Terrorist attack in Banjska: A sign of deliberate destabilization in northern Kosovo

In the year leading up to the attack in Banjska, northern Kosovo was a tense area with an increased presence of Serbian parallel structures and associated criminal groups. The Kosovar government’s decision to convert illegal Serbian license plates was met with disobedience, walkouts from institutions, the construction of barricades, and violent protests by Serbian groups in northern Kosovo.

Serbia supported these actions in political discourse or did not distance itself from them, while the Serbian List and figures such as Milan Radoićić played a key role in organizing resistance structures against the Kosovar authorities.

In November 2022, the mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovar institutions marked the beginning of institutional paralysis in the north. This left a security and governance vacuum that was exploited by parallel structures and organized criminal groups, often linked to influential Serbian politicians and businesspeople in Belgrade.

Despite public statements of support for dialogue with Kosovo and verbal agreement to the basic agreement in March 2023, Serbia refused to sign and fully implement it. At the same time, it intensified its rhetoric against Kosovo’s statehood, accompanied by an aggressive international diplomatic campaign and indirect support for destabilization on the ground.

The boycott of local elections by Serbs in the north (April 2023) led to an anomalous situation: institutional power without local legitimacy, which Belgrade then used as an argument to question the authority of Albanian mayors. This development was accompanied by violent protests in May 2023, in which dozens of KFOR soldiers were injured.

In the summer, there were reports of weapons stockpiling, paramilitary training, and unusual movements in northern Kosovo, particularly in the area around the village of Banjska. These activities took place quietly, with indications of logistical support from individuals with links to Serbian structures—as was later confirmed by the involvement of Milan Radoić.

On September 24, an organized, armed, and trained Serbian group carried out a well-coordinated attack on the Kosovo police in the village of Banjska. Police Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed during the terrorist attack. Heavy fighting broke out between Kosovar special forces and the attackers, during which three of the attackers were killed and others retreated.

Large arsenals of weapons, armored vehicles, and high-quality military equipment were seized. The state leadership condemned the attack, describing it as an act of aggression against the state of Kosovo.

This was not a sporadic incident, but a planned terrorist operation intended to challenge Kosovo’s sovereignty and provoke a larger conflict.

The identification of Milan Radoićić as the leader of this group and his public admission of having organized the attack raised serious suspicions of indirect involvement by the official authorities in Belgrade, or at least of their tolerance of his activities.

The attack was also condemned as a terrorist attack by the US, the EU, and NATO, which called on Serbia to cooperate in the investigation.

Analysis:

The terrorist attack on September 24, 2023, in Banjska i Zvecani represents the most dangerous point of escalation in tensions in northern Kosovo since 2004.

This attack was not a local incident, but a well-planned act with political and military motives, aimed at creating a precedent for destabilization, possibly the creation of a de facto autonomous zone, similar to the Donbass model in Ukraine.

This attack reinforced Kosovo’s arguments regarding the danger of parallel structures in the north.

To make it clearer that Serbia is behind the aggression in Banjska i Zvecani, we recall the reports in Serbian media outlets close to Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. They treated the terrorist attack in Banjska primarily as a tragic incident and an act that highlights the deep tensions in northern Kosovo.

Reports by Serbian state television RTS, the tabloid newspapers Alo, B92, the newspaper Vecernje Novosti, and Kosovo Online constructed a narrative of the events in Banjska that differed fundamentally from that of the Kosovar authorities and the international media. In addition, pro-Russian media outlets close to Vučić, such as Sputnik, Informer, and RT Balkan, emphasized what they described as the “harsh reaction of the US/EU towards Serbs” and accused the West of “never calling Albanians who kill Serbs terrorists” and “crying more for one Albanian policeman than for hundreds of Serbs killed.”

The use of the media as a strategic tool for political and psychological influence in the region and on the Serbian public, the avoidance of terms that could brand armed groups as terrorists, and the defense of key figures such as Radoičić downplay the role of Serbian groups in organizing the attack and portray it as a response to “pressure and discrimination against Serbs in the north.”/The Geopost/