However, in November 2025, Putin said that the Sarmat should be put on combat test duty before being put on full combat readiness. Indirect evidence suggests that several missile tests during this period failed.

Several Sarmat tests since 2022 have ended in failure

According to US officials, during Joe Biden’s visit to Ukraine in February 2023, Russia failed another Sarmat launch test. In November of the same year, a typical flight restriction notice was issued for the Plesetsk Cosmodrome ahead of the upcoming tests, but the launch did not take place (apparently for technical reasons). In September 2024, satellite images emerged showing the aftermath of an explosion at a Sarmat silo launch facility in Plesetsk, leading OSINT specialists to conclude that the missile had exploded inside the silo. Most recently, in November 2025, a missile exploded in the initial phase of flight at the Yasny Launch Base in the Orenburg Region. This was most likely another failed Sarmat test.

In short, the Sarmat missile (intended to replace the Soviet-era Voyevoda missiles) still requires technical improvement, while the service life of the Voyevodas expired long ago, but has been continuously extended (in particular, full maintenance of these missiles became impossible after 2014 due to the severance of ties with their developer, the Ukrainian Pivdenne Design Bureau). Under these conditions, Russia must either quickly resume the Sarmat testing program or reallocate nuclear warheads from the Voyevodas to other available delivery systems.

Kinzhal: "A not-quite-hypersonic missile"

The 9‑A‑7760 Kinzhal missile (NATO classification: AS‑24 Killjoy) has also been praised by Putin as a “special” weapon: a “high-precision hypersonic missile system” with a claimed speed of Mach 10 and air-launch capability that, according to him, “is guaranteed to penetrate all existing… and future air and missile defense systems.”

However, during the war in Ukraine, it became clear that the Kinzhal's actual performance is far from what Putin claimed.

First, the Kinzhal missile has not lived up to its reputation as a “high-precision weapon.” Satellite images of the attacks on the Starokostiantyniv air base in the Khmelnytskyi Oblast — home to F-16 fighter jets transferred to Ukraine — show impact craters hundreds of meters from the reinforced concrete shelters where the aircraft are located.

Second, the Kinzhal does not meet the criteria for a hypersonic missile, as it travels at the relevant speeds only along part of its flight path (and, presumably, without the ability to maneuver at those speeds). According to estimates by Ukrainian military experts, in the final phase of flight, the missile moves at a “sub-hypersonic” speed of only Mach 3 (hypersonic speed is generally defined as Mach 5 and above).

Recently, Ukrainian air defense forces using US-made Patriot systems in the PAC-3 configuration have repeatedly reported intercepting Kinzhal missiles. The first such interception occurred in May 2023 over the Kyiv Region.

Zircon: "Five minutes from Washington"

The 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missile (NATO reporting name: SS-N-33), a sea-based system with a range of 1,000 km and a speed of Mach 10, is described by Putin as a weapon capable of “performing strategic tasks.” Kremlin propaganda places the missile alongside other “wonder weapons,” portraying it as “impervious to interception” and “changing the principles of naval strategy,” with a flight time of “five minutes to Washington.” (The Insider has explained why Zircon is unlikely to qualify as a “wonder weapon.”)

Theoretically, such a missile poses a significant threat to any surface target: modern radars can detect it at a distance of approximately 12-14 nautical miles, which at a speed of Mach 5-6 leaves a ship's air defenses only about 15 seconds to react. In practice, however, according to Ukrainian estimates, the Zircon travels at about Mach 5.5 during the cruise phase, accelerates briefly to Mach 7.5 before entering the target area, and then slows to about Mach 4.5 in the final phase of its trajectory.

The Russian Navy has relatively few Zircon-compatible submarines and surface carriers – and more importantly, it lacks the ability to acquire targeting data. Furthermore, the limited number of missile strikes carried out against Ukrainian territory are said to have been launched not from ships or submarines, but from modified land-based launch systems in Crimea.

How Putin's "wonder weapons" affect Russia's security and the war in Ukraine

Putin’s “wonder weapons” have so far had no discernible impact on the course of the war in Ukraine. Neither the Oreshnik demonstration attacks, nor the occasional launches of Zircon missiles, nor the relatively regular launches of Kinzhal missiles have brought anything resembling a turning point in the fighting (while other categories of “Putin-Waffe” are not at all suited to conventional conflict).

In terms of strategic stability, “unique” weapons are more likely to harm Russia’s national security in the long term. With the formal expiration of the New START treaty on February 5 (the agreement had largely lost its practical value after mutual inspections ceased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and Putin demonstrated its lack of practical relevance when he announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in February 2023), various “wonder weapons” will pose a significant obstacle to concluding any new agreement to replace it.

"Unique" weapons harm Russia's national security in the long term.

A new arms control instrument would need to include criteria for assessing a wide range of possible future developments: taking into account new types of delivery systems such as Burevestnik and Poseidon, responding to resulting changes in the doctrinal approaches of potential adversaries, and implementing countermeasures in response to the development of similar classes of weapons or means to counter them.

Rather than serving as tools of deterrence and power projection, these Russian inventions not only raise doubts about their claimed technical capabilities – they have already prompted the United States to make preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing.

The Geopost